Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 February 2017
Nine years ago, Kenneth Abbott published an article exhorting international lawyers to read and master regime theory, arguing that it had multiple uses for the study of international law. He went as far as to call for a “joint discipline” that would bridge the gap between international relations theory (IR) and international law (IL). Several years later, one of us followed suit with an article mapping the history of the two fields and setting forth an agenda for joint research. Since then, political scientists and international lawyers have been reading and drawing on one another’s work with increasing frequency and for a wide range of purposes. Explicitly interdisciplinary articles have won the Francis Deák Prize, awarded for the best work by a younger scholar in this Journal, for the past two years running; the publication of an interdisciplinary analysis of treaty law in the Harvard International Law Journal prompted a lively exchange on the need to pay attention to legal as well as political details; and the Hague Academy of International Law has scheduled a short course on international law and international relations for its millennial lectures in the year 2000. Further, the American Society of International Law and the Academic Council on the United Nations System sponsor joint summer workshops explicidy designed to bring young IR and IL scholars together to explore the overlap between their disciplines.
1 See Kenneth, W. Abbott, Modem International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers , 14 Yale J. Int’l L. 335 (1989)Google Scholar.
2 Anne-Marie, Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda , 87 AJIL 205 (1993)Google Scholar.
3 One measure of this trend, albeit a crude and mechanical one, is a marked increase in cross-citations. A LEXIS/NEXIS search conducted in December 1997 revealed 41 citations to Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (1984), in the legal literature. Thirtynine of these citations appear in articles published after 1993, even though After Hegemony was published in 1984. Similarly, the term “regime theory” has been used 44 times since 1994, although only 6 times between 1990 and 1994; “Institutionalism” has been referred to 40 times after 1994, as compared to 6 between 1990 and 1994. Abbott’s Prospectus, published in 1989, has been cited 91 times, 34 since 1995; Slaughter’s Dual Agenda, published in 1993, has been cited 56 times, 38 since 1995 and 29 since 1996. The term “epistemic communities,” an important concept for some segments of the IR community, has been cited 30 times in the legal literature since 1990, 23 of them since 1993. Even political Realism, in its classical Thucydidean variant, is experiencing a modest revival, with 13 references since 1990, 10 of which were after 1994.
4 Jutta, Brunnée & Stephen, J. Toope, Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building , 91 AJIL 26 (1997)Google Scholar; Eyal, Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources Law , 90 AJIL 384 (1996)Google Scholar.
5 John, K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law , 37 Harv. Int’l L.J. 139 (1996)Google Scholar; Michael, Byers, Taking the Law out of International Law: A Critique of the Iterative Perspective , 38 Harv. Int’l L.J. 201 (1997)Google Scholar.
7 International Rules: Approaches from International Law and International Relations (Robert, J. Beck, Anthony, C. Arend & Robert, D. Vander Lugt eds., 1996)Google Scholar [hereinafter International Rules].
8 Robert, O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics , 38 Harv. Int’l L.J. 487 (1997)Google Scholar.
9 See Abbott, supra note 1.
10 See Slaughter, supra note 2; see also Anne-Marie, Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States , 6 Eur. J. Int’l L. 503 (1995)Google Scholar.
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12 The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Michael, E. Brown, Sean, M. Lynn-Jones & Steven, E. Miller eds., 1995)Google Scholar.
13 Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism: The Contemporary Debate (David, A. Baldwin ed., 1993)Google Scholar.
14 See John, J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions , Intl Security, Winter 1994–95, at 5 Google Scholar (arguing that institutions cannot prevent war by changing state behavior); Promises, Promises: Can Institutions Deliver? Int’l Security, Summer 1995, at 39 (responses to Mearsheimer by Robert, Keohane, Lisa, Martin, Charles, Kupchan, Clifford, Kupchan, John, Ruggie & Alexander, Wendt)Google Scholar; John, J. Mearsheimer, A Realist Reply , id. at 82 Google Scholar.
15 See Andrew, Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics , 51 Intl Org. 513 (1997)Google Scholar.
16 New Thinking in International Relations Theory (Michael, W. Doyle & John Ikenberry, G. eds., 1997)Google Scholar.
17 This vocabulary signals self-conscious use of common theoretical frameworks, facilitating active or passive collaboration on issues of interest to both disciplines. At the same time, however, such collaboration will not be possible or desirable on many issues that each discipline is likely to claim as its own.
18 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for a thoughtful discussion of the broader spectrum of interdisciplinary work. Any remaining errors of omission or commission are our own.
