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Mao Tse-tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International Behavior*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Tang Tsou  and
Morton H. Halperin
Tang Tsou
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
Morton H. Halperin
Affiliation:
Harvard University
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Extract

Despite its political implications, the recent explosion of an atomic device has not greatly altered China's present military position vis-à-vis the West. By all standards except population and size, Communist China is still not a first-rate power. But she has nevertheless proceeded to engage the two superpowers simultaneously in a contest from her position of military and economic weakness. What is equally undeniable is that the success of Peking's foreign policy in the struggle with both superpowers, though limited and perhaps only temporary, has considerably exceeded anticipations based on her military and economic strengths. It is the contention of this paper that an explanation of these two striking facts must be sought in the nature of Mao's revolutionary strategy in the Chinese internal political-military struggle and his belief in the applicability of this strategy to the international arena and to other countries, particularly those in the underdeveloped areas. Mao dared to challenge the militarily and economically strong United States because his revolutionary experience proved to his own satisfaction that his integrated and comprehensive strategy would enable him presently to score political gains from a position of military inferiority, and ultimately enable him to achieve highly ambitious objectives with initially meager means in a protracted struggle.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 59 , Issue 1 , March 1965 , pp. 80 - 99
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1965

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References

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74 In a highly significant passage, Mao wrote: “[W]e must pay attention to the following principles in waging struggles against the die-hards. First the principle of self-defense. We shall never attack unless attacked; if attacked, we shall certainly counterattack. That is to say, we must never attack others without provocation; but once we are attacked, we must never fail to return the blow. Herein lies the defensive nature of the struggle. As to the military attacks of the die-hards, we must resolutely, thoroughly, utterly and completely smash them. Secondly, the principle of victory. We do not fight unless we are sure of victory; we must on no account fight without preparation and without certainty of the outcome. We should know how to utilize the contradictions among the die-hards and must not deal blows to many sections of them at the same time; we must pick out the most reactionary section to strike at first. Herein lies the limited nature of the struggle. Thirdly, the principle of truce. After we have repulsed the attack of the die-hards and before they launch a new one, we should stop at the proper moment and bring that particular fight to a close. In the period that follows we should make a truce with them. Then we should on our own initiative seek unity with the die-hards and, upon their consent, conclude a peace agreement with them. We must on no account fight on daily and hourly without stopping, nor become dizzy with success. Herein lies the temporary nature of every particular struggle. Only when the die-hards launch a new offensive should we retaliate with a new struggle. In other words, the three principles are ‘justifiability,’ ‘expediency’ and ‘restraint.’ Persisting in such justifiable, expedient and restrained struggles, we can develop the progressive forces, win over the middle-of-the-road forces, isolate the die-hard forces and make the die-hards chary of heedlessly attacking us … or heedlessly starting a large-scale civil war. And we can in this way win a favorable turn in the situation.” Ibid., p. 199.

75 This use of negotiations gave rise to the familiar pattern of “fight, fight—talk, talk.”

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90 Ibid., p. 150.

91 Ibid., pp. 207, 209–10.

92 Ibid., pp. 220, 225–6, 407.

93 Halperin, Morton H., China and the Bomb (New York, 1965), pp. 24–82Google Scholar. See also Hsieh, Alice Langley, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Age (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962)Google Scholar; Charles, David, “The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Teh-huai,” China Quarterly (10–Dec., 1961), p. 65Google Scholar.

94 Marshal Lo Jung-huan claimed that no better discussion of the question of war and peace is to be found than in a speech by Mao in 1945 which dealt with CCP-Kuomintang relations and the civil war in China. Work Correspondence, no. 8 (Feb. 6, 1961), p. 17.

95 Ibid., no. 17 (April 25, 1961), p. 19.