¹ Moritz, Csàky, “Mitteleuropäische Perspektiven—Überlegungen zu Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts,” in Zukunft beginnt im Kopf. Festschrift 75 Jahre Urania, ed. Walter Ernst, Caesar and Markus, Jaroschka (Graz, 1994), 58.Google Scholar

² Alfred, Pfeil, Der Völkerbund (Darmstadt, 1976), 62 ff.:Google Scholar America did not ratify the Treaty of Versailles because of internal political conflicts (the Wilson-Lodge conflict concerning the Monroe Doctrine), which is why America did not become a member of the League of Nations. Apart from Wilson, Germany, France, and Great Britain also presented their ideas for a peace program; the German suggestions, however, were not accepted; see ibid., 40 ff.

³ Alfred, Ableitinger, “Der ‘Deutschlandkomplex’ der Österreicher in der Ersten Republik,” in Österreich 1934–1938, ed. Desput, Joseph F. (Graz, 1984), 174.Google Scholar For Austrian identity, see Ernst, Bruckmüller, Nation Österreich. Kulturelles Bewuβitsein und gesellschaftlich-politische Prozesse (Vienna, 1996);Google Scholar and Kurt, Skalnik, “Auf der Suche nach der Idenrität,” in Österreich 1918–1938, ed. Erika, Weinzierl and Kurt, Skalnik (Graz, 1983),11–24.Google Scholar

⁴ See Michael, Jungwirth, “In Brüssel gilt Österreich nicht als Anhängsel Bonns,” Kleine Zeitung, July 17, 1996, 4–5. In his article the reporter comments on the accusations of the chief whip of theSocial Democratic Party, Kostelka, that the decisions of the Austrian members of the European Parliament in Strasbourg show a leaning toward Germany. The fear of a German-Austrian axis, however, is not a thing of the past: according to Jungwirth's inquiries in Brussels, diplomats from Spain, Ireland, and France occasionally have to answer questions about this in their home countries.Google Scholar

⁵ Martin, Polaschek, “Die ‘platonische Volksabstimmung’. Die Maßinahmen zu einer österreichweiten Anschlußbefragung im Jahr 1921 im Spannungsfeld von Bund und Ländern,” Zeitschrift für Neuere Rechtsgeschichte 20 (1998): 49–70.Google Scholar

⁶ Maurice, Baumont, Aristide Briand. Diplomat und Idealist (Göttingen, 1966), 54.Google Scholar Clemenceau, in contrast, had been “chef de guerre.” See also Hans, Herzfeld, “Der Erste Weltkrieg und der Vertrag von Versailles,” in Die Europtäer und ihre Geschichte, ed. Leonhard, Reinisch (Munich, 1961), 173.Google Scholar

⁷ Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard N., Paneuropa (Vienna, 1923).Google Scholar The idea of a “United States of Europe” always gained momentum when the Old World lay in ruins because of armed conflicts; see Claus, Schöndube and Christel, Ruppert, Eine Idee setzt sich durch (Bonn, 1964).Google Scholar For the geographical concept of Europe, see Delgado, M. and Lutz-Bachmann, M., Herausforderung Europa. Wege zu einer europäischen Identität (Munich, 1995), 9–27.Google Scholar

⁸ Before the Anschluss in 1938, Coudenhove had to leave the country. Allthe documents of the main secretariat were seized by the National Socialists and transferred to Moscow by the Red Army after World War II.

⁹ Prominent politicians supporting Pan-Europe included Chancellor Seipel, who was chairman of the Viennese Pan-European movement; the deputy chairman was Karl Renner,who accepted that function only because others convinced him that Pan-Europe would be an “Anschluss all around.” The Pan-German representative Franz Dinghofer became third deputy chairman. The president of the German Reichstag, Paul Löbe, was appointed chairman of the German section of the movement, his deputy being Reichsminister Erich Koch-Weser. In France, Minister Louis Loucheur was persuaded to assume that function. Members of the movement also included, among others, Léon Blum and Joseph Barthelemy.

¹⁰ See Walter, Lipgens, “Europäische Einigungsidee 1923–1930 und Briands Europaplan im Urteil der deutschen Akten,” in Historische Zeitschrift (Munich) 203 (1966): pt. 1, 46–89, pt.2, 316–63.Google Scholar He does not share Coudenhove's opinion expressed in the “Pan-European manifesto”: Coudenhove excluded the Soviet Union from Pan-Europe because it was not a democratic state, but advocated the maintenance of relations with the Soviet Union, planning to integrate it and all countries into Pan-Europe to form a quasi League of Nations. See “Das Paneuropaische Manifest,” Paneuropa 1 (1924): 3–19.Google Scholar

