¹ Mr. Martin (Canada), in the Ad Hoc Political Committee, General Assembly, 10th Sess., Dec. 1, 1955. A/AC.80/P.V.25, at 43–5. Since then the Security Council recommended the admission of three new states, the Sudan on Feb. 6, 1956, Morocco on July 20, 1956, and Tunisia on July 26, 1956. See United Nations Review, Volume 3, No. 3, p. 1. There is no doubt that the General Assembly will admit these states at its 11th session, thereby raising the membership to 79 states.

² A/P.V.555, at 23–25.

³ Spain applied in the course of the Tenth Session by letter dated Sept. 23, 1955. Docs. A/2984 and S/3441/Rev. 1.

⁴ Afghanistan (Nov. 19, 1946), Burma (March 17, 1948), Iceland (Nov. 19, 1946), Israel (May 11, 1949), Pakistan (Sept. 30, 1947), Sweden (Nov. 19, 1946), Thailand (Dec. 16, 1946), Yemen (Sept. 30, 1947), and Indonesia (Sept. 28, 1950). Summary statement by the Secretary General on Matters of which the Security Council is Seized and on the Stage Beached in their Consideration, Doc. S/2310, p. 23.

⁵ Jordan, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Austria, Finland, Ceylon, Republic of Korea, Nepal, Libya, Japan, Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos. The General Assembly expressed itself in favor of the admission of these states in Resolutions 113 (II), 197(III), 296 (IV), and 620 (VII).

⁶ Albania, Mongolian People’s Republic, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam.

⁷ Security Council, Official Records, First Year, 2nd Ser., No. 4, pp. 41–43. Memorandum on the Historical Background of the Question of the Admission of New Members, U. N. Doc. A/AC.64/L.1, p. 20.

⁸ General Assembly Resolution 113B(II), adopted Nov. 17, 1947.

⁹ [1948] I.C.J. Reports 57 at 65; see also infra, p. 822.

¹⁰ General Assembly, 3rd Sess., Official Records, Pt. 1, Doc. A/810, p. 30.

¹¹ On this point see Fitzmaurice, G. G., “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: International Organizations and Tribunals,” 29 British Year Book of International Law 1-62 (1952)Google Scholar at 53.

¹² S. Res. 239, 80th Cong., 2d Sess.

¹³ General Assembly, 3rd Sess., Official Records, Pt. II, Doc. A/900, p. 7.

¹⁴ General Assembly Resolution 296 (IV) J.

¹⁵ [1950] I.C.J. Reports 4 at 10; see also Leo Gross, “Election of States to United Nations Membership,” Proceedings, American Society of International Law, 1954, pp. 37–59 at p. 47.

¹⁶ See Report of the Special Committee on Admission of New Members, Doc. A/2400, pp. 8–9, and Leo Gross, loc. cit., 44 ff.

¹⁷ [1950] I.C.J. Reports 10.

¹⁸ “Memorandum of points for consideration in the development of a twenty-year programme for achieving peace through the United Nations” submitted by the Secretary General on July 26, 1950, Doc. A/1304, par. 5. See also General Assembly Res. 494(V) of Nov. 20, 1950, in which the Secretary General was commended for his initiative. General Assembly, 5th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 20, p. 79.

¹⁹ “We re-affirm the validity of this principle of universality. The United Nations system makes ample room for diversity within a universal framework. We believe it would be a disaster if efforts to realize the principle of universality in practice were to be abandoned now. We believe that the greatest efforts should, on the contrary, be directed towards achieving in fact true universality in the membership and programmes of the United Nations and of those of the specialized agencies which are founded on that principle.” Seventh Beport of the Administrative Committee on. Coordination to the Economic and Social Council, Doc. E/1682, May 11, 1950, pp. 2–3.

²⁰ See above, p. 792. Typical is Res. 506(VI) adopted on Feb. 1, 1952: “The General Assembly, considering that the Charter of the United Nations provides that membership is open to all States not original Members of the Organization and that this universality is subject only to the conditions that they be peace-loving and accept the obligations contained in the Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations,

“Considering that the judgment of the Organization that they are willing and able to carry out these obligations and are otherwise qualified for membership ought to be based on facts such as: the maintenance of friendly relations with other States, the fulfilment of international obligations and the record of a State’s willingness and present disposition to submit international claims or controversies to pacific means of settlement established by international law,

“Considering that, according to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 28 May 1948, a Member of the United Nations voting on the application of a State for membership in the United Nations is not juridically entitled to make its consent to admission dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Charter; and that this opinion excludes the possibility that, consistently with the letter and spirit of the Charter, Members can base their votes on motives which are outside the scope of Article 4 of the Charter….” General Assembly, 6th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 20, p. 4. It seems to have escaped the Assembly that there may well be a contradiction or incompatibility between the first and third “considering” on the one hand, and the second on the other. On this point, see Gross, loc. cit. at 42.

