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Separate substantive from statistical hypotheses and treat them differently
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2022
Abstract
I suggest addressing the problems Yarkoni identifies by separating substantive from statistical hypotheses, and treating them differently. A statistical test of experimental data only bears directly on statistical hypotheses. Evaluation of related substantive hypotheses requires an additional, qualitative inference to the best explanation. Statistical inference cannot do all of the work of theory choice.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
Dacey, M. (forthcoming). Evidence in default: Rejecting default models of animal minds. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1086/714799.Google Scholar
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