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The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case and Its Legal Consequences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 April 2017

Jens Evensen
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Extract

On December 18, 1951, the International Court of Justice at The Hague rendered its judgment in the Fisheries Case between the United Kingdom and Norway. By ten votes to two the International Court declared “that the method employed for the delimitation of the fisheries zone by the Royal Norwegian Decree of July 12, 1935 is not contrary to international law.”

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 46 , Issue 4 , October 1952 , pp. 609 - 630
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1952

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References

1 I.C.J. Reports, 1951, p. 116; this Journal, Vol. 46 (1952), p. 348.

2 The two dissenting Judges were Sir Arnold McNair (Great Britain) and Judge J. E. Bead (Canada).

3 The four dissenting votes were those of Sir Arnold McNair, Judge Bead, Judge Hsu Mo (China), and one Judge whose name was not given. Cf. Statute of the Court, Art. 57.

4 Both Great Britain and Norway have accepted the compulsory clause provided for in Art. 36(2) of the Statute of the Court conferring jurisdiction on the Court in all legal disputes concerning: … (b) any question of international law; (c) the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

5 One-half cable corresponds to about one hundred yards.

6 According to Art. 40(4) of the Rules of the Court, Norway availed itself of the opportunity of having its written proceedings printed through the Registrar of the International Court. The way in which the Court’s printing office under its chief, Mr. Rene Knaap, accomplished this at times somewhat difficult task was admirable.

7 In its application to the Court, the United Kingdom had formulated its reservation in this way: “Actuated by the same spirit of compromise as led it in 1933 to agree to the Red Line modus vivendi, the Government of the United Kingdom, for the purpose of the present dispute and without prejudice to the position it maintains regarding the extent of Norwegian territorial waters in other matters than fisheries, is prepared to agree that the Norwegian Fisheries Zone shall be delimited on the assumption that the zone extends seaward four sea-miles. …” (Application, par. 8.)

8 These proposals of the Second Subcommittee were never accepted by the Hague Conference of 1930.

9 Part II of the Counter-Memorial was prepared by Professor Maurice Bourquin of Geneva.

10 The ares-of-circles method was proposed by the United States Delegation at the Hague Conference of 1930. It has been further described by S. W. Boggs in articles in this Journal, Vol. 24 (1930), p. 541 et seq., and Vol. 45 (1951), p. 240. See also the same author in Geographical Review, Vol. 41, p. 185 et seq. A description illustrated by diagrams is given in the British Beply, Annex 42.

11 According to Art. 3 of the Statute of the Court, the International Court of Justice consists of fifteen Judges. Only twelve members of the Court heard the case, however, as Judges Fabela (Mexico) and Krylov (U.S.S.R.) were absent because of illness, and Judge Azevedo (Brazil) died in May, 1951.

12 The British submissions and conclusions are printed in full in this Journal, Vol. 46 (1952), pp. 849–352.

13 Of the same opinion, see Richard Young, “The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,” in American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 38, No. 3, p. 244.

14 The viewpoints set forth by Judge McNair on pp. 183–185 (see likewise pp. 171–180) of the Judgment show that, according to these conditions, only very seldom would a state be able to prove special rights to certain water areas based on “historic title.”

15 He added, however: “Whether or not claims to bays of great breadth can be supported, apart from historic factors, is a question which does not need to be considered in this case.” However, he did not give his reasons therefor.