²¹ At the Sixth Session the Soviet proposal for the admission of fourteen states was adopted in the First Committee of the Assembly by a majority of 21 to 12, with 25 abstentions, and in the plenary meeting by 22 to 21, with 16 abstentions. Official Records, 6th Sess., First Committee, p. 257, Plenary, p. 469. At the Seventh Session a similar Soviet move was supported by 20 members in the Committee and by 9 in the plenary meeting. Official Records, 7th Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, p. 317, Plenary, p. 480.

²² The 19 Members were: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Greece, Lebanon, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, the United States of America. Under its terms of reference the Special Committee was “to make a detailed study of the question of the admission of States to membership in the United Nations, examining the proposals and suggestions which have been made in the General Assembly and its Committees or which may be submitted to the Special Committee by any Member of the United Nations, such study to be conducted in the light of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the discussions in the General Assembly and its Committees, the debates in the Security Council, the advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the other antecedents of the question and the principles of international law.” General Assembly Ees. 620A(VII) of Dec. 21, 1952, 7th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 20, p. 10.

²³ Report of the Special Committee on Admission of New Members, Doc. A/2400, p. 17.

²⁴ 8th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 17, p. 5.

²⁵ 8th Sess., Official Records, Ad Hoc Political Committee, p. 15.

²⁶ Doc. A/2720, Sept. 3, 1954. General Assembly, 9th Sess., Official Records, Annexes, Agenda item 21, pp. 3–4.

²⁷ Res. 817(IX) General Assembly, 9th Sess., Official Records, Supp. No. 21 (A/2890), p. 8. For the vote on the draft resolution (Doe. A/AC.76/L.11/Rev.1) in the Ad Hoc Political Committee see ibid., Annexes, Agenda Item 21, p. 15, and in the General Assembly, ibid., Verbatim Records of Meetings, p. 330.

²⁸ The Security Council had not held any meetings on the membership question since September, 1952. Doc. S/3410, p. 24.

²⁹ In Commemoration of the Tenth Anniversary of the Signing of the Charter of the United Nations in the City of San Francisco on June 26, 1945, Proceedings of the Commemorative Meetings (U.N. Publication, Sales No.: 1955 I.26), pp. 61, 65, 67, 83, 85, 121, 135, 136, 162, 178, 180, 196, 199, 213, 250, 259, 266, 296.

³⁰ Preliminary Report of the Committee of Good Offices on the Admission of New Members. Doc. A/2973, Sept. 19, 1955, pars. 5, 6 (emphasis supplied).

³¹ Ibid. at 12 (emphasis supplied).

³² A/AC.80/P.V.25, at 12, 14–15. The 16 applicants were: Albania, the Mongolian People’s Republic, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria, Ceylon, Nepal, Laos, Cambodia, Libya. Doc. A/AC.80/P.V./25, at 46 f.

³³ Docs. S/3441/Rev. 1 and A/2984.

³⁴ A/AC.80/P.V.25, at 17–20, 21.

³⁵ Docs. A/AC.80/L.3, A/AC.80/L.3/Add. 1 and 2, and A/AC.80/L.3/Add. 2/Rev.1. (emphasis supplied). The original 25 sponsors were: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Yemen and Yugoslavia. The three additional co-sponsors were: Chile, Ecuador, Ethiopia.

³⁶ China was not consulted. See Mr. Tsiang’s remark, Doe. A/AC.80/P.V.26 (Dec. 2, 1955) at 2–5.

³⁷ The amendment proposed to replace the words “of all those countries about which no problem of unification arises” by the following: “of eighteen States (Albania, the Mongolian People’s Republic, Jordan, Portugal, Ireland, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Japan, Laos, and Spain).” Doc. A/AC.80/L.5, Nov. 18, 1955. See also Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.25, at 54–55.

³⁸ For comparable comments of Netherlands, Burma, Philippines, Australia, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Docs. A/AC.80/P.V.25 (Dec. 1, 1955) at 61, A/AC.80/P.V.26 (Dec. 2, 1955) at 42, 54–55, A/AC.80/P.V.28 (Dec. 5, 1955) at 37, 53, 77–78, 79.

³⁹ Doc. A/AC.80/L.3/Rev.1, Dec. 2, 1955. The added words are emphasized.

⁴⁰ Thus Indonesia, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.30 (Dec. 6, 1955) at 21; Guatemala, ibid. at 53; India, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.31 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 86; Canada, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V. 32 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 13; Mexico, ibid. at 17; United Kingdom, ibid. at 21.

⁴¹ Ibid. 26. A change in the Soviet attitude was intimated earlier in the day; see Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.31 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 63–65.

⁴² Mr. Krishna Menon (India), ibid. at 86.

