1 See Nyugen Quoc Dinh, Droit International Public 500 (Patrick Daillier & Alain Pellet eds., 5th ed. 1994) (noting “‘disengagement’ of international law”); James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 268 (1979) (secession outside colonial context not per se lawful or unlawful); Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination 45 (1978) (“Despite its apparendy alegal nature, the conviction that the legitimacy of a claim to self-determination can be tested by the degree of success that attends the claimants’ undertaking is probably the prevailing view among most international jurists.”).

2 Georges Scelle, Obsession du Territoire, in Symbolae Verzijl 347 (1958).

3 Robert Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law 8 (1963) (law on new states “has looked to the sovereign, rather than the territorial, element of territorial sovereignty”).

4 Warren Zimmermann, The Choice in the Balkans, N.Y. Rev. Books, Sept. 21, 1995, at 4, 4.

5 See, e.g., Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States, June 22, 1993, Art. 3, 34 ILM 1279, 1283 (1995); SC Res. 713, preambular para. 8, UN SCOR, 46th Sess., Res. & Dec., at 42, 42–43, UN Doc. S/INF/47 (1991).

6 See Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission Opinion No. 3 (Jan. 11, 1992), 31 ILM 1499 (1992) [hereinafter Opinion No. 3].

7 Cf. Hurst Hannum, Self-Determination, Yugoslavia, and Europe: Old, Wine in New Bottles?, 3 Transnatl L. & Contemp. Probs. 57, 69 (1993) (Badinter Commission’s views may discourage constitutional options short of dissolution).

8 For an account by a key negotiator highlighting this aspect of European policy toward Yugoslavia, see David Owen, Balkan Odyssey 33–34 (1995) (“The refusal to make [Yugoslavia’s internal] borders negotiable greatly hampered the EC’s attempt at crisis management … and subsequendy put all peacemaking … within a straitjacket that gready inhibited compromises …”).

9 See, e.g., Buchheit, supra note 1; Allen Buchanan, Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (1991); Avishai Margalit & Joseph Raz, National Self-Determination, 87 J. Phil. 439 (1990). For theories by legal scholars, see, e.g., Robert McCorquodale, Self-Determination: A Human Rights Approach, 43 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 857 (1994); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era, 88 AJIL 304 (1994); Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 Yale J. Int’l L. 177 (1991); Eisuke Suzuki, Self-Determination and World Public Order: Community Response to Territorial Separation, 16 Va. J. Int’l L. 779 (1976); Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AJIL 459 (1971).

10 Cf Louis B. Sohn, The Rights of Minorities, in The International Bill of Human Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 270, 270’76 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (purpose of minority rights); Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell … Lung-chu Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order: The Basic Policies of an International Law of Human Dignity 561–68 (1980) (general norm of nondiscrimination).

11 See Buchheit, supra note 1, at 29–30. Cf. The Federalist, No. 10, at 127 (J. Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“Extend the sphere [of a republic and] … you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens …”).

12 See Buchheit, supra note 1, at 29, 230–31. Exceptions are evident, notably Eritrea, and international economic integration can mitigate this factor.

13 See Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal 123 (1995) (state practice “overwhelmingly” opposed to recognizing generalized right to secession).

14 W. W. Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law From Augustus to Justinian 734 (Peter Stein ed., 3d rev. ed. 1963); John Bassett Moore, Costa Rica-Panama Arbitration: Memorandum on Uti Possidetis 5–8 (1913). Thus, the praetor would address both parties, declaring, “I forbid force to be done by either of you whereby one of you is prevented from enjoying the land as he now does, not clam vi aut precario.” Buckland, supra, at 740. See also Dig. J. 43.17.1; Leopold Wenger, Institutes of the Roman Law of Civil Procedure 251, 415 (Otis Harrison Fisk trans., Fred B. Rothman 1986) (1940).

15 Moore, supra note 14, at 8.

16 Id. at 8–11 (citing works by Rivier, Bynkershoek, Oppenheim and Calvo); Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, Boundaries in Latin America: Uti Possidetis Doctrine, in 1 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 449, 450 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992) [hereinafter Encyclopedia].

17 I appreciate this insight from one of the Journal’s anonymous reviewers. See also Moore, supra note 14, at 9.

18 Paul de la Pradelle, La Frontière: Etude de Droit International 86–87 (1928).

19 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 56–59 (rev. ed. 1991); Mark A. Burkholder & D. S. Chandler, From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the American Audiencias, 1687–1808, at 3–5 (1977).

20 See generally Hubert Herring, A History of Latin America 260–91, 434–37 (1955); The Times Atlas of World History 223 (Geoffrey Parker ed., 4th ed. 1993) (dissolution of United Provinces of the Río de la Plata into Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia; of Gran Colombia into Venezuela, Colombia and Ecuador; and of United Provinces of Central America into Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica).

21 See Beagle Channel (Arg./Chile), 52 ILR 93, 125 (1977) (five-person panel); Frontières Colombo-Vénézuéliennes (Colom./Venez.), 1 R.I.A.A. 225, 228 (1922) (Swiss Fed. Council); Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso/Mali), 1986 ICJ Rep. 554, 661–62 (Dec. 22) (Abi-Saab, J., sep. op.).

22 See Arthur S. Keller, Oliver J. Lissitzyn & F.J. Mann, Creation of Rights of Sovereignty Through Symbolic Acts 1400–1800, at 6 (1938); see also W. Michael Reisman, Protecting Indigenous Rights in International Adjudication, 89 AJIL 350, 352 (1995). But cf. Crawford, supra note 1, at 177–81 (lands occupied by indigenous peoples not terra nullius under traditional law of nations).

23 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal./Hond.: Nicar. intervening), 1992 ICJ Rep. 351, 387–88 (Sept. 11) [hereinafter Land, Island].

24 Const. Art. V (Venez. 1830), 18 Brit. & Foreign St. Papers 1119 (1833). See also Const. Art. IV (Hond. 1848), 36 id. at 1086 (1861) (“all the territory which, during the Spanish dominion, was known by the appellation of Province”); L. D. M. Nelson, The Arbitration of Boundary Disputes in Latin America, 20 Neth. Int’l L. Rev. 267, 268–71 (1973).

25 See, e.g., Definitive Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Nov. 8, 1831, Bol.-Peru, Art. XVI, 19 Brit. & Foreign St. Papers 1383, 1387–88 (1834) (“such cessions may be reciprocally made, as may be necessary for an exact and natural demarkation [sic]”); Treaty of Peace, Sept. 22, 1829, Colom.-Peru, Art. V, 16 id. at 1242, 1243 (1831).

26 S. Whittemore Boggs, International Boundaries: A Study of Boundary Functions and Problems 17 (1940); Jean-Marc Sorel & Rostane Mehdi, L’Uti possidetis entre la consécration juridique et la pratique: essai de réactualisation, 40 Annuaire Français de Droit International 11, 26–27 (1994).

