Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-55b6f6c457-kv5sj Total loading time: 0.212 Render date: 2021-09-26T13:52:26.759Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "metricsAbstractViews": false, "figures": true, "newCiteModal": false, "newCitedByModal": true, "newEcommerce": true, "newUsageEvents": true }

Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2014

William H. Riker*
Affiliation:
University of Rochester

Abstract

While contemporary political science (as, for example, in such subjects as political socialization, studies of public opinion, etc.) tends to emphasize the study of values and tastes (because of an assumption that political outcomes–like market outcomes–are determined by the amalgamation of individual preferences), the older tradition of political science emphasized the study of institutions. The line of research in political theory followed during the last generation has involved seeking an equilibrium of tastes; but it has revealed that such an equilibrium exists only rarely, if at all. The inference then is that prudence in research directs the science of politics toward the investigation of empirical regularities in institutions, which, though congealed tastes, are “unstable constants” amenable to scientific investigation.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1980

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Arrow, Kenneth J. (1963). Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Black, Duncan (1948). “On the Rationale of Group Decision Making.” Journal of Political Economy 56: 2334.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Black, Duncan (1958). The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Black, Duncan, and Newing, R. A. (1951). Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuation. Edinburgh: William Hodge.Google Scholar
Davis, Otto, and Hinich, Melvin (1966). “A Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society.” In Bernd, J. (ed.), Mathematical Applications in Political Science. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press.Google Scholar
Davis, Otto, Hinich, Melvin, and Ordeshook, Peter (1970). “An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process,” American Political Science Review 64: 426–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Downs, Anthony (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper.Google Scholar
Eliot, T. S. (1940). The Idea of a Christian Society. New York: Harcourt Brace.Google Scholar
Fishburn, Peter (1973). The Theory of Social Choice. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
McKelvey, Richard D. (1976). “Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control.” Journal of Economic Theory 12: 472–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKelvey, Richard D. (1978). “General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models,” Unpublished, Carnegie Mellon University.Google Scholar
Plott, Charles R. (1967). “A Notion of Equilibrium and its Possibility under Majority Rule.” American Economic Review 67: 787806.Google Scholar
Riker, William H. (1961). “Voting and the Summation of Preferences,” American Political Science Review 55:900–11.Google Scholar
Riker, William H. (1965). “Some Ambiguities in the Notion of Power.” American Political Science Review 57: 341–49.Google Scholar
Riker, William H.. (1978). “A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice,” New York: American Political Science Association.Google Scholar
Riker, William H.. (forthcoming, 1980). Liberalism against Populism. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.Google Scholar
Rubinstein, Ariel (1979). “A Note about the ‘Nowhere Denseness’ of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule.” Econometrica 47:511–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Robertson, Dennis (1977). A Theory of Party Competition. New York: John Wiley.Google Scholar
Schofield, Norman (1978). “Instability of Simple Dynamic Games,” The Review of Economic Studies 45: 575–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sen, A. K. (1966). “A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions.” Econometrica 34:491–99.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sen, A. K., and Pattanaik, P. K. (1969). “Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Rational Choice and Majority Decision.” Journal of Economic Theory 1:178202.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schloss, Judith (1973). “Stable Outcomes in Majority Voting Games.” Public Choice 15: 1948.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shepsle, Kenneth (1979). “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models.” American Journal of Political Science 23: 2759.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
392
Cited by

Send article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle.

Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
Available formats
×

Send article to Dropbox

To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox.

Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
Available formats
×

Send article to Google Drive

To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your <service> account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive.

Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *