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FRAND Defences Against the Grant of Injunctive Relief: Applying Huawei v ZTE in Singapore and China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 November 2021

Joseph Lau*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore, Singapore
*
Corresponding author. E-mail: lawlcyj@nus.edu.sg
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Abstract

From the size of A4 paper to 5G in the telecommunications sector, standards are ubiquitous. Standard essential patents (SEPs), which protect technology essential to standards, enable their proprietors to gain significant market power. Antitrust authorities therefore scrutinize the exercise of SEPs for breaches of competition law. In this regard, the ability of SEP proprietors to obtain injunctions against implementers as a remedy for infringement of SEPs where licensing negotiations have broken down or are ‘ongoing’ has proven controversial. Some fear that this enables SEP proprietors to threaten injunctions unless implementers agree to unfair, unreasonable, or discriminatory terms. In Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:477, the Court of Justice of the European Union identified circumstances where a SEP proprietor's application for injunctive relief as a remedy for infringement of its SEP constitutes an abuse of a dominant position, with the classification of the SEP proprietor's application as being abusive forming a ‘FRAND Defence’ which implementers may invoke against the grant of the injunction requested. This article analyzes whether this approach can be replicated by the Singapore Courts and whether the Chinese Courts, which have already dealt with SEP licensing disputes, adopt a similar approach.

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Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the National University of Singapore

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References

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3 Case C-170/13 [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:477.

4 ibid paras 61, 63, 65–67 and 71.

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6 Huawei (n 3) para 41.

7 In 2019, Singapore was ranked #2 in the world for the strength of its intellectual property protections. See Klaus Schwab (ed), The Global Competitiveness Report 2019 (World Economic Forum 2019) 507 <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2019.pdf> accessed 4 Jun 2021.

8 In 2019, Singapore's Parliament passed the Intellectual Property (Dispute Resolution) Act 2019 (No 23 of 2019). The Act ‘takes significant steps forward in positioning Singapore as a hub for international [IP] dispute resolution’. See Singapore Parliament, Second Reading of the Intellectual Property (Dispute Resolution) Bill, 5 Aug 2019, Singapore Parliament Reports, vol 94 (Louis Ng Kok Kwang MP).

9 Insofar as the SEP in question concerns voluntary national, industry or local Chinese standards (as classified under the Chinese system), or an international standard. See Section I below for an elaboration on the Chinese system of classifying standards.

10 Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, (adopted at the 10th National People's Congress on 30 August 2007, effective 1 August 2008).

11 Though see n 195 below for recent developments which may qualify this analysis.

12 Mark A Lemley, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations’ (2002) 90(6) California Law Review 1889, 1896.

13 European Commission, Competition Policy Brief: Standard-Essential Patents (European Union 2014) 1 <https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2014/008_en.pdf > accessed 13 Jul 2020.

14 Oke Odudu, ‘Intellectual Property Rights’, in David Bailey & Laura Elizabeth John (eds), Bellamy & Child: European Union Law of Competition (8th edn, Oxford University Press 2018).

15 Alison Jones, ‘Standard-Essential Patents: FRAND Commitments, Injunctions and the Smartphone Wars’ (2014) 10(1) European Competition Journal 1, 2.

16 Richard H Stern, ‘Who Should Own the Benefits of Standardization and the Value It Creates?’ (2018) 19(1) Minnesota Journal of Law, Science and Technology 107, 115–116.

17 Renata B Hesse, ‘Response to Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Incorporated’ (US Department of Justice, 2 Feb 2015) <www.justice.gov/atr/response-institute-electrical-and-electronics-engineers-incorporated> accessed 4 Jun 2021, cited in Stern (n 16) 116.

18 European Commission (n 13) 1–2.

19 Stern (n 16) 116.

20 ibid 115.

21 ibid.

22 European Commission (n 13) 2.

23 Hui Yan & Jiaqian Li, ‘Balancing Between ‘De Facto’ and ‘De Jure’ in Standard-setting Strategy by a Latecomer Country: The Case of ICT Industry in China’ (2018) 8(12) Developing Country Studies 24, 24.

24 The Standardization Law of the People's Republic of China (revised and adopted at the 12th National People's Congress on 4 November 2017, effective 1 January 2018).