27 See Waldemar Hummer, Boundary Disputes in Latin America, in 1 Encyclopedia, supra note 16, at 464, 465–72. But see Jiménez de Aréchaga, supra note 16, at 451. See also Gabriel Escobar, Peru, Ecuador Sign Agreement to End Fighting, Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 1995, at A23.

28 See, e.g., Honduras Borders Case (Guat./Hond.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1309, 1323 (1933) (three-judge panel) (Honduras arguing for juris and Guatemala for facto).

29 Compare Frontières Colombo-Vénézuéliennes, 1 R.I.A.A. 225, 228–29 (1922) (endorsing juris) with Honduras Borders Case, 2 R.I.A.A. at 1324 (uti possidetis “makes possession the test” unless clearly usurping a definitive expression of royal will). See also Moore, supra note 14, at 40–41 (addition of juris both unnecessary and misleading); C. H. M. Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, 25 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 311, 325 (1948) (interpretive dispute renders uti possidetis “so indefinite and ambiguous that it has become somewhat discredited”).

30 See Land, Island, 1992 ICJ Rep. at 386–87 (noting that both parties accept uti possidetis juris); Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 565 (using uti possidetis and uti possidetis juris interchangeably).

31 See de la Pradelle, supra note 18, at 79–83; Jiménez de Aréchaga, supra note 16, at 452–53 (Brazilian formula “is exactly contrary to what was intended”).

32 Romain Yakemtchouk, Les Frontières africaines, 74 Revue Générale de Droit International Public [RGDIP] 27, 32–35 (1970).

33 Saadia Touval, The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa 16 (1972). See generally Thomas Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa: White Man’s Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912 (1991).

34 Jeffrey Herbst, The creation and maintenance of national boundaries in Africa, 43 Int’l Org. 673, 678–85 (1989); Touval, supra note 33, at 3–17. See also Ravi L. Kapil, On the Conflict Potential of Inherited Boundaries in Africa, 18 World Pol. 656, 660 (1966) (preponderance of straight lines in African borders).

35 See Resolutions Adopted by the All-African People’s Conference, Accra, December 5–13, 1958, in Colin Legum, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide 228, 231 (1962) (denouncing “artificial frontiers drawn by Imperialist powers to divide the peoples of Africa” and calling for “the abolition or adjustment of such frontiers at an early date”).

36 O.A.U. Resolution on Border Disputes, 1964, in Basic Documents on African Affairs 360, 361 (Ian Brownlie ed., 1971). The resolution is often referred to by its OAU document number, AGH/RES.16(I). See also Saadia Touval, The Organization of African Unity arid African Borders, 21 Int’l Org. 102 (1967).

37 See Touval, supra note 33, at 90; Yakemtchouk, supra note 32, at 61; J. de Pinho Campinos, L’Actualité de V’“uti possidetis,” in La Frontière 95, 107–09 (Société Française pour le Droit International ed., 1980).

38 See Herbst, supra note 34, at 687 (uti possidetis ensured that “if an African government is in control of the capital city, then it has the legitimate right to control the nation-state”).

39 See Francis Vallat, First report on succession of States in respect of treaties, UN Doc. A/CN.4/278 & Adds. 1–6, reprinted in [1974] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, pt. 1, at 1, 77–80, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.1 (Part 1) (Somali claims to Ogaden region of Ethiopia and Northern Frontier District of Kenya); Kapil, supra note 34, at 663–70 (Moroccan and Somali claims); Touval, supra note 36, at 103–19.

40 See Ian Brownlie, Boundary Disputes in Africa, in 1 Encyclopedia, supra note 16, at 460, 462–64; Touval, supra note 33, at 279–90.

41 See, e.g., GA Res. 1474 (ES-IV), UN GAOR, 4th Emer. Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 1, UN Doc. A/4510 (1960) (resolution originating in Afro-Asian draft on Katanga and Congo); O.A.U. Resolution on the Situation in Nigeria, 1967, in Basic Documents on African Affairs, supra note 36, at 364 (Biafra).

42 See Thomas M. Franck, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in Peoples and Minorities in International Law 3, 5 (Catherine Brölmann, Renée Lefeber & Marjoleine Zieck eds., 1993) [hereinafter Peoples and Minorities].

43 Malcolm Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues 229 (1986).

44 Steven L. Burg, Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia: Political Decision Making Since 1966, at 16–17 (1983).

45 Id. at 24.

46 See Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AJIL 569, 574–82 (1992).

47 See Opinion No. 3, supra note 6.

48 See Robert J. Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and The USSR 107–08, 111 (1994); Margot Light, Russia and Transcaucasia, in Transcaucasian Boundaries 34, 37–39 (John F. R. Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg & Richard Schofield eds., 1996).

49 See Kaiser, supra note 48, at 111, 114; Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire; The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism 143–49 (1953).

50 Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Secret Additional Protocol, Aug. 23, 1939, in Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945, ser. D, vol. 7, at 246 (1956). Bessarabia joined the Moldavian ASSR (the area on the east bank of the Dniester River within the Ukrainian SSR) to form the Moldavian SSR. Pal Kolstø & Andrei Edemsky, The Dniester Conflict: Between Irredentism and Separatism, 45 Eur.-Asia Stud. 973, 978–79 (1993).

51 See Kaiser, supra note 48, at 370.

52 The most prominent were Nikita Khrushchev’s so-called gift of Crimea from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954 and the transfer of a large area in the Kazakh SSR to the Uzbek SSR in 1963. See Pal Kolstø, The New Russian Diaspora: Minority Protection in the Soviet Successor States, 30 J. Peace Res. 197, 204–05 (1993); Svetlana Svetova & Roman Solchanyk, Chronology of Events in Crimea, Radio Free Eur.-Radio Liberty Res. Rep., May 13, 1994, at 27.

53 See, e.g., Yury Golotyuk, Establishment of First Post-Soviet Border Begins, Sevodyna, June 23, 1994, at 2, reprinted and translated in Current Dig. Post-Soviet Press, July 20, 1994, at 21.

54 See Charter, supra note 5 (“recognition of existing frontiers and renouncement of illegal acquisition of territories”). Although only 7 of the former 12 non-Baltic republics signed the Charter, the other five acceded in 1993–1994. Sergei Khabarov, Introductory Note, 34 ILM 1298, 1299 & n.2 (1995).

55 See, e.g., Kolstø & Edemsky, supra note 50, at 988–94; Svetova & Solchanyk, supra note 52. See also Kaiser, supra note 48, at 358–73; Philip Chase, Conflict in the Crimea: An Examination of Ethnic Conflict under the Contemporary Model of Sovereignty, 34 Colum. J. Transnatl L. 219, 222–39 (1995).

56 Alan Sharp, The Versailles Settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919, at 148 (1991).

57 C. A. Macartney, Hungary and Her Successors: The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences 1919–1937, at 73, 76 (1937).

58 Susan Greenberg, Borderline Case: Czechoslovakia’s old internal frontiers are being revived, Guardian, Oct. 20, 1992, at 21.

