The problem of reservations to multilateral treaties signed at the close of international conferences is one that has long been a matter of concern to the regional Organization of the American States, as it is now to the Secretariat of the United Nations. How can we promote the general acceptance of international agreements and yet recognize that, after the text of the treaty has been agreed upon and signed by representatives of the executive department of a state, the popularly elected Congress, which in democratic constitutions must give its assent to the ratification of the treaty, may object to certain provisions of the treaty and refuse to approve the agreement without making exception of one or more objectionable articles?

The simplest answer would be to say that we simply cannot recognize any such intervention on the part of the legislative body. Once the treaty has been signed, the treaty must be ratified in the form signed or not ratified at all. But such a position would be needlessly extreme. What if the other signatories of the treaty find no objection to the proposed reservation, looking upon it as being no more than the expression of a national complex which the particular state may have with respect to possible effects of the treaty not contemplated by themselves, or in any case as not constituting any substantial obstacle to the attainment of the objectives of the treaty? In such a case the other signatories might readily agree to accept the proposed reservation under the belief that it is better to have the particular state cooperate in that restricted way than not at all; and if they are willing to do so, why not let them?