¹ Kelly, Mary Louise, Officials: Bin Laden Running Out of Space to Hide, National Public Radio (June 5, 2009)Google Scholar, at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. php?storyId=104938490.

² ISIS is also known by the acronym “ISIL” or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. Increasingly, the group is known as “Daesh,” an Arabic form of the name. Isis broke with Al Qaeda in Iraq and has subsequently been denounced by the main Al Qaeda organization.

³ Castle, Stephen, Britain Says First Drone Strike in Syria Hit ISIS Suspects, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 2015, at A4 Google Scholar.

⁴ Ackerman, Spencer, Drone Strikes by UK and Pakistan Point to Obama’s Counter-terror Legacy, Guardian, Sept. 9, 2015 Google Scholar, at http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/sep/09/obama-drone-strikes-counterterror-uk-pakistan.

⁵ Id.

⁶ For example, the British government filed a declaration related to its accession to Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions that noted the following: “It is the understanding of the United Kingdom that the term ‘armed conflict’ of itself and in its context denotes a situation of a kind which is not constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes including acts of terrorism whether concerted or in isolation.” Declaration of United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 (July 2, 2002), available at http://www. wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/details_notes.jsp?treaty_id=281.

⁷ The government of France, too, has declared a “war on terror” following terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015, believed to have links to Isis. About 130 people were killed. In April 2001, however, France had made a declaration like that of the United Kingdom, supra note 6, upon joining Additional Protocol I in which France distinguished terrorism from armed conflict: “Le Gouvernement de la République Française considère que le terme ‘conflits armés’ évoqué au paragraphe 4 de l’article 1, de lui-meˆme et dans son context, indique une situation d’un genre qui ne comprend pas la commission de crimes ordinaires, y compris les actes de terrorisme, qu’ils soient collect if souisolés.” (The Government of the French Republic considers that the term ‘armed conflict’ mentioned in paragraph 4 of Article 1, on its own and in its context, indicates a situation of a kind that does not include the commission of ordinary crimes, including acts of terrorism, whether collective or isolated.) Declaration of the French Republic, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 (Apr. 11, 2001), available at https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Notification.xsp?action=open Document&documentId=D 8041036B40Ebc44C1256A34004897B2. [Editors’ note: The attacks in Paris occurred after the cutoff date for this issue, but, for completeness, this reference has been added during production.]

⁸ For example, the following major publications on targeted killing and drones appeared in 2015: Laurie Calhoun, We kill because we can: From soldiering to Assassination in the Drone Age (2015); Antonia Chayes, Borderless Wars: Civil Military Disorder and Legal Uncertainty (2015); Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy (Peter L. Bergen & Daniel Rothenberg eds., 2015): Kenneth R. Himes, OFM, Drones and the Ethics of Targeted Killing (2015); Scott Shane, Objective Troy: A Terrorist, A President, and the Rise of the Drone (2015); Scahill, Jeremy, The Assassination Complex: Secret Military Documents Expose the Inner Workings of Obama’s Drone Wars, The Intercept, Oct. 15, 2015 Google Scholar, at https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/the-assassination-complex (Article No. 1 of 8); and Benjamin Wittes & Gabriella Blum, the Future of Violence: Robots and Germs, Hackers and Drones—Confronting a New Age of Threat (2015).

⁹ Following thirteen years of comparative statistical analysis, including early efforts at compiling the data myself with the help of a graduate research assistant from Uzbekistan, I find that the most reliable numbers are provided by the Bureau of Investigative Journal ism, where Woods once worked. Its data sets are avail able online at https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs.

¹⁰ For a more standard history of drones, see, for example, John Kaag & Sarah Kreps, Drone Warfare 1–18 (2014).

¹¹ Citing Duhigg, Charles, The Pilotless Plane That Only Looks Like Child’s Play, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 2007 Google Scholar, at http://www.nytimes.come/2007/04/15/business/yourmoney/15atomics.html.

¹² It is widely reported that Britain also has a kill list. See, e.g., Dathan, Matt, David Cameron Draws Up ‘Kill List’ of Isis Fighters Who Can Be Taken Out at AMoment’s Notice, Independent, Sept. 16, 2015 Google Scholar, at http://www. independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-draws-up-kill-list-of-isis-fighters-who-can-be-taken-out-at-a-moments-notice-10491191.html.

¹³ SC Res. 1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (“Recognizing the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter”).

¹⁴ UN Charter Article 51 provides:

¹⁵ See O’Connell, Mary Ellen, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 889, 901–02 (2002)Google Scholar (discussing British white paper).