59 Jirí Malenovsky, Problèmes juridiques liés à la partition de la Tchécoslovaquie, 39 Annuaire Français de Droit International 305, 328 (1993).

60 See, e.g., Treaty of Arbitration, July 16, 1930, Guat.-Hond., Art. V, in Honduras Borders Case (Guat./ Hond.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1309, 1322 (1933) (“the only juridical line which can be established … is that of the Uti Possidetis of 1821”); Treaty of Arbitration, Sept. 14, 1881, Colom.-Venez., Art. I, in Frontières Colombo-Vénézuéliennes, 1 R.IA.A. 225, 290 (1922).

61 GA Res. 1514 (XV), para. 4, UN GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, 67, UN Doc. A/4684 (1960) (requiring states to respect the “integrity of [the] national territory [of dependent peoples]”); id., para. 6 (prohibiting the “partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country”). See also Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 122 (1994).

62 See Pinho Campinos, supra note 37, at 103 (legal status ambiguous); Daniel Bardonnet, Les Frontieres terrestres et la relativite de leur trace, 153 Recueil des Cours 9, 56 (1976 V).

63 1986 ICJ Rep. at 565. See also Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 ICJ Rep. 6, 89 (Feb. 3) (Ajibola, J., sep. op.) (“principle of general application”). Cf. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 19 (4th ed. 1990) (distinguishing between “general principles of international law” and custom).

64 See, e.g., Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 557 (quoting 1983 compromis); id. at 565 (“there is no need, for the purposes of the present case, to show that this is a firmly established principle of international law where decolonization is concerned”); Land, Island, 1992 ICJ Rep. at 386.

65 Sorel & Mehdi, supra note 26, at 12 (Frontier Dispute marks “consécration” of uti possidetis in international law); W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AJIL 83, 92 (1993) (“A statement of the law … by a court obliged to decide according to law, cannot help but say something authoritative about the law.”).

66 See Frontières Colombo-Vénézuéliennes, 1 R.I.A.A. 225, 229 (1922) (dictum that uti possidetis of 1810 is law for parties under “une théorie générate sud-américaine”); Beagle Channel (Arg./Chile), 52 ILR93, 124–25 (1977) (referring to it as “doctrine” and suggesting legal force); id. at 230 (Gros, arb., concurring); Alejandro Alvarez, Le Droit International Américain 65 (1910); Marcelo G. Kohen, L’Uti possidetis revisité: L’arrêt du 11 septembre 1992 dans L’affaire El Salvador/Honduras, 97 RGDIP 939, 956 (1993). But see Gérard Cohen Jonathan, Les Iles Falkland (Malouines), 18 Annuaire Français de Droit International 235, 239 (1972) (“perhaps” an inter-American rule); Ian Brownlie, African Boundaries: A Legal and Diplomatic Encyclopaedia 11 (1979) (customary effect in Africa for “those states which have unilaterally declared their acceptance of the principle”); Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère, Les Procédures de règlement des différends frontaliers, in La Frontière, supra note 37, at 112, 125.

67 See Kohen, supra note 66, at 957 (“une règie dispositive que les Etats peuvent substituer par d’autres”); Higgins, supra note 61, at 123–24. Cf. Brownlie, supra note 63, at 134 (emphasizing that principle is not mandatory).

68 To mention the most notable examples: Britain and France split the German colony of Togo after World War I, and the British area became part of Ghana, not Togo or a separate state. See A. Rigo Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination 151–63 (1973). These same powers split German Kamerun; the northern part of the British area voted for merger with Nigeria and the southern part for merger into the French area as Cameroun. See Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. UK), 1963 ICJ Rep. 15, 21–25 (Dec. 2). British and Italian Somalia became independent as one state and not two; Kuria Muria, an island in British-administered Aden (later Soudi Yemen), became part of Muscat and Oman (now Oman) in 1967 after its people voted for separate status. See Rigo Sureda, supra, at 199–202. And various enclaves of one state in another were absorbed (through the euphemism of “retrocession”) into the latter at independence or thereafter, not made separate countries. See Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine in the United Nations 19–21 (1982). For a forcible incorporation of an enclave formally rejected by the international community, see SC Res. 389, UN SCOR, 31st Sess., Res. & Dec, at 18, UN Doc. S/INF/32 (1976), and GA Res. 32/34, UN GAOR, 32d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 169, UN Doc. A/32/45 (1977) (East Timor).

69 See Pomerance, supra note 68, at 19–20 (plebiscites on reversion of Belgian Rwanda-Urundi to two countries and divisions of British Gilbert and Ellice Islands and of U.S. Trust Territories).

70 See Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 653 (Luchaire, J., sep. op.); Brownlie, supra note 63, at 135. See also GA Res. 49/18, UN GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 49, vol. 1, at 17, UN Doc. A/49/49 (1994) (calling on France to return Mayotte to Comoros Islands and preserve “unity and territorial integrity of the Comoro Archipelago”); GA Res. 34/91, UN GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 82, UN Doc. A/34/46 (1979) (calling on France to return islands to Madagascar); Rigo Sureda, supra note 68, at 199–202 (UK rejection of Assembly stance on Kuria Muria); Pomerance, supra note 68, at 18–19 & nn.99–100, 30–31 & n.178.

71 See Dutheil de la Rochère, supra note 66, at 125, 135; Yehuda Z. Blum, Historic Titles in International Law 342 (1965).

72 See, e.g., Gámez-Bonilla Treaty, Oct. 7, 1894, Hond.-Nicar., Art. II(6), in Arbitral Award made by the King of Spain on 23 December 1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 ICJ Rep. 192, 199–200 (Nov. 18) (allowing commission and arbitrator to “grant compensations and even fix indemnities in order to establish, in so far as possible, a well-defined natural boundary line”) [hereinafter King of Spain]; Beagle Channel (Arg./Chile), 52 ILR 93, 132–33 (1977) (1881 boundary treaty supersedes unsatisfactory uti possidetis used in 1856 treaty); Indo-Pakistan Western Boundary (Rann of Kutch) (India/Pak.), 50 ILR 2, 470 (1968) (three-person panel).

73 Treaty of Arbitration, supra note 60, Art. V, at 1322.

74 See, e.g., Honduras Borders Case (Guat/Hond.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1309, 1352, 1356–57 (1933) (refraining from “idealistic conception” of uti possidetis and recognizing line of de facto control along stretch of border).

75 King of Spain, 1960 ICJ Rep. at 215.

76 See Higgins, supra note 61, at 123–24; Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 Va. J. Int’l L. 1, 55–56 (1993). For one African leader who recognized that uti possidetis need not preclude boundary changes, see Jean-Pierre Langellier, Quand le respect des frontières n’est plus “sacro-saint’…, Le Monde, Oct. 19, 1977, at 11 (quoting OAU Secretary-General Mboumoua).