⁴³ Docs. A/AC.80/L.7, A/AC.80/L.8 and Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.27 (Dec. 5, 1955) at 22. The text of the Cuban amendment (A/AC.80/L.7) is as follows: 1. Delete the first paragraph of the preamble and insert the following: “Having noted the general sentiment which has been expressed on numerous occasions that the United Nations should have the widest possible membership of States possessing the qualifications required by Article 4 of the United Nations Charter,”. 2. Delete the fourth paragraph of the preamble and insert the following: “Believing that a broader representation in the membership of the United Nations will, provided that the Members possess the qualifications required by Article 4 of the Charter, enable the Organization to play a more effective role in the current international situation,”. 3. Delete paragraph 2 of the operative part and insert the following: “2. Requests the Security Council, in the light of the general opinion that the United Nations should have the widest possible membership of States possessing the qualifications required by Article 4 of the Charter, to consider the pending applications for membership in accordance with the principles established by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 28 May 1948;”. 4. Delete paragraph 3 of the operative part and insert the following: “3. Requests further that the Security Council, in accordance with the principles established by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of 28 May 1948, make its report on these applications to the General Assembly during the present session.”

⁴⁴ Doc. A/AC.80/L.8.

⁴⁵ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.31 (Dee. 7, 1955) at 47; Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.32 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 11.

⁴⁶ Ibid. at 17, 18–20.

⁴⁷ Docs. A/AC.80/P.V.27 (Dee. 5, 1955) at 69 (Poland); A/AC.80/P.V.28 (Dee. 5, 1955) at 76 (Yugoslavia; the Yugoslav Delegation opposed both the Cuban amendment and the sub-amendment); A/AC.80/P.V.30 (Dee. 6, 1955) at 22 (Indonesia); ibid. at 42 (Afghanistan); A/AC.80/P.V.31 (Dee. 7, 1955) at 62 (U.S.S.B.); A/AC.80/P.V.32 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 13 (Canada); ibid. at 17 (Mexico; Mexico considered that the amendments to the joint draft resolution of 28 “would destroy the very delicate balance in the wording of the draft resolution.”); ibid. at 21 (TJ.K.) ; ibid. at 22 (El Salvador) ; ibid. at 27 (Colombia). The delegate of Colombia stated that his delegation “has never been in agreement with, nor has it accepted, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, in 1948, which, as we all know, is not binding in character.” See also the statements by the delegates of Greece, A/AC.80/P.V.28 (Dee. 5, 1955) at 12, and Thailand, A/AC.80/P.V.30 (Dec. 6, 1955) at 37.

⁴⁸ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.32 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 31. See infra for decision on Cuban amendment.

⁴⁹ Mr. Shukairy (Syria), A/AC.80/P.V.28 (Dec. 5, 1955) at 38.

⁵⁰ For rationalizations of the inevitable change of attitude, see remarks by Mr. Martin, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.25 at 31, 32, and the delegations of Australia, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.28 at 32–36, Panama, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.30 at 11, and India, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.31 at 66.

⁵¹ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.25 (Dec. 1, 1955) at 43–45.

⁵² Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.26 (Dec. 2, 1955) at 68. The delegate of Pakistan invoked Art. 3 in support of Art. 4 to demonstrate that the authors of the Charter intended the Organization to be universal, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.28 (Dec. 5, 1955) at 52. The principle of universality was also supported by The Netherlands, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.25 (Dec. 1, 1955) at 58–60; Egypt, ibid. at 57; Burma, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.26 (Dec. 2, 1955) at 46; Iraq, ibid. at 56; Greece, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.28 (Dec. 5, 1955) at 6; Ukrainian S.S.E., ibid. at 13–15; Lebanon, ibid. at 56; Iceland, ibid. at 66; Argentine, ibid. at 81; Dominican Republic, ibid. at 89; Thailand, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.38 (Dec. 6, 1955) at 36; Afghanistan, ibid. at 41; Liberia, ibid. at 43; Saudi Arabia, ibid. at 47; Guatemala, ibid. at 52; Yemen, ibid. at 61; Ecuador, ibid. at 73; Uruguay, ibid. at 78; Mexico, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.32 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 16; Colombia, ibid. at 26; Bolivia, ibid. at 32.

⁵³ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.30 (Dec. 6, 1955) at 57.

⁵⁴ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.32 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 2–10.

⁵⁵ Doe. A/AC.80/P.V.26 (Dec. 2, 1955) at 6. Mr. Tsiang noted, however, “that there are a goodly number of delegations which, while believing in the principle of univerality, reject the package deal.”

⁵⁶ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.28 (Dec. 5, 1955) at 23–25.

⁵⁷ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.30 (Dec. 6, 1955) at 12, 13–15.

⁵⁸ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.32 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 33–35, 36. See also Burma, Doc. A/AC. 80/P.V.26 (Dec. 2, 1955) at 47; Australia, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.28 (Dec. 5, 1955) at 23–25, Greece, ibid. at 2–5; Argentina, ibid. at 84–85; Ecuador, A/AC.80/P.V.30 (Dec. 6, 1955) at 67; Honduras, ibid. at 84.

⁵⁹ [1948] I.C.J. Reports 57, at 64.

⁶⁰ Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law viii.