19 But see Cheryl, Shanks, Harold, K. Jacobson & Jeffrey, H. Kaplan, Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International Governmental Organizations, 1981–1992 , 50 Int’l Org. 593 (1996)Google Scholar (arguing that, within the general trend of increasing international cooperation, formal organizations have stopped proliferating).
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21 The classic account remains Joseph, H. H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe , 100 Yale L.J. 2403 (1991)Google Scholar. For a review of much of the legal and political science literature on the ECJ, and a definition of the elements of a community of law, see Laurence, R. Heifer & Anne-Marie, Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication , 107 Yale L.J. 273, 290–93, 366–70 (1997)Google Scholar.
22 The transformation of the GATT dispute resolution process from one that relies principally on political negotiation to a much more formal legal process in which the disputants present claims before a binding third-party tribunal has focused attention on judicialization as a wider phenomenon. See, e.g., Robert, E. Hudec, The Judicialization of GATT Dispute Settlement , in In whose interest? Due process and Transparency in International Trade 9 (Michael, M. Hart & Debra, P. Steger eds., 1992)Google Scholar; John, H. Jackson, The Legal Meaning of a GATT Dispute Settlement Report: Some Reflections , in Towards More Effective Supervision by International Organizations, Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers 149 (Niels, Blokker & Sam, Muller eds., 1994)Google Scholar; Alec, Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance , J. Comp. Pol. Stud, (forthcoming April 1999)Google Scholar (on file with authors); see also David, Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under NAFTA: Lessons from the Early Experience , 32 Tex. Int’l L.J. 163 (1997)Google Scholar.
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24 Much of the energy behind the recent turn to “governance” in public international law has come from IR theory. See, e.g., Oran, R. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society (1994)Google Scholar [hereinafter Young, International Governance]; Oran, R. Young, Introduction: The Effectiveness of International Governance Systems , in Global Environmental Change and International Governance 1 (Oran, Young et al. eds., 1996)Google Scholar; Governance Without Government: Orderand Change in World Politics (James, N. Rosenau & Ernst-Otto, Czempiel eds., 1992)Google Scholar.
25 See Harold, H. Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation , 100 Yale L.J. 2347 (1991)Google Scholar.
27 Oran, R. Young, Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory With International Applications (1979)Google Scholar; Thomas, M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (1990)Google Scholar; Chayes & Chayes, supra note 6; Engaging Countries: Strengthening Environmental Accords (Edith, Brown Weiss & Harold, K. Jacobson eds., 1997)Google Scholar.
28 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 6.
29 See Koh, Why Obey? supra note 11; Beth Simmons, Capacity, Commitment and Compliance: International Law and the Setdement of Territorial Disputes, paper delivered at Conference on Domestic Politics and International Law, St. Helena, Cal. (June 4–7, 1997) (on file with authors).
30 See Brian, Z. Tamanaha, An Analytical Map of Social Scientific Approaches to the Concept of Law , 15 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 501, 512 (1995)Google Scholar.
31 Annalise, Riles, Representing In-Between: Law, Anthropology, and the Rhetoric of Interdisciplinarity , 1994 U. Ill. L. Rev. 597, 633–36, 649–50 Google Scholar; see also Gunther, Teubner, How the Law Thinks: Toward a Constructivist Epistemology of Law , 23 L. & Socyrev. 727, 743, 745 (1989)Google Scholar.
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33 See Slaughter, supra note 10.
34 Rationalists share, at a minimum, a commitment to positivist social scientific research methods and the assumption that states are rational, unitary actors pursuing exogenously given preferences in an anarchic (selfhelp) world. See, e.g., Robert, O. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches , 2 Int’l Stud. Q. 379 (1989)Google Scholar; Ole, Waever, Figures of International Thought: Introducing Persons Instead of Paradigms , in The Future of International Relations: Masters in the Making 1, 19–21 (Iver, B. Neumann & Ole, Waever eds., 1997)Google Scholar [hereinafter Future of IR].
36 See, e.g., International Rules, supra note 7; Ronald, B. Mitchell, Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance (1994)Google Scholar; Anthony, C. Arend & Robert, J. Beck, International Law and the Use of Force: Beyond the U.N. Charter Paradigm (1993)Google Scholar; Judith, Goldstein, International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American “Unfair” Trade Laws , 50 Int’l Org. 541 (1996)Google Scholar; see also sources cited supra note 20.