¹⁶ Quoting David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Memorandum for the Attorney General Re: Applicability of Federal Criminal Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi (July 16, 2010) (redacted), available at https://lawfare.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/staging/s3fs-public/uploads/2014/06/6-23-14_Drone_Memo-Alone.pdf. The memo cited above was ordered released to the public by a U.S. federal court. A shorter version of the same memo was also released by the Obama administration and was dated February 2010. The New York Times and the American Civil Liberties Union have attempted to get the release of ten more memos on targeted killing, one known to date from 2002, but have not yet been successful in their pursuit.

¹⁷ See, e.g., UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, UN Doc. A/Conf. 144/28/Rev. 1 (1990), available at http://www.ohchr.org/En/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/UseOfForceAndFirearms.aspx.

¹⁸ Mayer, Jane, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of the C.I.A.’s Covert Drone Program?, New Yorker, Oct. 26, 2009 Google Scholar, at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/10/26/the-predator-war (quoting Vicki Divoll, a former Cia lawyer), excerpted in Drones and Targeted Killing: Legal, Moral, and Geopolitical Issues 63 (Marjorie Cohn ed., 2014).

¹⁹ UN Commission on Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Questions of Disappearances and Summary Executions, UN Doc. E/Cn.4/2003/3 (Jan. 13, 2003) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Asma Jahangir).

²⁰ Citing Id., para. 39.

²¹ For detailed accounts of the Awlaki killing, see the books by two journalists, Shane, supra note 8, and Jeremy Scahill, Dirty Wars: the World Is a Battle field (2013).

²² Woods does not cite, for example, one of the most important articles precisely on histopic, Gray, Christine, Targeted Killings: Recent Us Attempts to Create a Legal Framework, 66 Current Legal Probs. 75 (2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. He equally overlooks these leading titles on jus ad bellum : Olivier Corten, the Law Against War: The prohibition on the Use of Force Incontemporary International Law (2010); Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self defence (5th ed. 2011); Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (3d ed. 2008). These authorities and others were made available to Woods by the present author at Aconference in Chicago on drones in 2013.

²³ See International Law Committee on the Use of Force, Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law 5 (2010), at http://www.ila-hq. org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1022. The present author chaired the committee. Judith Gardam of the University of Adelaide, Australia, was the rapporteur. For a full list of members, documents, and commentary on the report, see What is war? An investigation in the Wake of 9/11 (Mary Ellen O’Connell ed., 2012).

²⁴ See Schabas, William A., Lex Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conun drum of Jus Ad Bellum, 40 Isr. L. Rev. 592 (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁵ See, e.g., Zakaria, Rafia, The Myth of Precision: Human Rights, Drones, and the Case of Pakistan, in Drones and the Future of Armed Conflict: Ethical, Legal, and Strategic Implications 199 (Cortright, David, Fairhurst, Rachel & Wall, Kristen eds., 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁶ See, e.g., UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, Addendum, Study on Targeted Killings, paras. 3, 54, 87–92, UN Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010). A brief reference is made to the illegality of killing beyond armed conflict zones with drones. Id., paras. 85–86. Arguably, this point should have been a main subject of the report.

²⁷ During the Obama administration, the legal justifications shifted from the existence of a global war to self-defense and host-state consent. Shah heavily criticizes these claims, as discussed infra. Again, human rights and humanitarian law scholars have focused on aspects of these claims, such as the definition of “imminence” used, without acknowledging that the term “imminence” does not actually appear in UN Charter Article 51 on self-defense or that the law of self-defense simply does not apply to most Cia drone strikes. Another concern relates to the demand that the Obama administration make public “the rules” that it has developed for carrying out drone attacks. On the existence of these rules, see Lee, Carol E. & Nissenbaum, Dion, Obama’s Drone-Strike Rules to Be Reviewed, Wall St. J., Apr. 23, 2015 Google Scholar, at http://www.wsj.com/articles/obamas-drone-strike-rules-to-be-reviewed-1429832348; see also Woods, p. 284. Beyond the contradiction that anything purporting to be “law” can be kept secret from the public, the administration has no authority to create its own code for killing that overrides the readily accessible international legal rules on the use of lethal force. Administration lawyers may have in mind litigation strategy or covert operation methods, which may be kept secret, but the law under which government officials purport to act must be openly acknowledged. Better compliance with international law would plainly benefit from greater general understanding, especially of the jus ad bellum, by all— governments, nonstate actors, and individuals. Even with enhanced understanding, however, advocacy for resort to war is likely to continue given the current high confidence in the utility of military force. For a discussion of the limits of military force in the terrorism context as well as the reasons why scholars and government lawyers have nevertheless sought permissive interpretations of the restrictions on military force, see infra notes 36–43 and accompanying text.