77 See supra note 20.

78 See Shaw, supra note 43, at 213–14 (dissolution of Mali federation after Senegal’s departure); Frank N. Trager, The Federation of Malaysia: An Intermediate Failure?, in Why Federations Fail: An Inquiry into the Requisites for Successful Federalism 125, 143–50 (Thomas M. Franck ed., 1968) (dissolution of Federation of Malaysia after separation of Singapore). See also the other essays in Why Federations Fail for discussions of federations that collapsed before formal independence.

79 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, Principle III, 14 ILM 1292, 1294 (1975), 73 Dept St. Bull. 323, 324–25 (1975) (parties regard frontiers as “inviolable” and will refrain from “assaulting these frontiers”) [hereinafter Helsinski Final Act].

80 Opened for signature May 23, 1969, Art. 62, 1155 UNTS 331, 347.

81 Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/6309/Rev.1, reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 169, 259, UN Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1966/Add.1 (“present article would not exclude the operation of the principle of self-determination in any case where the conditions for its legitimate operation existed”).

82 Opened for signature Aug. 23, 1978, Art. 11,3 United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Official Documents 185, 189, UN Sales No. E.79.V.10 (1979), 17 ILM 1488, 1494 (1978).

83 See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-sixth session, UN Doc. A/9610/ Rev.1, reprinted in [1974] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm'n, supra note 39, pt. 1, at 157, 201 (succession of boundaries “would leave untouched any other ground of claiming the revision or setting aside of the boundary settlement, whether self-determination or the invalidity or termination of the treaty”); Bardonnet, supra note 62, at 102.

84 See Jan Klabbers & René Lefeber, Africa: Lost between Self-Determination and Uti Possidetis, in Peoples and Minorities, supra note 42, at 37, 63.

85 See Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal Focus?, 16 Mich. J. Int’l L. 733, 751–52 (1995) (reviewing Yves Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, Referenda and National Elections: Self-Determination and Transition to Democracy (1994)).

86 For background, see generally Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic Tale of Two Cities—Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AJIL 321 (1972); Dan Connell, Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution (1993). The United States and France advocated dividing Eritrea after World War II, though they differed on the arrangements to govern each part of the territory. See Recommendations by the Deputies of the Foreign Ministers for the Former Italian Colonies of the Council of Ministers (Aug. 31, 1948), [1948] 3 Foreign Relations of the United States 942, 945–46 (1974).

87 See Rosalyn Higgins, Comments, in Peoples and Minorities, supra note 42, at 29, 34–35; Sorel & Mehdi, supra note 26, at 22; Pinho Campinos, supra note 37, at 106.

88 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ Rep. 14, 100–01 (June 27).

89 See, e.g., Organization of African Unity, Charter Art. III(3), 479 UNTS 39, 74; Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 ILM 190, 196 (1991) (repeating obligation under UN Charter Art. 2(4)).

90 The OAU’s Cairo Declaration has led to significant confusion on this question, for its commitment that states “respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of independence,” see supra text at note 36, can be read as a mere duplication of Article 2(4) or as an equivalence between it and uti possidetis. In fact, the declaration more accurately identifies those borders deserving protection in the first place. See Touval, supra note 33, at 90. See also Sorel & Mehdi, supra note 26, at 22 (many states incorrectly view uti possidetis as rendering any claim for border changes a violation of frontiers).

91 Compare, e.g., Alain Pellet, Note sur la commission d’arbitrage de la Conference européenne pour la paix en Yougoslavie, 37 Annuaire Français de Droit International 329, 342 (1991) with Hannum, supra note 76, at 55.

92 Cf. Land, Island, 1992 ICJ Rep. at 388 (noting states’ conversion into international borders of boundaries “intended originally for quite other purposes”).

93 Boggs, supra note 26, at 10.

94 See C. B. Fawcett, Frontiers: A Study in Political Geography 25–29 (1918).

95 See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 ICJ Rep. 3, 35 (Dec. 19); Milan Sahović & William W. Bishop, The Authority of the State: Its Range with Respect to Persons and Places, in Manual of Public International Law 311, 316 (Max Sørensen ed., 1968).

96 See Fawcett, supra note 94, at 29–31 (“a state places its watch and ward for incomers of all kinds”); Boggs, supra note 26, at 10.

97 1 Oppenheim’s International Law 661 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 1992).

98 Richard Hartshorne, The Functional Approach in Political Geography, 40 Annals Ass’n Am. Geographers 95, 104–10 (1950).

99 See Ronan Paddison, The Fragmented State: The Political Geography of Power 19 (1983).

100 Id. at 29 (quoting Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869) (Constitution promotes “an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States”)).

101 Boggs, supra note 26, at 28–30. Their typology applies to both internal and international borders. See also T. S. Murty, Frontiers: A Changing Concept 217–21 (1978).

102 See Roy E. H. Mellor, Nation, State, and Territory: A Political Geography 131 (1989) (England); Franklin K. Van Zandt, Boundaries of the United States and the Several States 81–166 (1966) (eastern U.S.).

103 See, e.g., supra text at note 57.

104 See, e.g., Boggs, supra note 26, at 29 (quoting Hartshorne’s description of pioneer lines as “[t]otally antecedent” boundaries); Van Zandt, supranote 102, at 228–58 (western U.S.).

105 See Boggs, supra note 26, at 29–31 (categorizing these boundaries as either subsequent, i.e., drawn to reflect cultural development of the region; or superimposed, i.e., drawn to cross cultural landscape of the region). Cf. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory or Minority Rights 28–29 (1995) (U.S. state boundaries drawn in some cases to prevent any state with majority of indigenous peoples).

106 See Paddison, supra note 99, at 49–55; Ivo D. Duchacek, External and Internal Challenges to the Federal Bargain, Publius, Spring 1975, at 41, 49–50.

107 See generally Alexander B. Murphy, Territorial Policies in Multi-ethnic States, 79 Geographical Rev. 410 (1989).

108 Maryjanigan, The roots of the struggle: a turbulent past haunts Quebec, Macleans, Nov. 25, 1991, at 26.

109 See Mellor, supra note 102, at 145–46.

110 See Kaiser, supra note 48, at 109–12 (on Moscow’s merger of Georgia with Armenia and Azerbaijan into one Union Republic until 1936 to prevent Georgia’s secession; and reconstitution of Asian units during 1924–1936). But see Caroe, supra note 49, at 149. See also Kaiser, supra, at 159, 367–68, 409–11; Light, supra note 48, at 39 (on Stalin’s wartime forcible transfer of ethnic groups and elimination of their autonomous republics).

111 See Mellor, supra note 102, at 139–43.

112 See Paddison, supra note 99, at 136–38; Julian Minghi, Boundary Studies in Political Geography, 53 Annals Ass’n Am. Geographers 407, 424–27 (1963). See also Eric Fischer, On Boundaries, 1 World Pol. 196, 202–04 (1948) (persistence of some internal boundaries).

