Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-xtgtn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-24T20:34:33.943Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

A Dynamic Theory of Collective Goods Programs

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

David P. Baron
David P. Baron*
Affiliation:
Stanford University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

A collective goods program, such as an entitlement program, distributes benefits and costs according to constituents' characteristics. This paper presents a dynamic theory of the legislative choice of collective goods programs based on a sequential model of proposal-making and voting in a majority-rule legislature where the status quo in a session is given by the program last enacted. A stationary Markov perfect equilibrium is characterized for a unidimensional collective goods program and yields a generalized median voter theorem, comparative statics on preferences and legislative procedures, and a characterization of the dynamics of such programs. Equilibrium programs can expand or contract over time, but they ultimately converge to the median. On the path to that point, legislators may act strategically to address the durability problem—that a future legislature can undo the actions of the present legislature—by strategically positioning the status quo to limit the changes that future legislatures can make.

Type
Articles
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 90 , Issue 2 , June 1996 , pp. 316 - 330
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1996

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Baron, David P. 1993. “A Theory of Collective Choice for Government Programs.” Stanford University. Typescript.Google Scholar
Baron, David P. 1994. “A Sequential Choice Theory Perspective on Legislative Organization.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 19 (May):267–96.Google Scholar
Baron, David P., and Ferejohn, John A.. 1989. “Bargaining in Legislatures.” American Political Science Review 83 (December):1181–1206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baron, David P., and Kalai, Ehud. 1993. “The Simplest Equilibrium of a Majority Rule Division Game.” Journal of Economic Theory 61 (December):290–301.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barrilleaux, Charles J., and Miller, Mark E.. 1988. “The Political Economy of State Medicaid Policy.” American Political Science Review 82 (December):1089–1107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Black, Duncan. 1958. The Theory of Committees and Elections. London: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Calvert, Randall L. 1985. “Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty and Convergence.” American Journal of Political Science 29 (February):69–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Denzau, Arthur, and Mackay, Robert. 1983. “Gatekeeping and the Monopoly Power of Committees.” American Journal of Political Science 27 (November):740–61.Google Scholar
Diermeier, Daniel. 1995. “Commitment, Deference, and Legislative Institutions.” American Political Science Review 89 (June):344–55.Google Scholar
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.Google Scholar
Epstein, David. N.d. “An Informational Rationale for Committee Gatekeeping Power.” Public Choice. Forthcoming.Google Scholar
Fudenberg, Drew, and Tirole, Jean. 1991. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Hird, John A. 1991. “The Political Economy of Pork: Project Selection at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.” American Political Science Review 85 (June):430–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Inman, Robert P., and Fitts, Michael A.. 1990. “Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6:79–132.Google Scholar
Kramer, Gerald H. 1977. “A Dynamical Model of Political Equilibrium.” Journal of Economic Theory 16 (December):310–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ledyard, John. 1984. “The Pure Theory of Two-Candidate Elections.” Public Choice 44 (No. 1):7–60.Google Scholar
Lowi, Theodore H. 1964. “American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory.” World Politics 16 (July):676–715.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Maskin, Eric, and Tirole, Jean. 1994. “Markov Perfect Equilibrium.” Harvard University. Typescript.Google Scholar
McKelvey, Richard D., and Riezman, Raymond. 1992. “Seniority in Legislatures.” American Political Science Review 86 (December):951–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Riker, William H. 1980. “Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions.” American Political Science Review 74 (June):432–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Romer, Thomas, and Rosenthal, Howard. 1978. “Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo.” Public Choice 33 (No. 4):27–43.Google Scholar
Ways and Means Committee, U.S. House of Representatives. 1992. 1992 Green Book: Overview of Entitlement Programs. March 15, 1992. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.Google Scholar
Ways and Means Committee, U.S. House of Representatives. 1994. 1994 Green Book: Overview of Entitlement Programs. July 15, 1994. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.Google Scholar
Weaver, R. Kent. 1985. “Controlling Entitlements.” In The New Directions in American Politics, eds. Chubb, John E. and Peterson, Paul E.. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.Google Scholar
Weaver, R. Kent. 1988. Automatic Government: The Politics of Indexation. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.Google Scholar
Weingast, Barry R., and Marshall, William. 1988. “The Industrial Organization of Congress.” Journal of Political Economy 96 (February):132–63.Google Scholar
Wildavsky, Aaron. 1988. The New Politics of the Budgetary Process. Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman.Google Scholar