⁶¹ It may be noted that the joint draft resolution referred to the applications of countries, whereas Art. 4 of the Charter refers to “states.” The Soviet amendment (A/AC.80/L.5) used the term “states.” The sponsors of the joint draft resolution did not accept this rather obvious correction. It is a matter of speculation why the term “country” was preferred. It has no legal significance in international law. It may be that this curious terminology was designed to avoid a discussion of whether Outer Mongolia, one of the eighteen “countries,” would technically and strictly qualify as “state” in the international law sense of this term or, at the very least, in the Charter sense of the term.

⁶² Doc. A/P.V.552 (Dec. 8, 1955) at 58–60, 62.

⁶³ Doc. A/A.C.80/P.V.28 (Dec. 5, 1955) ; see below, p. 809.

⁶⁴ Ibid. at 27.

⁶⁵ Ibid. at 31, 32. Other delegations also explained their favorable attitude towards the “somewhat abnormal” or, from a juridical point of view, the less than perfect procedure by the use or abuse of the veto. See Turkey, ibid. at 29, Argentina, ibid. at 86.

⁶⁶ Idid. at 42.

⁶⁷ A/AC.80/P.V.31 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 3.

⁶⁸ ibid. at 61. Mr. Krishna Menon, ibid. at 71, based his views regarding the joint draft resolution on the equivalence of majority and minority opinions of members of the International Court of Justice in the first admission case (Advisory Opinion of May 28, 1948). In their joint dissenting opinion Judges Basdevant, Winiarski, Sir Arnold McNair and Read declared: “But it would be a strange interpretation which gave a Member freedom to base its vote upon a certain consideration and at the same time forbade it to invoke that consideration in the discussion preceding the vote. Such a result would not conduce to that frank exchange of views which is an essential condition of the healthy functioning of an international organization. It is true that it is not possible to fathom the hidden reasons for a vote and there exists no legal machinery for rectifying a vote which may be cast contrary to the Charter in the Security Council or the General Assembly. But that does not mean that there are no rules of law governing Members of the United Nations in voting in either of these organs; an example is to be found in paragraph 1 of Article 4 prohibiting the admission of a new Member which does not fulfill the qualifications specified therein. This distinction, which it has been attempted to introduce between the actual vote and the discussion preceding it, cannot be accepted; it would be inconsistent with the actual terms of the question submitted to the Court, and its recognition would involve the risk of undermining that respect for good faith which must govern the discharge of the obligations contained in the Charter (Article 2, paragraph 2).” [1948] I.C.J. Reports 47, at 29–30 (emphasis supplied).

⁶⁹ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.28 (Dec. 5, 1955) at 46.

⁷⁰ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.26 (Dec. 2, 1955) at 11.

⁷¹ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.27 (Dec. 5, 1955) at 16, 61. The Cuban delegate also blamed the veto for “the package or the cocktail that international public opinion is being asked to swallow.” Doc. A/P.V.552 (Dee. 8, 1955) at 23–25.

⁷² Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.30 (Dec. 6, 1955) at 57–61. Speaking two days later in the plenary meeting of the Assembly, the delegate of Israel stated: “We are told, either you admit eighteen States in a package or else you admit none, either you recognize that according to the provisions of the Charter all eighteen of the applicant States are peace-loving and accept and are able to carry out the obligations of the Charter and are willing to do so, or else the doors of the United Nations will be closed to all eighteen States without exception.” Doc. A/P.V.552 (Dec. 8, 1955) at 37.

⁷³ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.32 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 17, 18–20. See also the observations of the Greek Delegation, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.28 (Dec. 5, 1955) at 6 ff.; the Dominican Delegation, ibid. at 89; and the Paraguayan Delegation, Doc. A/P.V.552 (Dec. 8, 1955) at 41.

⁷⁴ A/P.V.552 (Dec. 8, 1955) at 42, 43–45; see also Doc. A/AC.801/P.V.32 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 2–10 for the French position in the Ad Hoc Committee.

⁷⁵ Doc. S/P.V.708 (Dec. 21, 1955) at 28, 29.

⁷⁶ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.31 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 51.

⁷⁷ Ibid. at 52.

⁷⁸ Ibid. at 52, 53–55 (emphasis supplied). Mr. Lodge repeated the substance of this statement at the 701st and 704th meetings of the Security Council, Dec. 10 and 13, 1955. Docs. S/P.V.701 at 35 f. and S/P.V.704 at 40–42.

⁷⁹ Doc. A/P.V.552 at 63–65.

⁸⁰ Doc. S/P.V.708 (Dec. 2, 1955) at 28, 29.

⁸¹ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.25 at 14–15, 16 (emphasis supplied). It is not clear on what grounds Mr. Belaunde claims the principle of abstention as a “Latin” principle.

⁸² See supra, p. 799.

⁸³ Doe. A/AC.80/P.V.32 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 52–58. The delegate of Prance, however, speaking in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on the following day, said that only six Members, namely, Cuba, Belgium, The Netherlands, Israel, France and the United States had voted in favor of the Cuban amendment (see Doc. A/P.V.552 (Dec. 8, 1955) at 42). This does not correspond to the verbatim record of the Ad Hoc Political Committee referred to above.