113 See Mellor, supra note 102, at 130–31.

114 See U.S. Const. Art. IV, ©3; Can. Const. Art. 43; Austl. Const. §§123–24; Grundgesetz Art. 29 (Ger.); Padmson, supra note 99, at 135–38. See also Stephen Kinzer, East Germans, in Slap at West, Reject Joining State with Berlin, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1996, at A8. But see USSR Const. Art. 72 (1977) (Novosti 1977) (providing “right freely to secede,” but without practical meaning).

115 See, e.g., Council Directive 64/221, 1963–1964 O.J. Spec. Ed. 117 (restrictions on persons within free trade area on limited grounds of public policy).

116 For the classic work on the frontier as zone, see de la Pradelle, supra note 18, especially at 14–17, 225–64. For a view from political geography, see Fawcett, supra note 94, at 17–24. For geographical and legal definitions, see Boggs, supra note 26, at 22; Robert Y. Jennings, General Course on Principles of International Law, 121 Recueil des Cours 323, 428 (1967 II).

117 For examples, see de la Pradelle, supra note 18, at 265–88; J. R. V. Prescott, Political Frontiers and Boundaries 5–7 (1987).

118 Affaire du Lac Lanoux (Fr./Spain), 12 R.I.AA. 281, 307–08 (1957) (five-person tribunal).

119 See S.S. “Lotus,” 1927 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 10, at 18–19 (Sept. 7). See also Murty, supra note 101, at 236–37 (zonal character relevant from anthropological view; linear character from legal view).

120 See Trail Smelter Case (U.S./Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941) (three-person panel); Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 2, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (1992), 31 ILM 874, 876 (1992); Alexander Murphy, Emerging Regional Linkages within the European Community: Challenging the Dominance of the State, 84 Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 103, 108–11 (1993).

121 The various peace plans for Bosnia challenge even this position. See General Framework for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, Bosnia-Croatia-Serbia, Ann. 2, 35 ILM 75, 111 (1996) [hereinafter Bosnia Agreement]; Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, UN Doc. S/25479, at 16 (1993).

122 Paddison, supra note 99, at 63–74, 108–15.

123 On the effect of U.S. state boundaries, see Arthur R. Stevens, State Boundaries and Political Cultures: An Exploration in the Tri-State Area of Michigan, Indiana and Ohio, Publius, Winter 1974, at 111.

124 See Philip Sherwell, Neighbors on the borderline: New boundaries rekindle old fear, Sunday Telegraph (London), Jan. 3, 1993, at 15.

125 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars 55, 57–58 (2d ed. 1992).

126 Cf. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 44 (1983) (noting that disputes over borders arise with end of imperial rule because critical issues are resolved witiiin geographical units).

127 See Buchheit, supra note 1, at 29–30.

128 See, e.g., Alexis Heraclides, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics 61–62 (1991) (describing large economic capacity of Katanga vis-à-vis the whole Congo); Mel McMillan, Ken Norrie & Brad Reid, Canada and Québec in a New World: The PQ’s Economic Proposals, Const. Forum, Fall 1994, at 11.

129 See, e.g., James Rupert, Yeltsin Cancels Trip to Ukraine for Treaty Signing, Wash. Post, Apr. 3, 1996, at A15 (continuing disagreements over Black Sea fleet).

130 See, e.g., Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, Art. B, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, 5, 31 ILM 247, 255 (1992) (goal of European Union “the creation of an area without internal frontiers”).

131 See, e.g., Emma Tucker, A pillar in need of support: EU members are still far from entrusting justice and policing to Brussels, Fin. Times (London), Mar. 18, 1996, at 14; Janet McEvoy, One-Year-Old Schengen Falls Short of Expectations, Reuter Eur. Comm. Rep., Mar. 25, 1996, available in Lexis, Nexis Library, Curnws File.

132 See Draft bill on Quebec sovereignty, Art. 2, 35th Leg., Quebec, 1st Sess. (1994) (calling for agreement of economic association between future independent Quebec and Canada).

133 See, e.g., Claude Blumann, Frontières et limites, in La Frontière, supra note 37, at 3, 4–6; Mellor, supra note 102, at 78–81; Boggs, supra note 26, at 22–25.

134 See Shaw, supra note 43, at 186.

135 See Owen, supra note 8, at 34–35 (on Yugoslav interrepublican boundaries).

136 Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 80, Art. 61(1), 1155 UNTS at 346 (withdrawal from treaty permissible owing to “permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable” for treaty’s execution); Duchacek, supra note 106, at 43–44 (federalism as “the partnership of territorial communities”); Kymlicka, supra note 105, at 117.

137 See Grand Council of the Crees, Sovereign Injustice: Forcible Inclusion of the James Bay Crees and Cree Territory into a Sovereign Quebec 207–12 (1995). But see Thomas M. Franck, Rosalyn Higgins, Alain Pellet, Malcolm N. Shaw & Christian Tomuschat, L’Intégrité territoriale du Québec dans l’hypothèse de l’accession a la souverainete, in 1 Les Attributs D’un Québec Souverain 377, 402–05 (Commission d’étude des questions afférentes à l’accession du Québec à la souveraineté ed., 1992).

138 Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 568.

139 See, e.g., Sorel & Mehdi, supra note 26, at 21–33; de la Pradelle, supra note 18, at 83–86.

140 See, e.g., Honduras Borders Case (Guat./Hond.), 2 R.I.A.A. 1309, 1324 (1933); Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 587.

141 1992 ICJ Rep. at 395–401. See also Kohen, supra note 66, at 964–66.

142 See, e.g., Van Zandt, supra note 102, at 4–14 (well-defined lines of U.S. states).

143 See Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 587 (“[W]here the territory … is effectively administered by a State other than the one possessing the legal title, preference should be given to the holder of the tide.”).

144 See supra note 129.

145 See supra note 68.

146 L. F. E. Goldie, The Critical Date, 12 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 1251, 1267 (1963). See also id. at 1254 (“Events occurring before the critical date … are right-creating facts.”); Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951–4: Points of Substantive Law. Part II, 32 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 20, 37–44 (1955–56).

147 See supra note 60 (Latin American reference to “uti possidetis of 1821”).

148 See Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 570 (finding irrelevant discrepancy over critical date as parties agree pertinent period is end of French colonial rule); id. at 653 (Luchaire, J., sep. op.); Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau/Sen.), 83 ILR 1, 26–27 (1989) (three-person panel), application to nullify rejected, 1991 ICJ Rep. 53 (Nov. 12) (acts by colonial power after commencement of self-determination process not relevant); Shaw, supra note 43, at 187–91.

149 Brownlie, supra note 63, at 130.

150 See Blum, supra note 71, at 208–21 and cases discussed therein. See also Land, Island, 1992 ICJ Rep. at 401 (possibility of more than one date if parties accept modifications of border after independence); Sorel & Mehdi, supra note 26, at 27–29; Kohen, supra note 66, at 962–64.

151 See supra note 52.

152 See Neil Finkelstein, George Vegh & Camille Joly, Does Québec Have a Right to Secede at International Law?, 74 Can. Bar Rev. 225, 260 (1995). But see Franck et al., supra note 137, at 417.