25 Standardization Law (n 24); Piergiuseppe Pusceddu, ‘Hic sunt dracones? Mapping the Legal Framework of China's Innovation Policy: Standardization and IPRs’ (2020) 51(5) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 559, 578. For the benefit of interested readers, Pusceddu's article provides a fuller explanation of the categories of Chinese standards.

26 Nadia Soboleva & Lawrence Wu, ‘Standard Setting: Should There Be a Level Playing Field for All FRAND Commitments?’ (2013) 1 CPI Antitrust Chronicle, 2–3.

27 ibid 4.

28 European Commission (n 13) 3.

29 ibid.

30 European Commission, (n 13) 3; Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) para 92 (Birss J).

31 Jones (n 15) 5; European Commission (n 13) 3.

32 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/47, art 102.

33 Jones (n 15) 16.

34 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) para 631 (Birss J); Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2344, [2018] RPC 20 para 216 (Lord Kitchin).

35 C-170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp [2015] ECLI: EU:C:2015:477, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet) para 57; Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2344, [2018] RPC 20 para 226 (Lord Kitchin).

36 ibid.

37 Huawei (n 3) paras 21–22.

38 ibid para 24.

39 ibid para 27.

40 ibid.

41 ibid para 41.

42 ibid para 43.

43 Rupprecht Podszun, ‘SEP Litigation and Huawei: Negotiations in the Shadow of Competition Law’ (2017) 62(4) The Antitrust Bulletin 786, 797.

44 Huawei (n 3) paras 56 and 71. The English Courts have emphasized that Huawei was not laying down mandatory conditions, non-compliance with which would render proceedings for injunctive relief in respect of SEP infringement a breach of Article 102 of the TFEU. Instead, account must be had of the circumstances of the case. This does not mean that the roadmap in Huawei is irrelevant – an SEP proprietor's failure to alert the implementer of the alleged breach of the SEP was held to itself render an application for injunctive relief in respect of infringement of the relevant SEP abusive, while the rest of the roadmap for SEP licensing negotiations set out in Huawei will constitute a valuable guide as to whether such an application is abusive and whether an implementer is willing to take a license on FRAND terms. See Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) para 741 (Birss J); Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2344, [2018] RPC 20 paras 269 and 271 (Lord Kitchin); Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies (UK) Co Ltd [2020] UKSC 37, [2021] 1 All ER 1141 para 149–157 (Lords Reed, Hodge, Briggs and Sales and Lady Black) (judgment delivered after this article was accepted for publication).

45 Though see n 44 above.

46 Huawei (n 3) paras 61 and 71.

47 ibid paras 63 and 71.

48 ibid.

49 ibid paras 65 and 71.

50 ibid para 66.

51 ibid para 67.

52 Huawei (n 3) paras 41 and 52–54.

53 ibid para 71.

54 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC 2988 (Pat) [724] (Birss J).

55 ibid para 744(vii).

56 Sean-Paul Brankin et al, ‘Huawei: Injunctions and Standard Essential Patents – Is Exclusion a Foregone Conclusion?’ (2015) 30(1) Antitrust 80, 83–84 <https://www.crowell.com/files/Huawei-Injunctions-Standard-Essential-Patents-Is-Exclusion-a-Foregone-Conclusion.pdf> accessed 4 Jun 2020.

57 European Commission, ‘DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses’, 4 <https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf> accessed 4 Jun 2020.

58 Rhodri Thompson et al, ‘Article 102’, in David Bailey & Laura Elizabeth John (eds), Bellamy & Child: European Union Law of Competition (8th edn, Oxford University Press 2018).

59 TFEU (n 32).

60 Brankin et al (n 56).

61 Huawei (n 3) paras 52–53 and 73.

62 Brankin et al (n 56).

63 ibid.

64 Jorge L Contreras et al, ‘The Effect of FRAND Commitments on Patent Remedies’ in C Bradford Biddle et al (eds), Patent Remedies and Complex Products: Towards a Global Consensus (Cambridge University Press 2019). See for example Jorge L Contreras and Peter Georg Picht, ‘Are PAEs Different? The Legal Treatment of Patent Assertion Entities in Europe and the United States’ (2018) 2(3) IEEE Communications Standards Magazine 80; Alison Jones & Renato Nazzini, ‘The Effect of Competition Law on Patent Remedies’, in C Bradford Biddle et al (eds), Patent Remedies and Complex Products (Cambridge University Press, 2019).