⁸⁴ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.25 (Dec. 1, 1955) at 37.

⁸⁵ ibid. at 41.

⁸⁶ ibid. at 37 ff.

⁸⁷ Ibid. at 38–40; see also A/AC.80/P.V.32 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 14–15.

⁸⁸ See, for example, New Zealand, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.26 (Dec. 2, 1955) at 36; Greece, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.28 (Dec. 5, 1955) at 8 (but see A/P.V.552 at 11 for reservations regarding Albania and Outer Mongolia); Syria, ibid. at 42: “This language (Membership in the United Nations is open …) establishes a presumption of admissibility, and not a presumption of prohibition”; Lebanon, ibid. at 57; Iceland, ibid. at 66; Indonesia, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.30 (Dec. 6, 1955) at 13–15; Thailand, ibid. at 37; Afghanistan, ibid. at 42; Liberia, ibid. at 43; Costa Rica, ibid. at 85; India, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.31 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 69–70 f.; Mexico, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.32 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 16; El Salvador, ibid. at 22.

⁸⁹ Gross, loc. cit. 39 ff.

⁹⁰ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.28 (Dec. 5, 1955) at 28.

⁹¹ SirPitzmaurice, Gerald, “The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: International Organizations and Tribunals,” 29 British Year Book of International Law 1–62 (1952) at 54 ff.;Google Scholar Gross, loc. cit. at 45.

⁹² Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.28 (Dec. 5, 1955) at 28. Sir Percy was apparently also of the opinion that in adopting the joint draft resolution of 28, the United Nations was doing something in the nature of an amendment to the Charter or laying a precedent for the future. He said: “I gain some satisfaction from the fact that, if what we are doing is, as I think it to be, contrary to the express provision of the Charter, it will be done by the expression of an overwhelming body of opinion within this Assembly—endorsed, I hope, in the Security Council. An amendment of the Charter would, after all, require no more—for Article 108 provides that amendment may be affected by two-thirds of the Assembly—and that will truly be forthcoming for this resolution—and a majority of the Security Council including the permanent members…. We are, in truth, taking a far-reaching step in this resolution. We are laying down a new practice; for it will be a bold man who, in the future, will call in aid Article 4 and its requirements that an applicant shall be a ‘peace-loving State’ and one which accepts the obligations contained in the Charter and is, in the opinion of the Organization, able and willing to carry out those obligations. I do not seek to place any interpretation upon these important words. It is sufficient for me, however, to say that I do not agree with the somewhat nebulous rules of construction which I have heard referred to in this debate and which reduce them to a meaningless collection of letters.” ibid. at 36, 37.

⁹³ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.30 (Dec. 6, 1955) at 67. This delegate, however, was willing to concede that “we are making a new political rule in the interpretation of this Article.” See statements by Chinese delegate, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.31 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 41 ff.; and Cuban delegate, Doc. A/P.V.552 (Dec. 8, 1955) at 31.

⁹⁴ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.32 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 21.

⁹⁵ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.28 (Dec. 5, 1955) at 38. Similar appeals were made by Iraq, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.26 (Dec. 2, 1955) at 61, Thailand, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.30 (Dec. 6, 1955) at 37, Saudi Arabia, ibid. at 51, Ecuador, ibid. at 77, and Peru, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.31 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 27. The Peruvian delegate quoted the following statement from a confidential document which he did not further identify: “Mr. Tsiang … said that he sticks to the rules of every case according to its own merits; but, at the same time, his judgment will be impartial, and, in any case of reasonable doubt, the doubt will be interpreted to the profit of the applicant. He has some suggestions, and will be delighted to speak to us at any time.”

⁹⁶ Ibid. at 47. Mr. Tsiang offered to submit evidence that Mongolia had participated in aggression in Korea. Ibid. Since it is not the purpose of this paper to examine the eligibility of the eighteen states, it is sufficient to refer to comments made by delegates in the debates concerning Outer Mongolia.

⁹⁷ Doc. 8/P.V.704 (Dec. 13, 1955) at 44.

⁹⁸ Sir Carl Berendsen (New Zealand), in General Assembly, 2nd Sess., Official Records, Plenary, p. 695.

⁹⁹ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.30 (Dec. 6, 1955) at 68–70. According to this delegate the Latin American group was represented by two of its members on the Security Council, by four on the Economic and Social Council, and by five on the International Court of Justice. Ibid. 71.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. See also statements by the delegate of Bolivia, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.32 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 37, and Chile, Doc. A/557 (Dec. 15, 1955) at 62.

¹⁰¹ Burma was elected to balance its composition between administering and non-administering nations. 2 United Nations Review 6 (March, 1956); see also Docs. T/1224 and T/L.633 for suggested consequential revision of the Council’s Rules of Procedure.

¹⁰² Art. 9 of the Statute.