153 Higgins, supra note 61, at 3 (“To rely merely on accumulated past decisions (rules) when the context in which they were articulated has changed—and indeed when their content is often unclear—is to ensure that international law will not be able to contribute to [solving] today’s problems …”); W. Michael Reisman, Some Reflections on International Law and Assassination under the Schmitt Formula, 17 Yale J. Int’l L. 687, 689 (1992) (need to “identify the conditioning factors in the past that shaped normative expectations [and] … determine whether they continue to operate”). See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council resolution 276 (1970), 1971 ICJ Rep. 16, 31 (Advisory Opinion of June 21).

154 Cf. Virginia Thompson & Richard Adloff, The Emerging States of French Equatorial Africa 28 (1960) (frequency of boundary alterations between French colonies).

155 See William B. Cohen, The French Governors, in African Proconsuls: European Governors in Africa 19, 23–27 (L. H. Gann & Peter Duignan eds., 1978); Anthony H. M. Kirk-Greene, On Governorship and Governors in British Africa, in id. at 209, 232 (quoting Churchill that “it would not be possible to govern the British Empire from Downing Street, and we do not try, “but noting ability of colonial office to supervise if needed); Jean Suret-Canale, French Colonialism in Tropical Africa 1900–1945, at 308–13 (Pica Press 1971) (1964).

156 See Cohen, supra note 155, at 23; Suret-Canale, supra note 155, at 312. But cf. Thompson & Adloff, supra note 154, at 26–30 (governor-general asserting strong control over governors, but later decentralization).

157 See Anderson, supra note 19, at 123–31.

158 See Francois Luchaire, Droit D’outre-mer 100–05 (1959) (categories of territories under 1946 Constitution); Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law 19–62 (1966) (categories of nations in British Empire).

159 UN Charter Arts. 73, 76(b) (obligating states to “develop self-government” for colonies and “promote … progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate” for the trust territories). See also Higgins, supra note 61, at 111–14; Cassese, supra note 13, at 37–43.

160 UN Charter Art. 1(2).

161 See Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations 103–06 (1963).

162 GA Res. 1514, supra note 61, paras. 2, 4, Supp. No. 16, at 67. For the vote, see UN GAOR, 15th Sess., 947th plen. mtg. at 1274–75, UN Doc. A/PV.947 (1960).

163 GA Res. 1541 (XV), Annex, Principle VI, UN GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 29, 29, UN Doc. A/ 4684 (1960). See also Pomerance, supra note 68, at 10–12.

164 See supra note 35.

165 See generally Beigbeder, supra note 85, at 126–47; Enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of periodic and genuine elections: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/46/609, at 27–28 (1991).

166 See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 21, GA Res. 217 (III), UN Doc. A/810, at 71, 75 (1948) (right to participatory government and “periodic and genuine elections”).

167 See, e.g., Arnold Rivkin, Nation-Building in Africa: Problems and Prospects 47–60 (1969); George B. N. Ayittey, Africa Betrayed (1992).

168 See Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Con flicting Rights 71–72 (1990); Allan Rosas, Internal Self-Determination, in Modern Law of Self-Determination 225, 227–28 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993); Franck, supra note 42, at 10.

169 Franck, supra note 42, at 10. See also Higgins, supra note 61, at 114–21.

170 Dec. 16, 1966, Art. 25, 999 UNTS 171, 179 [hereinafter ICCPR]. See Karl Josef Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms, in The International Bill of Human Rights, supra note 10, at 209, 238–45.

171 See ICCPR, supra note 170, Art. 1, 999 UNTS at 173; Cassese, supra note 13, at 48–52, 59–62. See also India’s reservation to Article 1, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at 31 December 1995, at 113, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/14, UN Sales No. E.96.V.5 (1996) (rejecting application beyond people under foreign domination); id. at 116–17 (objections to reservation by France, Germany, Netherlands).

172 See ICCPR, supra note 170, Arts. 2, 26–27, 999 UNTS at 173, 179. See generally Patrick Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities 141–247 (1991).

173 For a view that Resolution 1514 presaged this transformation, see Suzuki, supra note 9, at 841–44.

174 See GA Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, 124, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration], which limits the assurance that the declaration shall not authorize or encourage any action to “dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity” of states, to “States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.”

175 See, e.g., Robert Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AJIL 713, 732 (1971); Buchheit, supra note 1, at 92–94 (declaration recognizes some right to secede); Cassese, supra note 13, at 120 (declaration permits secession when internal self-determination “is absolutely beyond reach”).

176 See The Aaland Islands Question: Report submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Doc. B7/21/68/106, at 28 (1921) (separation “a last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and apply just and effective guarantees [of minority rights]”); id. at 34. The League eventually decided to retain the islands as part of Finland.

177 See supra note 174. See also McCorquodale, supra note 9, at 879–80.

178 For the question of minorities within minorities, see infra text at note 187.

179 Cf. Hurst Hannum, Synthesis of Discussions, in Peoples and Minorities, supra note 42, at 333, 335; Kymlicka, supra note 105, at 113 (“fair way to … draw boundaries … [involves] ensuring that all national groups have the opportunity to maintain themselves as a distinct culture, if they so choose”).

180 Helsinki Final Act, supra note 79, Principle VIII, 14 ILM at 1295.

181 Compare Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 174, at 124 (governments representative if they do not discriminate on basis of “race, creed or colour”); see also Antonio Cassese, The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination, in Human Rights, International Law and the Helsinki Accord 83, 100–03 (Thomas Buergenthal ed., 1977).

182 See, e.g., Charter of Paris for a New Europe, supra note 89, 30 ILM at 193–95; GA Res. 48/131, preambular para. 2, UN GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 250, UN Doc. A/48/49 (1993) (role of UN assistance in elections for “the strengthening and building of institutions relating to human rights and the strengthening of a pluralistic civil society”).

183 See Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 567.

184 Cf. Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions 168 (1995) (uti possidetis stronger for democratic state protecting minorities than a state persecuting them).

185 See Report of the International Commission of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, League of Nations O.J. Spec. Supp. 3, at 10 (1920):

If one part of a State actually separates itself from that State, the separation is necessarily limited in its effect to the population of the territory which has taken part in the act of separation…. [I]f a separation occurs from a political organism which is more or less autonomous, and which is itself de facto in process of political transformation [namely Finland], this organism cannot at the very moment when it transforms itself outside the domain of positive law invoke the principles of this law in order to force upon a national group a political status which the latter refuses to accept.

See also Nathaniel Berman, “But the Alternative is Despair”: European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1792, 1862–68 (1993).

186 See Franck, supra note 184, at 168 (claims of minorities stronger when state disintegrating). But see Harry Beran, Self-Determination: A Philosophical Perspective, in Self-Determination in the Commonwealth 23, 27–31 (W.J. Allan Macartney ed., 1988).