65 Brankin et al (n 56) 82.

66 Nicolas Petit, ‘Huawei v ZTE: Judicial Conservativism at the Patent-Antitrust Intersection’ (2015) 2 CPI Antitrust Chronicle 1, 5.

67 Haris Tsilikas, ‘Huawei v ZTE in Context – EU Competition Policy and Collaborative Standardization in Wireless Telecommunications’ (2017) 48(2) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 151, 172–173.

68 Huawei (n 3) para 42.

69 Unwired HC (n 54) para 95 (Birss J).

70 This is not to say that UK cases considering Huawei are not useful. Precedent from other common law jurisdictions is regarded by Singapore Courts as persuasive (see Kevin Y L Tan, ‘As Efficient as the Best Businesses: Singapore's Judicial System’ in Jiunn-Rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang (eds), Asian Courts in Context (Cambridge University Press, 2014)). However, in using UK cases discussing Huawei to predict the likely reception of the Huawei framework for SEP licensing negotiations before Singapore Courts, one must be careful not to rely on conclusions of the UK Courts driven by their need to comply with EU law at the time their judgment was handed down.

71 The status of CJEU jurisprudence before the UK Courts after 31 December 2020 is a complicated issue. Interested readers may consult the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 and the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (Relevant Court) (Retained EU Case Law) Regulations 2020.

72 See n 44 above.

73 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies (UK) Co Ltd [2020] UKSC 37, [2021] 1 All ER 1141 para 157 (Lords Reed, Hodge, Briggs and Sales and Lady Black) (judgment delivered after this article was accepted for publication).

74 Woo Pei Yee, ‘Rethinking a Principle Underlying Contract Law’ (2002) 22 Singapore Law Review 132, 175.

75 See Helmut Heinrichs in Palandt Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (61st edn, C H Beck 2002) and Giorgio Cian & Alberto Trabucchi, Commentario breve al codice civile (5th edn, CEDAM, 1997), cited in Martijn W Hesselink, ‘The Concept of Good Faith’, in Arthur Hartkamp et al (eds), Towards a European Civil Code (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2004).

76 Robert S Summers, ‘“Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code’ (1968) 54(2) Virginia Law Review 195, 262.

77 Edward P Belobaba, ‘Good Faith in Canadian Contract Law’, in Law Society of Upper Canada, Commercial Law: Recent Developments and Emerging Trends (Richard De Boo Publishers 1985), cited in Ter Kah Leng, ‘Good Faith in the Performance of Commercial Contracts Revisited’ (2014) 26(1) Singapore Academy of Law Journal 111, 122.

78 [1992] 2 AC 128 (HL).

79 ibid 138.

80 [1996] 134 FLR 211, 224–225 (a decision of the National Native Title Tribunal).

81 [2012] 4 SLR 738 (CA) para 45.

82 Huawei (n 3) para 65.

83 ibid para 66.

84 Western (n 80).

85 Huawei (n 3) paras 65–66.

86 HSBC (n 81).

87 ibid.

88 Huawei (n 3) paras 65 and 67.

89 Panatron Pte Ltd v Lee Cheow Lee [2001] 2 SLR(R) 435 (CA) paras 14–15.

90 HSBC (n 81).

91 Huawei (n 3) para 66.

92 Michael Furmston, et al, Contract Formation: Law and Practice (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2016) para 13.39.

93 Huawei (n 3) para 72.

94 ibid para 76.

95 HSBC (n 81) paras 32–48.

96 Andrew Phang Boon Leong & Tham Chee Ho, ‘Privity of Contract’, in Andrew Phang Boon Leong (ed), The Law of Contract in Singapore (Academy Publishing 2012).

97 Contract (Rights of Third Parties) Act (Cap 53B, 2002 Rev Ed), s 2(1)(a).

98 Caslav Pejovic, ‘Civil Law and Common Law: Two Different Paths Leading to the Same Goal’ (2001) 32(3) Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 817, 822.