36 See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 20. Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane and Anne-Marie Slaughter have convened a group of political scientists and international lawyers to study the phenomenon of “legalization” of international regimes. Harold Koh is editing a volume of essays by international relations scholars and international lawyers that includes contrasting approaches to international human rights. Finally, Michael Byers organized the 1998 annual meeting of the British branch of the International Law Association around the theme of international law and politics, explicitly featuring papers from both disciplines on subjects ranging from the sources of international law to the regulation of the international economy. These papers will also be published as an interdisciplinary edited volume.
37 See, e.g., Keohane, supra note 8; Young, International Governance, supra note 24. But see Oran, Young, Remarks, 86 ASIL Proc 172, 173–75 (1992)Google Scholar (pointing out the obstacles to interdisciplinary research).
38 See, e.g., Hedley, Bull, The Anarchical Society (1977)Google Scholar; Andrew, Hurrell, International Society and the Study of Regimes: A Reflective Approach , in Regime Theory and International Relations 49 (Volker, Rittberger & Peter, Mayer eds., 1993)Google Scholar (discussing the English school’s relation to international law and regime theory); Alexander, Wendt & Raymond, Duvall, Institutions and International Order , in Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges 51 (Ernst-Otto, Czempiel & James, S. Rosenau eds., 1989)Google Scholar (discussing the relation between Constructivism and the English school).
39 Many international organizations specialists are among the relatively small group of IR scholars who “are fluent in both languages” of law and IR, as Oran Young puts it. Young, supra note 37.
41 See, e.g., Kratochwil, supra note 11; Martha, Finnemore, International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy , 47 Int’l Org. 565 (1993)Google Scholar; Nicholas, G. Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (1989)Google Scholar; Kratochwil & Ruggie, supra note 20.
42 See Christian, Reus-Smit, The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions , 51 Int’l Org. 555 (1997)Google Scholar; Albert, S. Yee, The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies , 50 Int’l Org. 69 (1996)Google Scholar; Audie, Klotz, Norms Reconstituting Interests , 49 Int’l Org. 451 (1995)Google Scholar.
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44 See Risse-Kappen, Cooperation, supra note 43.
46 Benvenisti, supra note 4.
47 Robert, J. Schmidt, International Negotiations Paralyzed by Domestic Politics: Two-Level Game Theory and the Problem of the Pacific Salmon Commission , 26 Nw. Envtl. L. Rev. 95 (1996)Google Scholar; see also Miguel, Montañá-Mora, International Law and International Relations Cheek to Cheek: An International Law/International Relations Perspective on the U.S./EC Agricultural Export Subsidies Dispute , 19 N.C.J. Int’l L. & Com. Reg. 1 (1993)Google Scholar (seeking to use IR theory to explain the source of the U.S.-European Community agricultural export subsidies dispute during the Uruguay Round).
48 See David, Wippman, Practical and Legal Constraints on Internal Power Sharing , in International Law and Ethnic Conflict 211 (David, Wippman ed., 1998)Google Scholar.
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50 See, eg., Hugh, Ward, Game Theory and the Politics of the Global Commons , 37 J. Conflict Resol. 203 (1993)Google Scholar (demonstrating that some global commons issues may be best analyzed as a Prisoner’s Dilemma and others as a game of Chicken, and showing that different institutional responses are appropriate to each); Duncan, Snidal, Coordination vs. Prisoner’s Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes , 79 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 923 (1985)Google Scholar (predicting that agreements designed to deal with prisoners’ dilemmas will differ from those designed to cope with coordination problems).
51 Robert, O. Keohane, Studying Cooperation and Conflict: Intra-Rationalistic and Extra-Rationalistic Research Programs, talk at a roundtable on conflict and cooperation, American Political Science Association annual meeting, San Francisco (Aug. 1996)Google Scholar.
52 Compare Benvenisti, supra note 4 (analyzing freshwater resources, but not the institutions that manage them, as collective goods) with Abbott, supra note 1, at 379–81 (arguing that both collective goods themselves and the legal regimes designed to provide them present collective-action dilemmas that can be analyzed in terms of IR theory).
53 Kenneth, W. Abbott, “Trust But Verify”: The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agreements , 26 Cornell Int’l L.J. 1, 2 (1993)Google Scholar.
54 See Kenneth, W. Abbott, The Trading Nation’s Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of International Trade , 26 Harv. Int’l L.J. 501 (1985)Google Scholar.
55 See Abbott, supra note 53.
56 William, J. Aceves, Institutionalist Theory and International Legal Scholarship , 12 Am. U.J. Int’l L. & Poly 227 (1997)Google Scholar.
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59 Setear, supra note 5.