¹⁰³ Senator Alexander Wiley, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, observed that, if any substantial number of applicants are admitted to the United Nations, “their votes could have ‘a drastic effect’ on the present voting which ‘has worked well for us.’” Preface to Representation and Voting in the United Nations General Assembly, Staff Study No. 4 (September, 1954), Committee Print, 83rd Cong., 2d Bess., p. iii. This Staff Study concluded that, on the one hand, if the organization continues to expand, “a reconsideration of the voting provisions in the General Assembly might become a more pressing issue,” and on the other hand, while “theoretically, there may be logical reasons for supporting a system of weighted voting for the General Assembly,” from a practical point of view “it might be better to let well enough alone.” Ibid. pp. 6, 23.

¹⁰⁴ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.28 (Dec. 5, 1955) at 11.

¹⁰⁵ Earlier in his speech Mr. Malik referred to the phenomenon of an abstention “of a mass nature.”

¹⁰⁶ Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.31 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 62.

¹⁰⁷ The U. K. delegate, Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.32 (Dec. 7, 1955) at 21.

¹⁰⁸ The amendment to the first paragraph of the preamble was rejected by 38 votes to 7, with 14 abstentions; the first paragraph was adopted by 48 votes to 2, with 4 abstentions ; the second and third paragraphs of the draft resolution were adopted by 53 votes to none, with 6 abstentions; the Cuban amendment to the fourth paragraph of the preamble was rejected by 37 votes to 7, with 15 abstentions; the fourth paragraph was adopted by 53 votes to 2, with 4 abstentions; paragraph 1 of the operative part was adopted by 51 votes to none, with 8 abstentions; the Cuban amendment to paragraph 2 of operative part was rejected by 38 votes to 7, with 14 abstentions, and the paragraph adopted by 52 votes to 2, with 5 abstentions; the Cuban amendment to paragraph 3 of the operative part was rejected by 37 votes to 7, with 15 abstentions, and the paragraph adopted by 52 votes to 2, with 4 abstentions. The United States, France and China voted in favor of all Cuban amendments, the Soviet Union opposed them all, and the United Kingdom abstained. Ibid. at 52–58.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. at 59–60.

¹¹⁰ A/P.V.552 (Deo. 8, 1955) at 71. For text of resolution, see Doc. A/3079, at 7, and S/3467.

¹¹¹ Ibid. at 72.

¹¹² Doc. S/P.V.701 (Dec. 10, 1955) at 33–34; the draft resolutions were Docs. S/3468–3480.

¹¹³ Ibid. at 28. The text of the Soviet proposal was as follows: “The Security Council, Bearing in mind the General Assembly resolution A/EES/357 of 8 December 1955 on the admission of new Members to the United Nations, Kesolves to examine the applications for admission to the United Nations of the eighteen States referred to in the said General Assembly resolution in the chronological order of their receipt, on the understanding that the Council shall take a separate decision on each application and will begin to consider each application after the General Assembly has completed its consideration of the Security Council’s recommendation on the preceding application; Empowers the President of the Security Council to reach agreement with the President of the General Assembly concerning the above-mentioned procedure for the examination of applications.” Ibid. at 29–31.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. at 38 (emphasis supplied).

¹¹⁵ Ibid. at 37 (emphasis supplied).

¹¹⁶ Doc. S/P.V.703 (Dee. 13, 1955) at 7, 8–9, 10, 26–27, and Doc. S/3506.

¹¹⁷ Sir Pierson Dixon was first in objecting to the Chinese draft resolutions and said “it would be quite wrong to begin” with them. Doc. S/P.V.701 (Dee. 10, 1955) at 24.

¹¹⁸ S/P.V.702 (Dec. 10, 1955) at 2. Similar statements were made by Mr. Entezam, Sir Pierson Dixon and Mr. Belaunde, ibid. at 18, 23 f., 26 f.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. at 29 ff. Mr. Sobolev based his adamant position on the argument that “according to a preliminary estimate, some twenty delegations have either not stated their positions, or have made express reservations to the effect that they would not support all eighteen countries. I would therefore ask Sir Pierson Dixon whether he could guarantee that all the fifty-two delegations which voted for the draft resolution will support all eighteen States without exception.”

¹²⁰ Doc. S/P.V.703 (Dee. 13, 1955) at 3 (emphasis supplied). For background speculation see William R. Frye, “18-17-16 and Why We Lost the Game,” The Reporter (Jan. 28, 1956) at 17.

¹²¹ Ibid. at 28.

¹²² See supra, p. 814.

¹²³ Ibid. at 28.

¹²⁴ S/P.V.704 (Dec. 13, 1955) at 3–4, 10.

¹²⁵ Ibid. at 8. “This is a difficult moment for me,” he admitted, “and a very important moment for me. In replying to you, Sir, I have to fall back on the words of a great historical figure in European history, ‘Ich kann nicht anders,’ ‘I cannot do otherwise.’” Mr. Sobolev’s comment may be noted: “Actually, nothing else was to be expected from a person whose days, perhaps even hours, in the United Nations are numbered.”

¹²⁶ Ibid. at 6, 8, 9, 10.

¹²⁷ Ibid. at 23.

¹²⁸ ibid. at 24.