99 Translating into ‘stipulation for a third party’. See Gary F Bell, ‘Formation of Contract and Stipulations for Third Parties in Indonesia’, in Mindy Chen-Wishart et al (eds), Formation and Third-Party Beneficiaries (Oxford University Press 2018).

100 Unwired HC (n 54) para 106 (Birss J).

101 Huawei (n 3) para 22.

102 Unwired HC (n 54) para 101 (Birss J).

103 Unwired HC (n 54) para 160 (Birss J).

104 ibid para 86.

105 ibid paras 100 and 139 (Birss J).

106 ibid paras 721–723.

107 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2344, [2018] RPC 20 para 27 (Lord Kitchin).

108 Unwired HC (n 54) para 723.

109 ibid paras 100 and 139 (Birss J).

110 ibid paras 160 and 723.

111 Unwired HC (n 54) paras 721–723 (Birss J).

112 ibid.

113 Burton Ong, ‘The Interface Between Intellectual Property Law and Competition Law in Singapore’, in Steven D Anderman (ed), The Interface Between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy (Cambridge University Press 2007).

114 (Cap 50B, 2006 Rev Ed).

115 Lim Chong Kin & Scott Clements, Competition Law in Singapore (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International BV 2016) para 252.

116 [2010] SGHC 97 para 72.

117 Robert Ian McEwin, ‘Introduction’, in Robert Ian McEwin et al (eds), Competition Law in Singapore – Principles, Practice and Procedure (LexisNexis 2007).

118 TFEU (n 32).

119 Competition Act 1998, s 18(2)(a).

120 Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2016) 351–352, cited in Khoo & Sng (n 1) 90.

121 Richard Whish, ‘Abuse of a Dominant Position’, in Lim Chong Kin & Cavinder Bull (eds), Competition Law and Policy in Singapore (2nd edn, Academy Publishing 2015).

122 McEwin (n 117).

123 Daniel Koh et al, Law and Practice of Injunctions, Interim Measures and Search Orders in Singapore (Sweet & Maxwell/Thomson Reuters Asia 2017) para 1.001.

124 ibid.

125 [2011] 2 SLR 232 para 113.

126 [2015] 2 SLR 630 paras 64–65.

127 HSBC (n 81) para 33.

128 Marcel Fontaine, ‘Concluding Report’ in International Chamber of Commerce (ed), Formation of Contracts and Precontractual Liability (The Dossiers of the Institute of International Business Law and Practice, ICC Publication no 440/9, ICC Publishing SA 1990) 345.

129 Singapore Parliament, Second Reading of the Competition Bill, 19 Oct 2004, Singapore Parliament Reports, vol 78, col 873 (S Iswaran MP, Deputy Speaker of Parliament).

130 European Commission, ‘Setting out the EU Approach to Standard Essential Patents’ COM (2017) 712, 10.

131 McEwin (n 117); Khoo & Sng (n 1) 87.

132 Singapore Parliament, Second Reading of the Competition Bill, 19 Oct 2004, Singapore Parliament Reports, vol 78, col 864 (Vivian Balakrishnan MP, Senior Minister of State for Trade and Industry).

133 Josef Drexl, ‘Is There a ‘More Economic Approach’ to Intellectual Property and Competition Law?’ in Josef Drexl (ed), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property and Competition Law (Edward Elgar 2008).

134 Pearl Lee, ‘Singapore Needs to Base Its Growth on Productivity and Innovation: Ong Ye Kung’ The Straits Times (25 Jan 2017), cited in Lin, ‘Private Equity in Singapore’, in Dora Neo et al (eds), Financial Services Law and Regulation (Academy Publishing 2019).

135 Report of the Committee on the Future Economy: Pioneers of the Next Generation (Committee on the Future Economy 2017) ii, 8, 13 and 29 <https://www.mti.gov.sg/-/media/MTI/Resources/Publications/Report-of-the-Committee-on-the-Future-Economy/CFE_Full-Report.pdf> accessed 4 Jun 2021.

136 Gerald F Masoudi, ‘Intellectual Property and Competition: Four Principles for Encouraging Innovation’ (The United States Department of Justice, 11 Apr 2006) <https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/intellectual-property-and-competition-four-principles-encouraging-innovation> accessed 4 Jun 2021.

137 ibid.