60 John, K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and Rationalist International Relations Theory: The Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility , 83 Va. L. Rev. 1, 8–10 (1997)Google Scholar. Setear also argues that, to the extent there is a divergence between what IR theory predicts and the legal doctrines, the doctrines should be modified to conform with the rationalist design hypothesis because rationalist Institutionalism provides a normative theory of how international arrangements should be organized. See id. at 8.
61 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 20.
62 Richard, H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU, NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development , 91 AJIL 231 (1997)Google Scholar; see also Waller, supra note 49.
63 Steinberg, supra note 62, at 232
64 In the now classic special issue of International Organization on regime theory, Robert Keohane observed that “ [understanding the function of international regimes helps . . . to explain why actors have an incentive to create them, and may therefore help to make behavior intelligible within a rational-choice mode of analysis that emphasizes the role of incentives and constraints.” Robert, O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes , in International Regimes 141, 149 n.22 (Stephen, D. Krasner ed., 1983)Google Scholar.
65 A recent article by Frank Garcia illustrates what such work might look like. Frank, J. Garcia, New Frontiers in International Trade: Decisionmaking and Dispute Resolution in the Free Trade Area of the Americas , 18 Mich. J. Int’l L. 357, 368–69 (1997)Google Scholar (drawing on Abbott & Snidal’s work on meso-institutions to make proposals concerning the governance structure of the Free Trade Area of the Americas).
66 Kenneth, W. Abbott & Duncan, Snidal, Mesoinstitutions, paper presented at Seminar on International Law and International Relations, Harvard Law School (1995)Google Scholar.
68 This—and a second article by Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participation by Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 359 (1996)—prompted a lively exchange with Philip Nichols over which school of IR theory supplies the best assumptions for the construction of the WTO. See Philip, Nichols, Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade Organization , id. at 851 Google Scholar.
69 David, J. Bederman, The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality and the Lighthouse at Cape Spartel , 36 Va. J. Int’l L. 275, 371, 376 (1996)Google Scholar.
70 An epistemic community is a set of experts, often located in multiple states, sharing a common core of values and beliefs, a specialized language or practice, and a common policy enterprise. The epistemic communities literature suggests that, by virtue of their expert knowledge in policy-relevant areas, such groups can influence the success or failure of international cooperation. See generally Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination , 46 Int’l Org. 1 (Peter, M. Haas ed., 1992)Google Scholar (special issue).
71 See Slaughter, supra note 10. Slaughter also uses IR theory to evaluate the efficacy and suitability of the law of extraterritoriality and recommends specific doctrinal changes grounded in a liberal theory of IR. See Anne-Marie, Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic Law , 10 Am. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 717 (1995)Google Scholar. She conducts a similar analysis of the United Nations. See Anne-Marie, Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace: International Relations Theory and the Future of the United Nations , 4 Transnatl L. & Contemp. Probs. 377 (1995)Google Scholar.
78 Kingsbury, supra note 23.
73 See Slaughter, supra note 10; Anne-Marie, Slaughter, The Real New World Order , Foreign Aff., Sept/Oct. 1997, at 183 Google Scholar.
74 Benedict, Kingsbury, Sovereign or Agent? Globalization, Democratization, and the Place of the State in International Law (Feb. 1997)Google Scholar (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
75 See, e.g., Lynne, M. Jurgielewicz, Global Environmental Change and International Law: Prospects for Progress in the Legal Order 116–17 n.6 (1996)Google Scholar (claiming that legal scholar L. F. E. Goldie “introduced the concept of regimes into international law over a decade before it was introduced into the international relations literature by Ernst Haas”). Without wishing to contribute further to this debate, we should also note that many people credit John Ruggie with originating the concept of international regimes. See John, G. Ruggie, International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends , 29 Int’l Org. 557, 569 (1975)Google Scholar.
The more interesting general point is that lawyers are rediscovering their own concept of regimes, which differs from that used by political scientists, as Shinya Murase points out. Shinya, Murase, Perspectives from International Economic Law on Transnational Environmental Issues , 253 Recueil des Cours 283, 413–14 (1995)Google Scholar (asserting that regimes are formed on a foundation of a treaty or treaties concluded between states or international organizations; that their objective is to realize either the shared interests of the states concerned or the general interests of the international community as a whole; that member states are required to fulfill nonreciprocal obligations toward the regime; and that regimes have self-contained procedures to settle claims and disputes among members). It is a more precise definition than the now-classic formulation used in Krasner’s original volume on “international regimes,” see Stephen, D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables , in International Regimes, supra note 64, at 1, 2,Google Scholar and it may be useful to both disciplines.