²⁸ Johnsen, Gregory D., How We Lost Yemen: The United States Used the Pakistan Playbook on Yemen’s Terrorists. It Didn’t Work, Foreign Pol’y, Aug. 6, 2013 Google Scholar, at http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/06/how-we-lost-yemen.

²⁹ See Mary Ellen O’Connell, International Law and Drone Attacks Beyond Armed Conflict Zones, in Drones and the Future of Armed Conflict, supra note 25, at 63, 64.

³⁰ Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.

³¹ See Castle, supra note 3.

³² Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 ICJ Rep. 168 (Dec. 19); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 ICJ Rep. 43 (Feb. 26).

³³ A similar critique has arisen about the possible justification of the UK attack in Syria as related to Iraq’s civil war with Isis. The prime minister did not make this argument, and it is not clear that Iraq wants this sort of attack on friendly Syria as part of its anti-Isis effort. See McCorquodale, Robert, Human Rights and the Targeting by Drone, Ejil Talk! (Sept. 18, 2015)Google Scholar, at http://www.ejiltalk.org/human-rights-and-the-targeting-by-drone.

³⁴ On this case and its relevance to the law of self-defense, see Jennings, R. Y., The Caroline and McLeod Cases , 32 AJIL 82 (1938)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁵ UN Charter Art. 51.

³⁶ In its analysis of “imminent,” the DOJ white paper noted that “the condition that an operational leader present an ‘imminent’ threat of violent attack against the United States does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future.” Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al Qaeda or an Associated Force, NBC News, Feb. 4, 2013, at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_Doj_White_Paper.pdf (providing link to Doj white paper). It is uncertain whether the Doj authors were dis cussing “imminent” in the context of Article 51 self-defense or the rules governing police use of lethal force. Regardless, the analysis is erroneous. See the discussion of self-defense at notes 32–35 supra and accompanying text. Respecting police rules, see UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, supra note 17; McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 145 (1995), at http://hudoc.ECHR.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57943; Duffy, Helen, The War on Terror and the Framework of International Law 763 (2d ed. 2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also the discussion that missiles cannot be used lawfully under police rules, supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.

³⁷ Woods also critiques the DOJ white paper. He quotes the New York Times description of the white paper as “‘a slapdash pastiche of legal theories—some based on obscure interpretations of British and Israeli law—that was clearly tailored to the desired result’” (p. 284).

³⁸ Scott Shane’s article on the killing of Awlaki also leads to the conclusion that he was killed principally to avenge acts of terrorism that the Obama administration believes Awlaki inspired. See Shane, Scott, Dead Reckoning, N.Y. Times Mag. Aug. 30, 2015, at 56–62 Google Scholar.

³⁹ Byman, Daniel, Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice, Foreign Aff. Mag., July/Aug. 2013 Google Scholar, at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/somalia/2013-06-11/why-drones-work, excerpted in Drones and Targeted Killings: Ethics, Law, Politics 46, 46–49 (Sarah Knuckey ed., 2015).

⁴⁰ Audrey Kurth Cronin, The Strategic Implications of Targeted Drone Strikes for Us Global Counter terrorism, in Drones and the future of armed conflict, supra note 25, at 99, 119. The counterproductive nature of drone attacks is argued by many experts. Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, former head of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, has said drone attacks cause more harm than good, calling their use “a failed strategy.” Retired Us General: Drones Cause More Damage Than Good, Aljazeera, July 10, 2015, at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/retired-general-drones-damage-good-150716105352708.html; see also Shane, supra note 8, at 62. But see Anderson, Kenneth, The Case for Drones, Commentary, June 2013, at 14 Google Scholar, excerpted in Drones and Targeted Killings, supra note 39, at 57, 60– 64 (not ing that the author is not persuaded by the evidence of unintended negative consequences).

⁴¹ Cronin, supra note 40, at 120.

⁴² For a similar point, see Waldron, Jeremy, Justifying Targeted Killing with a Neutral Principle?, in Targeted killings: Law and morality in anasymmetrical World 112, 131 (Finkelstein, Claire, Ohlin, Jens David & Altman, Andrew eds., 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴³ Richard Falk, Why Drones Are More Dangerous Than Nuclear Weapons, in Drones and Targeted Killing, supra note 18, at 31.

⁴⁴ On the special nature of professional responsibility standards for international lawyers in government, see Bilder, Richard B. & Vagts, Detlev F., Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98 AJIL 689 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.