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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2009
In his article Elrod concentrates on an issue which was indeed vital to the Habsburg empire: the central idea of the pentarchy's international policy. At the Congress of Vienna, held after the end of the Napoleonic wars, the policy of the victorious powers was primarily oriented toward maintaining a balance of power and accepted the concept that the Great Powers were jointly responsible for keeping the peace. By the middle of the century at the latest there was an obvious change in motivation, for, under the ever increasing impetus of new ideas and new people, changes now came to be measured primarily on the basis of self-interest and only secondarily on the basis of their effect on international stability.
1 See ante, . p. 84.Google Scholar
2 Many of the ideas in these comments can be found in my articles on “Österreich und der deutsche Bund 1815ß und Könniggrätz,” in Österreich und die deutsche Frage im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Probleme der politisch-staatlichen und soziokulturellen Differenzierung im deutschen Mit-teleuropa. edited by Lutz, Heinrich and Rumpler, Helmut. In Wiener Beiträge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit. No. 9 (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik. 1981). pp. 92–116Google Scholar; and “Österreich und die Deutsche Frage zwischen 1848 und 1866/71. Konzeptionelles Dilemma und situative Probleme der Donaumonarchie gegenüber Deutschland,” in Die Deutsche Frage im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Referate und Diskussionsbeiträge eines Augsburger Symposions 23. bis 25. September 1981. edited by Becker, Josef and Hillgruber, Andreas.Google Scholar In Schriften der Philosophischen Fakultäten der Universilät Augsburg. No. 24 (Munich: Ernst Vögel, 1983), pp. 63–90. In these articles reference is made to additional literature related to this topic which is not specifically alluded to in these comments.Google Scholar
3 See ante, , p. 87.Google Scholar
4 See ante, , p. 90. To be sure. Elrod rightly stresses the existence of this dilemma over and over again. See particularly the article dealing with the Italian question, which is listed in n. 48 of his essay.Google Scholar
5 See ante, . p. 93.Google Scholar
6 These and the remarks that follow in regard to the Rechberg-Biegeleben controversy are to be found in Srbik, Heinrich von and Schmid, Oskar (eds.), Quellen zur deutschen Politik Österreichs 1859–1866, Vol. IV. In Deutsche Geschichtsquellen des 19. Jahrhunderts, No. 72 (Oldenburg, Berlin: Stalling, 1937), Doc. No. 1,818.Google Scholar
7 Ante, , p. 95.Google Scholar
8 Elrod has also confirmed this. See ante, , p. 93. The resort chief&s responsibility for the conduct of policy must be stressed, for even when they had independent, even willful subordinates, these subordinates were bound by their instructions. By the same token, Elrod's observations in n. 14 that only one written “rebuke” by Rechberg can be found in regard to Biegeleben's style must be modified. Inasmuch as verbal (possibly also general) instructions were not transmitted, but are hardly to be ruled out, the conclusion that Rechberg had otherwise given Biegeleben a free hand is not viable.Google Scholar
9 These are actually Rechberg's words! An untenable notion, even though the foreign minister repeatedly expressed it and tried to use a French diplomat as the chief witness.
10 See ante, , pp. 87–88.Google Scholar
11 In the discussion that follows I will endeavor to present reflections about the possible results of a consistent execution of one of the two opposing views without discussing whether it can be characterized as a typical erhaltungspolitisch or realpolitisch course and without considering the fact that it is almost never possible to follow a single consistent policy in day-to-day politics, which is, after all, dependent on a large number of factors.
12 Ante, , p. 95.Google Scholar
13 Ante, , p. 92.Google Scholar
14 In the end, Biegeleben had justified his proposals for a new resolute course with the phrase, “if peace is to be maintained.”
15 Bismarck was clearly trying to bring about the unification of Germany by following a “farà da se” principle. It still remains to be proved whether this is actually to be attributed to the strict rejection of any compensation for France (with whose help it would have been possible to bring about a kleindeutsch solution essentially without risk) or whether it cannot also be explained in the light of national aspirations (for example, Alsace-Lorraine)—the proof of which, of course, indeed would show the practitioner of Realpolitik suddenly as a practitioner of Prinzipienpolitik and prove how close together these areas can be in the field of politics and how fluid the line that separates them is.
16 Oncken, Hermann, Die Rheinpolitik Kaiser Napoleons III. von 1863 bis 1870 und der Ursprung des Krieges von 1870/71. Nach den Slaatsakten von Österreich, Preußen und den siiddeutschen Mittelstaaten, Vol. I. In Deutsche Geschichtsquellen des 19. Jahrhunderts, Vol. XIX (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1926).Google Scholar
17 The words are those of Heinrich Friedjung.
18 Ante, , p. 96.Google Scholar
19 Compare with the following remarks in the Austrian ministerial council on October 31, 1864, after Mensdorff's appointment: “Experience shows that the employment of the middle-sized German states in the campaign against Prussia has been detrimental and led to pre-sumptuousness on their part…. One should not surround them with the aura of a political significance which these small states do not possess.” Srbik, and Schmid, , Quellen zur deutschen Politik Österreichs, Vol. IV, Doc. No. 1,831.Google Scholar
20 Ante, , p. 97.Google Scholar