¹²⁹ ibid. at 25.

¹³⁰ The result of voting was as follows: Jordan 10:1 (U.S.S.R.); Ireland 10:1 (U.S.S.R.); Portugal 10:1 (U.S.S.R.); Hungary 9:0:2 (China, United States); Italy 10:1 (U.S.S.R.); Austria 10:1 (U.S.S.R.); Rumania 9:0:2 (China, United States); Bulgaria 9:0:2 (China, United States); Finland 10:1 (U.S.S.R.); Ceylon 10:1 (U.S.S.R.); Nepal 10:1 (U.S.S.R.); Libya 10:1 (U.S.S.R.);’ Cambodia 10:1 (U.S.S.R.); Japan 10:1 (U.S.S.R.); Laos 10:1 (U.S.S.R.); Spain 9:1 (U.S.S.R.): 1 (Belgium). Ibid. at 26–32. It is remarkable that throughout the voting the President never used the term “veto” or “rejected” but correctly stated: “As the negative vote was cast by a permanent member of the Security Council, the name of … is not included.” It would be most desirable if this example were emulated by other Presidents of the Security Council.

¹³¹ Ibid. at 33.

¹³² Speaking in the Security Council on Dec. 13, 1955, only a few hours before the voting, Mr. Tsiang, summing up his position in an eloquent and moving address, said: “The Soviet Union stand is: eighteen or none. According to the speeches here on Saturday, I understand that the sponsors and the supporters of this draft resolution answer: yes, all eighteen. Therefore, in the substance of this matter, the sponsors and the supporters again made a total surrender to the dictates of the Soviet Union. There is no compromise, there is no consideration of the viewpoint of the other delegations; that is the naked nature of this paragraph.” Doc. S/P.V.703 at 8–9.

¹³³ Doc. S/P.V. 704, at 45. Like Sir Leslie Munro, Sir Pierson Dixon (United Kingdom) was of the opinion that both permanent members, in casting vetoes, have abused the veto. Ibid. at 46. Mr. Sobolev, defending the Soviet Union against the charge of rigidity and inflexibility, pointed out that in fact the Soviet Union had not maintained an uncompromising attitude. At the beginning of the Tenth Session of the Assembly the Soviet Union proposed the admission of sixteen states. In the course of the session, it agreed to support the additional candidacy of both Japan and Spain. Ibid. 47 f.

¹³⁴ Doc. S/P.V.705 (Dec. 14, 1955) at 3.

¹³⁵ Ibid. at 4–7.

¹³⁶ Ibid. at 4–7–9–10.

¹³⁷ The vote on Albania was 8:0:3 (Belgium, China, U. S.); on Jordan, Ireland, and Portugal unanimous; Hungary 9:0:2 (China, U. S.); Italy and Austria unanimous; Rumania and Bulgaria 9:0:2 (China, U. S.); Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, and Laos unanimous; Spain 10:0:1 (Belgium). ibid. at 12–21.

¹³⁸ Ibid. at 22.

¹³⁹ Ibid. at 23.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. at 39–40, 41.

¹⁴¹ Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Syria, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Bolivia, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Iceland, Honduras, Pakistan, Poland, Thailand, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yemen.

¹⁴² Doc. A/P.V.555 at 3.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ The result of voting was as follows: Albania 48:3 (Cuba, Greece, China): 5 (Dominican Republic, Netherlands, Philippines, United States, Belgium); Jordan 55:0:1 (Israel); Ireland, Portugal: unanimous; Hungary 49:2 (China, Cuba): 5 (Greece, Netherlands, Philippines, United States, Dominican Republic); Italy, Austria: unanimous; Rumania 49:2 (China, Cuba): 5 (same as in case of Hungary); Bulgaria 50:2 (China, Cuba): 5 (same as in case of Hungary); Finland, Ceylon, Nepal; unanimous; Libya 56:0:1 (Israel); Cambodia, Laos: unanimous; Spain: 55:0:2 (Belgium, Mexico). Ibid. at 4–22.

¹⁴⁵ ibid. at 23–25. South Africa, Paraguay and Haiti were absent during the voting; Ethiopia was absent during the voting on the first eight applicants. However, Paraguay and Haiti requested subsequently that their votes be “registered.” Paraguay desired to “register” its abstention with regard to Albania, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria; the delegates of Haiti and Ethiopia declared that they supported all 16 applicants. The General Assembly “decided” to “record” the votes of these three delegations. A/P.V.556 (Dec. 15, 1955) at 3–5, 52, 61. It is difficult to see how the Assembly, in view of the fact that there was no vote on the draft resolution as a whole, could decide to “record” abstentions except in a purely formal sense “for the record.” On the other hand, it is interesting to note that China, Belgium and the United States, which had abstained, did not request that they be registered as abstaining on the draft resolution as a whole.