¹¹ Lipgens, , “Einigungsidee,” 71. During a conversation between the German and British ambassadors, the latter declared that his government rejected the memorandum, and the former answered that Germany would only advocate a “United Europe” if Britain followed suit;Google ScholarKarl Dietrich, Erdmann, “Der Europaplan Briands im Licht der britischen Akten,” in Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, vol. 1 (Offenburg, 1950), 25.Google Scholar

¹² Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard N., “I. Paneuropa Kongreß,” Paneuropa 2, no. 13/14 (Vienna, 1926): 2 ff. About 2,000 people attended the congress. Chancellor Rudolf Ramek represented Austria, while France, Czechoslovakia, and Finland delegated ambassadors and many politicians and artists sent messages of greeting.Google Scholar

¹³ See Karl, Holl, “Europapolitik im Vorfeld der deutschen Regierungspolitik. Zur Tätigkeit proeuropäischer Organisationen in der Weimarer Republik,” in Historische Zeitschrift 219 (1974): 86: because of Coudenhove's personality, the congress developed into a “quasi-aesthetic, but nevertheless very impressive event.”Google Scholar

¹⁴ Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard N., Europa erwacht! (Paris, 1934), 105.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See Walter, Hagemann, “Die Europaidee bei Briand und Coudenhove-Kalergi. Ein Vergleich,” in the commemorative volume published on the occasion of the seventieth birthday of Ludwig Bergstrasser, Aus Geschichte und Politik. Festschrift zutn 70. Geburtstag von Ludwig Bergstrasser, ed. Alfred, Herrman (Düsseldorf, 1954), 153–66.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Pfeil, Völkerbund, 59.Google Scholar

¹⁷ NPA, “Denkschrift,” 2.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., 3. All four items are ibid., 3 ff.

²⁰ Ibid., 7.

²¹ The discussion here provides a detailed insight into the history of Austrian diplomacy during the interwar years. It forms the central part of this article, since it comprises the hitherto unpublished reports of Austrian diplomats from almost all European capitals. In some countries, for example, in Spain and Portugal, Austria was represented by coaccredited representatives or honorary consuls. Thus, no reports from these two countries to the Foreign Ministry are available. For the history of Austrian diplomacy, see Walter, Rauscher, “Strukrur und Organisation des österreichischen Auswärtigen Dienstes,” in Auβlenpolitische Dokumente der Republik Österreich 1918–1938, vol. 1, Selbstbestimmung der Republik 21.10.1918–14.03.1919, ed. Klaus, Koch, Walter, Rauscher, and Arnold, Suppan (Vienna, 1993), 17–29.Google Scholar

²² NPA, Vienna, May 21, 1930; May 1930; and May 27, 1930.

²³ Oskar, Kleinschmied, Schober (Vienna, 1930), 226.Google Scholar

²⁴ See Béla, Rásky, “Die außienpolitischen Beziehungen Österreichs zu den Nachfolgestaaten der Donaumonarchie (1918–1938),” in Handbuch des politischen Systems Österreichs. Erste Republik 1918–1933, ed. Emmerich, Tálos et al. (Vienna, 1995), 652–64.Google Scholar

²⁵ The cooperation between these states also manifests itself in their answer to Briand's memorandum. The member states of the Little Entente had drawn up their reply notes in joint talks. The notes were submitted to Aristide Briand by the Romanian minister of foreign affairs, Georg Mironescu, on July 9, 1930. On that occasion he let Briand know that the states of the Entente wanted to discuss their reservations with Briand outside the framework of the official note.

²⁶ NPA, Prague, May 31, 1930.

²⁷ NPA, Warsaw, July 16, 1930.

²⁸ Neuilly (Bulgaria): Nov. 27, 1919; Trianon (Hungary): June 4, 1920.

²⁹ NPA, Budapest, June 10, 1930; July 31, 1928; and June 4, 1930. See also Emma, Kövics, “Die Frage der europäischen Einheit und die politische öffentliche Meinung in Ungarn,” in Das Parteienwesen Österreichs und Ungarns in der Zwischenkriegszeit, ed. Anna, Drabek, Richard Georg, Plaschka, and Helmut, Rumpler (Vienna, 1990), 211–26.Google Scholar

³⁰ NPA, Budapest, June 4, 1930, received in Vienna on July 25, 1930.

³¹ NPA, Sofia, June 11, 1930.

³² NPA, Athens, June 8, 1930, and July 19, 1930.

³³ NPA, Bern, June 18, 1930.

³⁴ Actually, this did not happen before August 4, 1930; NPA, box 331, Geneva, Aug. 5, 1930.

³⁵ NPA, Bern, June 23, 1930. Boncour was minister of agriculture during Herriot's third cabinet; prime minister from Dec. 14, 1933, to Jan. 29, 1934, and foreign minister concurrently until Jan. 27, 1934; Bertold, Spuler, Regenten und Regierungen der Welt, Minister-Ploetz, pt. 2, vol. 4 (Würzburg, 1968), 197 ff.Google Scholar

³⁶ NPA, Bern, June 18, 1930. As envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, Hoffinger gathered internationally acknowledged expert knowledge; Rauscher, “Struktur,” 26.