138 Anurag Gupta & Satyajeet Mazumdar, ‘Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights: Whether Conflicting or Complementing Each Other to Serve a Common Purpose?’ (2011) 2(2) Asian Journal of Law and Economics No 5, 11.

139 Khoo & Sng (n 1) 80.

140 Unwired HC (n 54) paras 139 and 723 (Birss J).

141 Koh et al (n 123) para 6.023.

142 Cap 221, 2005 Rev Ed.

143 [1895] 1 Ch 287.

144 Lionel Bently & Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 1250.

145 Norman V Siebrasse et al, ‘Injunctive Relief’ in C Bradford Biddle et al (eds), Patent Remedies and Complex Products (Cambridge University Press 2019).

146 HTC Corporation v Nokia Corporation (No 2) [2013] EWHC 3778 (Pat), [2014] RPC 30 para 8 (Arnold J); Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822 para 123 (Lord Neuberger).

147 Siebrasse et al (n 145).

148 Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822 para 123 (Lord Neuberger).

149 Alison Jones & Renato Nazzini, ‘The Effect of Competition Law on Patent Remedies’ in C Bradford Biddle et al (eds), Patent Remedies and Complex Products (Cambridge University Press 2019).

150 [2012] EWHC 1446 (Ch).

151 Jones & Nazzini (n 149).

152 ibid.

153 Nokia (n 150), quoted in Marc Dominic Mimler, ‘United Kingdom’ in Peter Chrocziel et al (eds), Intellectual Property and Competition Law (Kluwer Law International BV 2016).

154 Unwired HC (n 54) para 160.

155 Florian Mueller, ‘UK High Court Denies a Patent Injunction Against Nokia in Light of a FRAND Commitment’ (Foss Patents, 30 May 2012) <http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/uk-high-court-denies-patent-injunction.html> accessed 4 Jun 2021; Mimler (n 153).

156 David L Schwartz & Jay P Kesan, ‘Analysing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System’ (2014) 99(2) Cornell Law Review 425, cited in Nikolaus Thumm & Garry Gabison (eds), Patent Assertion Entities in Europe (European Union 2016) 15 <https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC103321/lfna28145enn.pdf> accessed 4 Jun 2021.

157 Thumm & Gabison (n 156) 15–16; Ruslan Galiakhmetov et al, ‘How to Enhance Patent Commercialisation? An Analysis of Patent Aggregators in Europe’ (2018) 22(4) International Journal of Innovation Management 1850040, 1850040–7.

158 Jorge L Contreras, ‘Assertion of Standards Essential Patents by Non-Practicing Entities’ in D Daniel Sokol (ed), Patent Assertion Entities and Competition Policy (Cambridge University Press 2017) 21.

159 Huawei (n 3) para 42.

160 George Wei, Some Thoughts on Intellectual Property Rights in Singapore: A Monograph for Gerald Dworkin (George Wei 2009) 214.

161 Ong (n 113). Global does not define the term ‘anti-competitive practice’ under section 55 of the PA. The phrase ‘anti-competitive conduct’ was merely used in the judgment to refer to conduct breaching the provisions of the CA (see Global (n 116) paras 16(a) and 25).

162 Wei (n 160).

163 For completeness, see Ng-Loy Wee Loon, Law of Intellectual Property of Singapore (2nd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014) paras [2.4.4] and [34.4.5] where Ng-Loy argues that section 55(2) of the PA merely illustrates one instance in which the court may exercise its powers under section 55(1). See also Ng-Loy Wee Loon, ‘Exploring Flexibilities Within the Global IP Standards’ (2009) 2 Intellectual Property Quarterly 162, where Ng-Loy argues that section 55 of the PA is consistent with Singapore's obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.

164 Huawei (n 3) para 42.

165 See n 25, above.

166 Though see n 195 below for recent developments which may qualify this analysis.

167 Chang Wang and Nathan H Madson, Inside China's Legal System (Chandos Publishing 2013) 75–76.

168 ibid 76.

169 Mingde Li, ‘Special Intellectual Property Courts in China’, in Nari Lee et al (eds), Governance of Intellectual Property Rights in China and Europe (Edward Elgar 2016).

170 Wang & Madson (n 167) 78.

171 ibid.

