The law of standing—rules by which judges find whether a party may bring suit—has been liberalized in the federal courts to permit interest group disputes not ordinarily possible. Following an historical pattern of conflict containment within judicial-style processes, consumer and environmental groups contest corporate business decisions by challenging the legality of their regulatory or legislative authorization. The vagueness and substantive emphasis of the new rules give groups more influence in determining when courts will intervene in the affairs of the other branches; and the doctrine's recognition of noneconomic injuries logically forces judges to consider whether they may find standing for some “public interest” beyond a specific plaintiff. Changes in standing equalize social power; but the entanglement of courts in the puzzles of interest representation may restrict protections for strictly private litigants, and may further remove the political system from the Rule of Law.

The ambiguity of politicians' words and actions is sometimes attributed to rational seeking of support or votes. Such an explanation must clearly specify the preferences and decision processes among constituents and the calculations by politicians which make ambiguity seem attractive.

The leading effort of this sort is Shepsle's lottery theory, in which politicians take probabilistic stands on issues in order to appeal to risk acceptant, expected-utility-maximizing voters. But the lottery theory suffers from several difficulties. Its predictions are not strong; it can at best account for only certain kinds of observed ambiguous behavior; its main condition for the prediction of ambiguity—risk acceptance among constituents—may not be met; and the expected utility model of risky decision making is not well supported by available evidence.

An emphasis allocation theory is suggested as an alternative. According to it, ambiguity involves an effort to reduce the salience of conflictual matters (such as specific policy alternatives) in the evaluation of politicians, so that attention will be paid to consensual appeals (peace, prosperity, honesty in government).

The Center for Political Studies' 1972 presidential election survey was used to investigate the role that issue voting, ideology, candidate assessments, and partisan defections played in the Republican landslide of that year. An analysis of issue attitudes revealed a deep policy schism among the Democrats: McGovern supporters preferred liberal policy alternatives while Nixon Democrats favored distinctly conservative issue positions. Interitem correlations among various issues and a liberal-conservative scale showed the voters to have substantial attitude consistency. A normal-vote analysis of these issues demonstrated that the Vietnam war and social issue domains contributed more significantly to the explanation of the vote than did cultural or economic issues. The candidates were clearly perceived as having taken opposing issue positions, with Nixon's position the more preferred by a majority of the population. A proximity measure, computed as the discrepancy between perceived candidate issue position and the voter's policy preference, proved to be a better predictor of the vote decision than the voter's own issue position taken alone. Analyses of candidate assessments showed that McGovern was not a personally appealing candidate—a factor that allowed issue differences to gain maximal importance. The sharp intraparty polarization of Democrats over policy alternatives, a change in the educational composition of the electorate, a decrease in partisan identification, and a growth in partisan defection combined to suppress the impact of party identification as a determinant of the vote decision. It was concluded that the 1972 presidential race could be labeled “ideological” by comparison with past elections.

The analysis of military regimes, as opposed to military coups, has attracted comparatively little attention. This paper examines whether the political, military, and economic performance of systems which have experienced a military regime differs from the performance of systems which have not. The comparison between the performance of these two types of system is then used to examine the validity of the occurrence of a military regime as an indicator of instability. The population consists of all independent countries of the world. The time span examined is 1961–70. The comparison is made across a number of political, military, and economic variables. The basic comparison is elaborated by introducing controls for GNP, area, number of coups, and duration of the military regime. While the controls show a number of variations, the main summary finding is that it is easy to differentiate military and non-military regime systems in political terms, but not in military and economic terms. This finding seriously questions the utility of the occurrence of a military regime as an indicator of instability.

Bacon's New Atlantis presents a picture of human life governed by the new science to be produced by his reformation of the arts and sciences. Unlike his successor Hobbes, who forged a link between modern science and a certain, demonstrable doctrine of political rule, Bacon made no claim to found or present a political science. The reason for this is shown by an analysis of the political teaching of the New Atlantis. Bacon's political teaching is indirect, but it is the core of his comprehensive account of science and man. According to Bacon, the end of science is fully disclosed by political wisdom, and that wisdom shows the perfection of science to reverse the moral superiority of moderation over excess. The full meaning of Bacon's scientific utopia consists in a new stance toward the traditional problems of political philosophy.

Stephen Salkever in this Review (“Virtue, Obligation and Politics,” APSR 68 [March, 1974]) discusses two paradigms of politics: one based on the concept of virtue (ancient political philosophy), the other resting on obligation (modern political thought). We analyze the meaning and significance of these two paradigms in terms of the cognitive-developmental moral psychology common to Lawrence Kohlberg, John Dewey, and Jean Piaget. We first present the cognitive-developmental theory and its empirical findings. We then demonstrate that the politics of obligation falls within the virtue paradigm as a necessary stage in the development of virtue, which involves placing Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls within our developmental scheme. Finally, we explore the nature of understanding moral principles from within the cognitive-developmental perspective. In all this, we agree with Salkever's basic assumption that any account of political good (public as opposed to private) must be based on moral psychology, i.e., it must deal with the question of “What is good for the most inclusive of all publics, the human species?” We go two steps beyond Salkever, however, by showing the significance of the question, and by providing an answer to it (both of which bear upon the understanding of morality). An underlying purpose of our research is to present and to promote the political relevance and significance of moral psychology in general and cognitive development in particular.

The nature of community control ideology, its relation to more general political consciousness, and its social correlates are explored. The primary data are drawn from two main sources: a survey of the attitudes of 362 civic and political leaders in seven districts of New York City conducted in 1972 using a combination of structural and reputational indicators to identify the sample; and intensive participant observation in three of these districts during 1973–74, along with 175 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with individuals in district-level voluntary organizations, interest groups, political parties, poverty boards and agencies, and “street-level” bureaucratic roles.

Both quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that the great majority of leaders subscribes to a democratic rather than a race-conflict rationale for community control, but that there is a strong independent relationship between minority group status and operational support for community control. Possible explanations for this finding include the present interests of minority groups in American cities, the functional inadequacies of the political party structure, and the developmental history of the civil rights movement and its ideology. The relationship between race and community control may fade, however, if community control ceases to be a useful vehicle for advancing the interests of minority groups. One crucial determinant will be the identifications and beliefs of minority group members who are recruited into urban bureaucracies. Another is whether experience with decentralized city agencies indicates that movement toward increased community involvement in government leads, in fact, to enhanced power and patronage for minorities. The data point to a continuing attachment to the community control ideology but also a recasting of it in a more qualifiéd and complex form.