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The expressive rationality of inaccurate perceptions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 March 2017

Dan M. Kahan
Affiliation:
Yale Law School, P.O. Box 208215, New Haven, CT 06510. dan.kahan@yale.edu www.culturalcognition.net/kahan
Corresponding
E-mail address:

Abstract

This commentary uses the dynamic of identity-protective cognition to pose a friendly challenge to Jussim (2012). Like other forms of information processing, this one is too readily characterized as a bias. It is no mistake, however, to view identity-protective cognition as generating inaccurate perceptions. The “bounded rationality” paradigm incorrectly equates rationality with forming accurate beliefs. But so does Jussim's critique.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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