172 Claire Guo, ‘Intersection of Antitrust Laws with Evolving FRAND Terms in Standard Essential Patent Disputes’ (2019) 18(3) John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 259, 272.

173 Wang and Madson (n 167) 78; Xiaoye Wang et al, Competition Law in China (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International BV 2018) para 51.

174 Ni Zhenhua, ‘China Established a Centralized IP Appellate Tribunal’ (China Law Insight, 15 Jan 2019) <www.chinalawinsight.com/2019/01/articles/intellectual-property/china-established-a-centralized-ip-appellate-tribunal/> accessed 4 Jun 2021.

175 David Shen & Jill Ge, ‘Iwncomm v. Sony: First SEP-based Injunction Granted in China’ (Allen & Overy, 10 Apr 2017) <www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-and-insights/publications/iwncomm-v-sony-first-sep-based-injunction-granted-in-china> accessed 4 Jun 2021.

176 Susan Ning et al, ‘Injunctive Relief for Standard Essential Patents Holders Will be Restricted’ (King & Wood Mallesons, 6 Apr 2016).

177 Beijing Intellectual Property Court, 22 March 2017.

178 Ashish Bharadwaj & Dipinn Verma, ‘China's First Injunction in Standard Essential Patent Litigation’ (2017) 12(9) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 717, 717–719; Tristan Sherliker, ‘A Telecoms Blockbuster: Beijing High Court Upholds Patent Injunction in IWNCOMM v Sony’ (2018) 38(5) The Licensing Journal 10, 11.

179 Tristan Sherliker, ‘A Telecoms Blockbuster: Beijing High Court Upholds Patent Injunction in IWNCOMM v Sony’ (2018) 38(5) The Licensing Journal 10, 10 and 12.

180 Ashish Bharadwaj & Dipinn Verma, ‘China's First Injunction in Standard Essential Patent Litigation’ (2017) 12(9) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 717, 718.

181 Bharadwaj & Verma (n 180) 718.

182 Shen & Ge (n 175).

183 Yin Li et al, ‘New Developments on SEP-Related Disputes in China’ (Kluwer Patent Blog, 3 Jul 2017) <http://patentblog.kluweriplaw.com/2017/07/03/new-developments-sep-related-disputes-china/> accessed 4 Jun 2021.

184 ibid.

185 Guidelines for Patent Infringement Determination (2017) Beijing High People's Court, arts 149, 150 and 153. For an English translation, see ‘Guidelines for Patent Infringement Determination (2017), Beijing High People's Court’ (BJGY.chinacourt.gov.cn, 27 Apr 2017) <http://bjgy.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2017/04/id/2825592.shtml> accessed 4 Jun 2021.

186 Liyang Hou & Mengchi Tian, ‘IPR Protection and Antitrust Regulation of SEPs in China’, in Kung-Chung Liu & Reto M Hilty (eds), SEPs, SSOs and FRAND (Routledge 2019). As Article 149 of the Beijing Guidelines indicates, they may apply to cases where the SEP in question concerns international standards, in certain circumstances. See Li et al (n 183).

187 Huawei (n 3) para 65; Guidelines for Patent Infringement Determination (2017) (n 185) Art 153(2).

188 Huawei (n 3) para 66; Guidelines for Patent Infringement Determination (2017) (n 185) Art 153(2).

189 Huawei (n 3) para 65; Guidelines for Patent Infringement Determination (2017) (n 185) Art 153(3).

190 Li et al (n 183).

191 Sony Mobile Communications Products (China) Co, Ltd v Xi'an Xidian Jietong Wireless Network Communication Co, Ltd [2017] Jingmin 454.

192 Sherliker (n 179) 12.

193 The Guangdong Guidelines apply to SEP cases in the telecom industry but can be used ‘by reference’ in disputes in other industries. See Adrian Emch et al, ‘Guangdong Court Issues New Guidance for Standard Essential Patent Disputes’ (Hogan Lovells, May 2018) 3 <www.hoganlovells.com/~/media/shalib011174531v4clientalertguangdonghighcourtsepguidelines.pdf?la=en> accessed 4 Jun 2021.

194 Articles 10 - 14 of the Guangdong Guidelines, which deal with when a SEP proprietor's application for injunctive relief will be denied, focus on the relative fault between the parties for the breakdown in negotiations, seemingly without demanding a prior finding of a breach of Article 17 of the AML. Ben Ni, ‘Guidance on SEP Disputes in China’ (2018) 276 Managing Intellectual Property 13, 13-14.

