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Dynamics of Cosponsorship

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

Daniel Kessler  and
Keith Krehbiel
Daniel Kessler
Affiliation:
Stanford University
Keith Krehbiel
Affiliation:
Stanford University
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Abstract

Electoral-connection theories of legislative politics view bill cosponsorship as low-cost position taking by rational legislators who communicate with target audiences (e.g., constituents) external to the legislature. Legislative signaling games suggest a view of bill cosponsorship in which early cosponsors attempt to communicate to target audiences (e.g., the median voter) within the legislature. Using data from the 103rd U.S. House of Representatives, we show that the timing of legislators' cosponsorship decisions are more supportive of cosponsorship as intralegislative signaling than as extralegislative position taking. First, policy extremists on both sides of the political spectrum are more likely than moderates to be initial endorsers of legislative initiatives. Second, extremist-moderate differences diminish over the course of bill histories.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 90 , Issue 3 , September 1996 , pp. 555 - 566
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1996

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