187 See, e.g., Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1413, 1458–87 (1991) (voting scheme based on “interest representation” to promote political voice of minorities); Kymlicka, supra note 105, at 131–51 (“group representation” idea).

188 Opinion No. 3, supra note 6, 31 ILM at 1500 (citing Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 565).

189 See generally Misha Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War 235–42 (rev. ed. 1993); Owen, supra note 8, at 341–46.

190 1986 ICJ Rep. at 566 (emphasis added).

191 See Jochen A. Frowein, Self-Determination as a Limit to Obligations under International Law, in Modern Law of Self-Determination, supra note 168, at 211, 216–17; Hannum, supra note 76, at 55.

192 Opinion No 3, supra note 6, 31 ILM at 1500 (including references to ban on force); author’s interview with Robert Badinter (June 29, 1994). Judge Badinter has stated that the decision to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state led to the war in the former Yugoslavia.

193 Cited in Weller, supra note 46, at 577. See also SC Res. 713, supra note 5, preambular para. 8.

194 See supra text at notes 87–90.

195 Blum, supra note 71, at 3.

196 See Jennings, supra note 116, at 416–18.

197 Western Sahara, 1975 ICJ Rep. 12, 39 (Oct. 16). See also Island of Palmas (Neth./U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 845 (1928) (sole arbitrator Huber) (referring to “uninhabited regions or regions inhabited by savages or semi-civilized peoples”); Malcolm Shaw, The Western Sahara Case, 49 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 119, 127–34 (1978).

198 Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 846; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 PCIJ (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 45–46 (Apr. 5).

199 Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 858 (acquisition of colonial territory through contracts creating suzerain-vassal relationship); Shaw, supra note 197, at 127–30 (noting different views regarding Africa); Keller, Lissitzyn & Mann, supra note 22, at 6 (Latin America). Cf. Western Sahara, 1975 ICJ Rep. at 39, and Crawford, supra note 1, at 177–81 (terra nullius never applied to indigenous peoples).

200 J. L. Brierly, The Law of Nations 163 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); Lung-chu Chen, An Introduction to Contemporary International Law 121 (1989).

201 See Dinh, supra note 1, at 503–04; 1 Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 97, at 687 n.4.

202 See Western Sahara, 1975 ICJ Rep. at 39 (asserting that in 19th century “territories inhabited by tribes or peoples having a social and political organization were not regarded as terrae nullius”); Shaw, supra note 197, at 133–34 (Court “sidestep[s] … those late nineteenth-century theories denying any form of international legal personality inherent in non-European style State entities”).

203 See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, paras. 1.20, II.28–.32, in World Conference on Human Rights: The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, June 1993, at 35, 52–53, UN Doc. DPI/1394–39399–August 1993–20M (1993); Riadza Torres, The Bights of Indigenous Populations: The Emerging International Norm, 16 Yale J. Int’l L. 127, 151–63 (1991).

204 Western Sahara, 1975 ICJ Rep. at 68 (absent ties of territorial sovereignty, people of disputed territory have right to self-determination under Resolution 1514). See also Reisman, supra note 22, at 354–57.

205 See, e.g., Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on its forty-sixth session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2–E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56, at 105, reprinted in 34 ILM 546, para. 2 (“right to be free from any kind of adverse discrimination”); id., para. 4 (“right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, economic, social and cultural characteristics, as well as their legal systems”) [hereinafter UN Draft Declaration].

206 See, e.g., Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, Arts. 13–19, 28 ILM 1382, 1387–88 (1989); UN Draft Declaration, supra note 205, preambular para. 6 (recognizing “rights to their lands, territories and resources, which derive from their political, economic and social structures and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies”); id., para. 3 (“right of self-determination”).

207 See supra text at note 21.

208 See Torres, supra note 203, at 162; Hannum, supra note 168, at 96 & n.339.

209 See generally Grand Council of the Crees, supra note 137, at 196–99 (arguing that rights of indigenous peoples prevent independent Quebec from incorporating Cree lands). But see Franck et al., supra note 137, at 435–43.

210 A third defense could note that some administrative borders mean something and should not be tampered with, a point acknowledged, but irrelevant to those many administrative borders that lack functional, historical or other justification.

211 See Yakemtchouk, supra note 32, at 60; Shaw, supra note 43, at 186.

212 See generally Renée de Nevers, Democratization and Ethnic Conflict, in Ethnic Conflict and International Security 61 (Michael E. Brown ed., 1993).

213 John Chipman, Managing the Politics of Parochialism, in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, supra note 212, at 237, 261.

214 See supra text at note 187.

215 Cf. Margalit & Raz, supra note 9, at 459 (conditioning approval of secession on group’s “respect [for] the basic rights of its inhabitants, so that its establishment will do good rather than add to the ills of this world”).

216 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations 67–77 (1990). I appreciate this insight from Gregory Fox.

217 Compare Morton H. Halperin & David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New World Order 86 (1992) (proposing residents of new states be able to choose citizenship of neighboring state); Ted Robert Gurr, Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopoutical Conflicts 298–313 (1993) (proposing increased minorities’ rights within existing states) with Gidon Gottlieb, Nation Against State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty 46–47, 75–76 (1993) (proposal for differing sets of borders for different purposes).

218 See, e.g., Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE, Dec. 15, 1992, 32 ELM 557 (1993).

219 Cf. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AJTL 866, 873 (1990) (need to update old norms to account for constitutive changes).

220 See text at and note 84 supra.

221 Such a view of uti possidetis applies only to the former internal boundaries, not the international boundaries. For example, the border between Italy and Yugoslavia does not become provisional when it becomes the border between Italy and Slovenia. Moreover, this proposal is limited to recent and future breakups, and does not suggest revising the postindependence borders in Africa, a policy that might run afoul of important norms of stability and finality of borders. See infra text at notes 227–29. But see Charles William Maynes, The New Pessimism, Foreign Pol’y, Fall 1995, at 33, 48 (proposing “incentives to redraw borders to obtain more viable states”); Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1113 (1995).

222 Opinion No. 3, supra note 6, 31 ILM at 1500 (“Except where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become frontiers protected by international law.”).

223 See Michael Bothe, Boundaries, in 1 Encyclopedia, supra note 16, at 443, 445–46.

224 Margalit & Raz, supra note 9, at 457.

225 See Suzuki, supra note 9, at 835–41; S. James Anaya, The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims, 75 IOWA L. Rev. 837, 841–44 (1990).

226 See, e.g., Stephen Van Evera, Hypotheses on Nationalism and War, 18 Int’l Security 5, 8, 21–22 (1994); Herbst, supra note 34, at 678–79.

227 Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 ICJ Rep. 6, 34 (June 15); Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), 1994 ICJ Rep. at 37. See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 80, Art. 62(2) (a), 1155 UNTS at 347 (rebus sic stantibus does not apply to boundary treaties).

228 Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad, Some Observations on the Doctrine of Continuity and Finality of Boundaries, 54 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 119, 119 (1983). For the general principle behind the norm, see GrisbadarnaCase (Nor./Swed.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 121, 130 (1909) (three-person panel) (“a state of things which actually exists and has existed for a long time should be changed as little as possible”).