195 Though see Article 27 of the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines on Intellectual Property Rights, officially released by China's State Administration for Market Regulation after this article was accepted for publication, which may provide a new, competition law-based route to dismissing the SEP proprietor's application.

196 See n 195 above.

197 Wang Liming & Xu Chuanxi, ‘Fundamental Principles of China's Contract Law’ (1999) 13(1) Columbia Journal of Asian Law 1, 16, cited in Chunlin Leonhard, ‘A Legal Chameleon: An Examination of the Doctrine of Good Faith in Chinese and American Contract Law’ (2010) 25(2) Connecticut Journal of International Law 305, 308–309.

198 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetongfa [Contract Law of the People's Republic of China] (Law Press China 2007) 3, cited in Leonhard (n 197) 308.

199 Huawei Technologies Co v InterDigital Communications, Inc, 2011 Shen Zhong Fa Zhi Min Chu Zi No 857 (Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court 2011); Huawei Technologies Co v InterDigital Communications, Inc, 2013 Yue Gao Fa Min San Zhong Ni No 305 (Guangdong High People's Court, 2013).

200 Jyh-An Lee ‘Implementing the FRAND Standard in China’ (2016) 19(1) Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law 37, 48.

201 Guangliang Zhang & Gary Zhang, ‘A Review of Huawei v IDC’ (Managing Intellectual Property, 27 Mar 2015) <http://www.managingip.com/Article/3440420/A-review-of-Huawei-v-IDC.html>, cited in Lee (n 200) 49.

202 Lee (n 200) 49.

203 ibid 49–50.

204 General Principles of the Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted at the 6th National People's Congress on 12 April 1986, effective 1 January 1987).

205 Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted at the 9th National People's Congress on 15 March 1999, effective 1 October 1999).

206 Lee (n 200) 56–57.

207 Bing Ling, Contract Law in China (Sweet & Maxwell Asia 2002) 50, Zhu Jingwen & Han Dayuan (eds), Research Report on the Socialist Legal System With Chinese Characteristics, vol 3 (Enrich Professional Publishing 2013) 17; Hui Zheng, ‘Overview’, in Yuanshi Bu (ed), Chinese Civil Law (Munchen: CH Beck; Oxford: Hart Publishing 2013), 5, cited in Lee (n 200) 60.

208 Mark A Lemley & Carl Shapiro, ‘A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents’ (2013) 28(2) Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1135, 1140, cited in Lee (n 200) 60.

209 Lee (n 200) 60.

210 Though, see n 195 above.

211 Though, see n 195 above.

212 Dan Prud'homme & Taolue Zhang, China's Intellectual Property Regime for Innovation: Risks to Business and National Development (Springer International Publishing 2019) v.

213 Fagerberg, Jan et al. , ‘Innovation and Economic Development’, in Hall, Bronwyn H & Rosenberg, Nathan (eds) Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, vol 2 (Elsevier 2010)Google Scholar, cited in Prud'homme & Zhang (n 212) 4.

214 Prud'homme & Zhang (n 212) 5.

215 Tao Kaiyuan, ‘China's Commitment to Strengthening IP Judicial Protection and Creating a Bright Future for IP Rights’ (World Intellectual Property Organization Magazine, Jun 2019) <www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2019/03/article_0004.html> accessed 4 Jun 2021.

216 Though see n 195 above.

217 Intellectual Property Dispute Resolution Committee, Final Report: Review of Singapore's IP Dispute Resolution Framework (Ministry of Law 2016) para 1.2.3.

218 Re Harish Salve [2018] 1 SLR 345 (CA) para 45.

219 Unwired HC (n 54) para 100 (Birss J).

220 Woo (n 74) 133.

221 Ying, Yeo Hwee, ‘Of Shifting Winds – Insured's Pre-contractual Duty of Good Faith in Singapore’ (2018) 30 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 345, 346347Google Scholar.

222 HSBC (n 81) para 40.

223 Pang's Motor Trading v Competition Commission of Singapore [2014] SGCAB 1 para 34.

224 Though, see n 195 above.

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