³⁷ NPA, Bern, June 18, 1930.

³⁸ NPA, Rome, July 19, 1930. See also June 12, 1930.

³⁹ Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

⁴⁰ NPA, The Hague, July 5, 1930.

⁴¹ NPA, Stockholm, July 24, 1930. See also June 6, 1930.

⁴² NPA, Helsingfors, June 27, 1930.

⁴³ For British-Austrian relations, see Anna, Orde: “Großibritannien und die Selbständigkeit Österreichs 1918–1938,” in Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte (Stuttgart) 28 (1980): 224–47.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ NPA, London, May 20, 1930.

⁴⁵ NPA, London, July 21, 1930: Report of the Austrian ambassador Georg Franckenstein to the Foreign Ministry.

⁴⁶ NPA, Geneva, June 9, 1930: Alexis Léger was the head of cabinet of Aristide Briand and main author of the memorandum.

⁴⁷ NPA, Vienna, July 9, 1930.

⁴⁸ Statement by Julius Curtius cited by Lipgens, “Einigungsidee,” 341.

⁴⁹ The special position of the Austrian embassy in Berlin meant that the ambassador was appointed according to political considerations. The ambassador at that time, Felix Frank, had formerly been vice-chancellor in Seipel's second cabinet and was a member of the Pan-Germanic Party. He was vice-chancellor and minister of the interior in Seipel I-III (1922–1924) and minister of justice in Seipel II-III (1923–1924); Rauscher, , “Struktur,” 26, and Spuler, Regenten, 425–26.Google ScholarSee also Jan, Tombinski, Österreich und die europäische Integration (Graz, 1989), 291; Curtius is quoted as saying: “From the very beginning, we have used Briand's plan for Europe to implement the idea of political cooperation with Austria in one concrete individual field. The initiative for this originated both on our side and in Austria.”Google Scholar

⁵⁰ NPA, May 21, 1930.

⁵¹ NPA, Berlin, June 3, 1930: Germany's negative position was based on the following items: (1) The plan's emphasis on political considerations at the expense of economic aspects, and its aiming at an Eastern Locarno, (2) undermining of the League of Nations, and (3) competition with the League of Nations. Since only member states of the League of Nations could become members, Turkey and Russia were excluded from the plan, which had a negative impact on German-Russian relations.

⁵² NPA, BKA Vienna, June 13, 1930.

⁵³ Josef Winfried, Ewald, “Die deutsche Außienpolitik und der Europaplan Briands” (D.Phil, diss., University of Marburg, 1961), 40.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Julius, Curtius, Bemühungen um Österreich. Das Scheitern des Zollunionsplans von 1931 (Heidelberg, 1947), 26.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ The quotations are from NPA, Vienna, July 12, 1930.

⁵⁶ NPA, Berlin, July 12, 1930.

⁵⁷ NPA, answer of the Austrian Federal government to the memorandum of the French government of May 1, 1930, concerning the establishment of a European union, p. 7.

⁵⁸ NPA, Geneva, June 13, 1930.

⁵⁹ Lipgens, , “Einigungsidee,” 333–34.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ NPA, Vienna, July 24, 1930.

⁶¹ Angelika, Berchtold, “Die politischen französischen-österreichischen Beziehungen zwischen 1924–1934. Versuch einer Darstellung” (D.Phil, diss., University of Vienna, 1969), 111.Google Scholar

⁶² NPA, Vienna, July 24, 1930; Legate Norbert Bischoff to the envoy Alfred Grünberger.Google Scholar

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⁶⁵ Hubert, , Schober, 395–96.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Wiener Zeitung, Sept. 14, 1930, 1–2.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Curtius, , Bemühungen um Österreich, 27.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Goldinger, and Binder, , Geschichte der Republik Österreich, 179–80.Google Scholar

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⁷⁰ Hubert, , Schober, 395.Google Scholar

⁷¹ U.S. president Herbert, Hoover, quoted in Steininger, “12. November 1918 bis 13. März 1938,” 118 n. 63.Google Scholar

⁷² The reply notes were printed in Paneuropa 6 (1930): Czech note, 301; Romanian note, 298; Polish note, 295; Hungarian note, 303; Swiss note, 338; Italian note, 291.Google Scholar

⁷³ Tagespost (evening), Sept. 9, 1930, 6.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Tagespost (morning), Sept. 9, 1930, 3.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Tagespost (evening), May 23, 1930, 1.Google Scholar

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⁷⁸ Hans, Hattenhauer, Europäische Rechtsgeschichte (Heidelberg, 1994), 671.Google Scholar