229 See Temple of Preah Vihear, 1962 ICJ Rep. at 34 (relying on norm after finding Thai acquiescence justified Cambodia’s claims); Territorial Dispute, 1994 ICJ Rep. at 37 (relying on norm after determining 1955 treaty definitely established boundary); Kaikobad, supra note 228, at 125–26. See also Northern Cameroons, 1963 ICJ Rep. at 32–34 (acknowledging end of dispute by General Assembly’s acceptance of plebiscite). Cf. Bardonnet, supra note 62, at 71, 106 (political principle that does not extinguish even authoritatively addressed claims, as long as states act lawfully).

230 Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 174, at 122 (banning force to solve “territorial disputes and problems concerning frontiers of States” or to “violate international lines of demarcation”). See also SC Res. 502, UN SCOR, 37th Sess., Res. & Dec, at 15, UN Doc. S/INF/38 (1982) (Falkland Islands invasion); SC Res. 660, UN SCOR, 45th Sess., Res. & Dec, at 19, UN Doc. S/INF/46 (1990) (Iraqi invasion of Kuwait).

231 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, Art. 3, 6 UST 3516, 3518, 75 UNTS 287, 288–90; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 UNTS 609; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Appeal on Jurisdiction, UN Doc. IT–94–1–AR72, at 53–68, paras. 96–127 (1995), reprinted in 35 ILM 32, 62–70 (1996).

232 See Grisbadarna Case, Hague Ct. Rep. at 130.

233 Cf. Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 199–200 (immediacy of historical grievance as factor to justify secessions).

234 See Kaikobad, supra note 228, at 130–34; Fischer, supra note 112, at 222; Murty, supra note 101, at 56. But see Alexander B. Murphy, Historical Justifications for Territorial Claims, 80 Annals Ass’n Am. Geographers 531 (1990) (putative historical claims as means to recover lost lands).

235 See Kolstø & Edemsky, supra note 50, at 978.

236 See Charles R. Nixon, Self-Determination: The Nigeria/Biajra Case, 24 World Pol. 473, 482–92 (1972).

237 Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau/Sen.), 83 ILR at 26–30. The panel found that such a process has acquired international dimensions if the metropolitan state is forced to take “exceptional measures,” i.e., “means which are not those used normally to deal with occasional disturbances.” Id. at 29. The quoted passage is dicta, as the panel found that Portuguese Guinea remained under firm colonial control at the time of Portugal’s maritime treaty with France. Id. at 30.

238 See Von Evera, supra note 226, at 21–22; cf. Buchanan, supra note 9, at 127–49 (developing constitutional right to secede); Kymlicka, supra note 105, at 117 (consequences of varying modalities of incorporation).

239 Cf. Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 596–97 (acceptance by French Lieutenant Governor-General of border proposed by Governor-General not evidence of acquiescence since writers of letters “not of equal standing … [whereas] the idea of acquiescence … presupposes freedom of will”); Brilmayer, supra note 9, at 200 (evaluating relative power of group making claims). See also Temple of Preah Vihear, 1962 ICJ Rep. at 136–42 (Spender, J., dissenting) (Thailand should not be regarded as acquiescing in border as it lacked ability to check accuracy of French map); Rann of Kutch, 50 ILR at 414–15 (Bebler, arb., dissenting) (silence of vassal state Kutch against UK claims not convincing evidence of acquiescence).

240 See text at and note 136 supra.

241 See Crawford, supra note 1, at 36–37, 139–41. On noncolonial states, see GA Res. 47/231, 47/232, UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, vol. 2, at 6, UN Doc. A/47/49 (1993) (admission of Monaco and Andorra).

242 See, e.g., Mellor, supra note 102, at 58–73; Preston E. James, Some Fundamental Elements in the Analysis of the Viability of States, in Essays in Political Geography 33 (Charles A. Fisher ed., 1968); Hartshorne, supra note 98, at 106–10.

243 See, e.g., Buchheit, supra note 1, at 230–32; Suzuki, supra note 9, at 861–62.

244 See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), 1969 ICJ Rep. 3, 51–52 (Feb. 20) (on exploitation of oil deposits in allocation of continental shelf).

245 See Mellor, supra note 102, at 70; cf. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 ICJ Rep. at 51–52 (unity of deposits a factor in delimitation of continental shelf).

246 See G. W. S. Robinson, Exclaves, 49 Annals Ass’n Am. Geographers 283, 295 (1959). The Nakhichevan area of Azerbaijan, separated from the rest of the country by part of Armenia, is not technically an exclave because it borders a third country (Iran), though it faces similar problems.

247 Mellor, supra note 102, at 68–69.

248 See Western Sahara, 1975 ICJ Rep. at 33 (noting requirement of consultation during decolonization except if population not a “people” or “special circumstances” obtain); Cassese, supra note 13, at 190 (binding expression of will required); Shaw, supra note 197, at 148–49. Cf. Brownlie, supra note 63, at 170 (binding plebiscite not required); Bosnia Agreement, supra note 121, Ann. 2, 35 ILM at 111 (drawing line between two “entities” within a state without recourse to plebiscite). Presumably, Hong Kong and Macao do not constitute disputed territories in the eyes of those overseeing their decolonization.

249 The Versailles Treaty called for plebiscites in Schleswig, the Saar, Allenstein, Upper Silesia, and Marien-walder. See 1 Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War 3–45 (1933), which remains the authoritative account. See also id. at 42 (Allies avoided a plebiscite in every area of “first importance” except Upper Silesia).

250 See Steven R. Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War 100–01, 109–13, 131 (1995).

251 Compare Kolstø, supra note 52, at 207–08 (shortcomings for revising borders of former Soviet republics) with 1 Wambaugh, supra note 249, at 485–96. See also Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, The “Requirement” of Plebiscite in Territorial Rapprochement, 12 Hous. J. Int’l L. 23 (1989).

252 See Rigo Sureda, supra note 68, at 152–68 (disputes over divisions used in plebiscites in British Togoland and British Cameroons).

253 See Ali Khan, The Kashmir Dispute: A Plan for Regional Cooperation, 31 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 495, 532–35 (1994); International Commission of Jurists, Human Rights in Kashmir: Report of a Mission 95–96 (1995).

254 1 Wambaugh, supra note 249, at 494, 503.

255 See Paddison, supra note 99, at 131–32. For an example from before the modern era of self-determination, see 1 Wambaugh, supra note 249, at 251–61 (process of line drawing after Upper Silesia vote).

256 See 1 Wambaugh, supra note 249, at 504–05.

257 See Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ REP. at 567–68 (using equity to divide a pool equally); Land, Island, 1992 ICJ Rep. at 514–15 (relying on equity to give effect to unratified treaty); Moore, supra note 14, at 29.

258 Frontier Dispute, 1986 ICJ Rep. at 662–63 (Abi-Saab, J., sep. op.).