¹⁴⁶ Doc. A/P.V.556 (Dec. 15, 1955) at 36. It is interesting to note that in the list of those who were regarded as instrumental in steering the organs of the United Nations towards the “solution” of the problem of membership the names of Messrs. Martin (Canada), Belaunde (Peru), Maza (Chile), Sir Lesie Munro (New Zealand), and Dag Hanunarskjöld, the Secretary General of the United Nations, were frequently included.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. at 12.

¹⁴⁸ Doc. S/P.V.706 (Dec. 15, 1955) at 5–10, and Doc. S/3512.

¹⁴⁹ See observations by Peru, Doc. S/P.V.706 (Dec. 15, 1955) at 33, 44–45, Belgium, at 39, France at 41, Iran at 46, U. K., Doc. S/P.V.708 (Dec. 21, 1955) at 4–5 f. Neither of the resolutions was adopted by the Council. The American draft resolution received 10 votes in favor, 1 against (U.S.S.R.), and the Soviet draft received 1 vote in favor (U.S.S.R.), while 10 abstained. Doc. S/P.V.706 at 50. A very similar discussion was provoked by a British proposal declaring Japan to be fully qualified for membership and a Soviet amendment declaring both Outer Mongolia and Japan to be fully qualified and expressing the hope that both would soon be admitted. Ibid. at 51–55, and Doc. S/P.V.708 at 2. The “unequal” package deal was opposed by France, Ibid. at 11; the XI. S., ibid. at 12–13; Belgium, ibid. at 14; Turkey, ibid. at 21; Iran, ibid. at 23. Later in the proceedings the Soviet amendment was voted upon, but received only one vote in favor (U.S.S.R.), while 10 members abstained. The consideration of the British proposal was postponed by the Council, with the Soviet Union abstaining. ibid. at 34, 36.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. at 15.

¹⁵¹ Ibid. at 17, 19–20.

¹⁵² Ibid. at 24.

¹⁵³ Ibid. at 26. The Soviet representative was in error in stating that the resolution was voted as a whole. This was not the case, though it is true that in effect the affirmative decisions taken individually were annulled or more correctly voted as not having taken place. See above, p. 818.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. at 30 (emphasis supplied).

¹⁵⁵ But see above, p. 801 ff., and below, p. 824, for statements which indicate the existence of some sort of arrangement or deal.

¹⁵⁶ See Gross, loc. cit. at 44, 57.

¹⁵⁷ [1948] I.C.J. Reports 65.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Commenting upon the Advisory Opinion of the Court, Charles De Visscher, who was a member of the Court at the time and voted with the majority, observed: “Bien que la question fût en soi une question juridique et que l’Assemblée générate ait par la suite recommandé aux Etats membres de se conformer à la réponse que la Cour y a faite, l’expérience a démontré qu’une consultation ayant un tel objet est dénuée d’intéêret pratique. Rien, en effet, n’oblige les Etats à motiver leurs votes, et les mobiles non exprimés échappent á tout contrúle. En définitive, les données du problème envisagé dans sa réalité totale débordaient le cadre de la question posée.” Théories et Réalités du Droit International Public 409 (1953).

¹⁶⁰ The author has argued elsewhere that in cases in which there is the majority required for non-procedural decisions in the Security Council, the abstention by a permanent member has the character of tacit consent. See Gross, “Voting in the Security Council: Abstention from Voting and Absence from Meetings,” 60 Yale Law Journal 209–257 at 226 (1951)Google Scholar. This view has been adopted by Julius Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 207 (1954), and SirFitzmaurice, Gerald, “ Inter Arma Silent Leges,” 1 Sydney Law Review 332–343 (1955), at 338Google Scholar, note 16: “The practice which has grown up in the Security Council of regarding a resolution as adopted provided no Permanent Member votes against it—i.e. contents itself with an abstention (and this despite the fact that Article 27, paragraph 3, requires a concurring vote of the Permanent Members)—is based on the view that silence implies consent.”

¹⁶¹ See above, pp. 801 ff.

¹⁶² Doc. A/AC.80/P.V.28 (Dec. 5, 1955) at 37 (emphasis supplied).

¹⁶³ Gross, loc. cit. 57.

¹⁶⁴ See above, p. 820, the United Kingdom proposal of Dee. 15, 1955, that the Security Council take note “that Japan is fully qualified for membership of the United Nations….” Doc. S/P.V.706 (Dec. 15, 1955) at 51–55.

¹⁶⁵ [1948] I.C.J. Reports 57, 91 ff., 71, 81.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid. 64.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid. 58, 65.

¹⁶⁸ Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations 813 (1951), argues that “the exenemy states are, in principle, outside the law of the Charter. This outlawry is permanent; for, according to the wording of Article 107, it is not terminated by the admission of an ex-enemy state to the Organization. The definition of the term ‘enemy state’ in Article 53, paragraph 2, applies also to states after they have become Members of the United Nations.” The learned author adds that this probably was not intended by the draftsmen of the Charter. But see the ambiguous statements in the official British Commentary on the Charter, Misc. Cmd. 6666, p. 9, and the Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U. S. Senate, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., on the Charter of the United Nations (1945), pp. 302 ff.