77 See, e.g., Outi, Korhonen, Liberalism and International Law: A Centre Projecting a Periphery , 65 Nordic J. Int’l L. 481 (1996)Google Scholar (arguing, among other things, that international law and liberal IR theory share a basic liberal tradition and conceptual framework).
78 Byers, supra note 5, at 205.
79 Lori, F. Damrosch, Constitutional Control over War Powers: A Common Core of Accountability in Democratic Societies , 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 181 (1995)Google Scholar.
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83 See, e.g., Stanley, Hoffmann, The Study of International Law and the Theory of International Relations , 57 ASIL Proc. 26 (1963)Google Scholar.
84 See, e.g., Abram, Chaves, Thomas, Ehrlich & Andreas, F. Lowenfeld, International Legal Process (1968)Google Scholar; Abram, Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis: International Crises and the Role of Law (1974)Google Scholar. For a recent comparison of the New Haven School and the international legal process approach, see Koh, Why Obey? supra note 11, at 2618–19.
85 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 6; see also Abram, Chayes & Antonia, H. Chayes, On Compliance , 47 Int’l Org. 175 (1993)Google Scholar; Abram, Chayes & Antonia, H. Chayes, Adjustment and Compliance Processes in International Regulatory Regimes , in Preserving the Global Environment Google Scholar; The Challenge of Shared Leadership 280 (Jessica, T. Mathews ed., 1991)Google Scholar.
86 See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 6, at 118–23. This discursive process has several distinctive characteristics: it is carried out on the basis of legal norms; actors must attempt to gain assent to their value judgments on reasoned rather than idiosyncratic grounds; and normative factors such as legitimacy (of both the process and the substance of rule making) play a large role in justification and persuasion. The model draws substantially on Thomas Franck’s analysis of the roles of legitimacy and fairness in international law. See Franck, supra note 27; Franck, supra note 32.
87 Byers, supra note 5, at 203.
88 Id. at 204.
89 Michael, Byers, Custom, Power, and the Power of Rules: Customary International Law from an Interdisciplinary Perspective , 17 Mich. J. Int’l L. 109 (1995)Google Scholar.
90 See Koh, Why Obey? supra note 11, at 2600.
91 See id.; see also Koh, Transnational Process, supra note 11.
92 Henkin, supra note 26.
93 Koh, Why Obey? supra note 11, at 2646.
94 Keohane, supra note 8.
95 Cf. Hurrell, supra note 38, at 53 (arguing that the central challenge facing both international law and regime theory is to show that law and norms exert behavioral constraints on actors at least partially independently of power or interest).
96 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 6, at 27.
97 Koh, Why Obey? supra note 11, at 2646 (drawing in part on constructivist IR theory).
98 Kenneth, W. Abbott, “Economic” Issues and Political Participation: The Evolving Boundaries of International Federalism , 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 971 (1996)Google Scholar (citing John, G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order , 36 Int’l Org. 195 (1982)Google Scholar, and Alexander, Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State , 88 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 384 (1994)Google Scholar).
100 Koskenniemi, Place of Law, supra note 99, at 467–78.
101 See supra note 86. On the other hand, Koh criticizes Franck’s approach for its failure to account for the process by which norms are internalized by domestic legal systems. Koh, Why Obey? supra note 11, at 2633.
102 Shirley, V. Scott, International Law as Ideology: Theorizing the Relation Between International Law and International Politics , 5 Eur. J. Int’l L. 313 (1994)Google Scholar.
105 See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987).
106 See, e.g., Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer? (Miriam, F. Elman ed., 1997)Google Scholar; Debating the Democratic Peace (Michael, E. Brown, Sean, M. Lynn-Jones & Steven, E. Miller eds., 1996)Google Scholar; Bruce, Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (1993)Google Scholar; Michael, W. Doyle, Liberalism and World Politics , 80 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1151 (1986)Google Scholar; Michael, W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1 , 12 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 205 (1983)Google Scholar; Michael, W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs , Part 2, id. at 323 Google Scholar.
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108 Thomas, M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance , 86 AJIL 46, 89 (1992)Google Scholar; see also Gregory, H. Fox, The Bight to Political Participation in International Law , 17 Yale Int’l L.J. 539 (1992)Google Scholar; Gregory, H. Fox & Georg, Nolte, Intolerant Democracies , 36 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1 (1995)Google Scholar.
109 Brad, R. Roth, Evaluating Democratic Progress: A Normative Theoretical Approach , 9 Ethics & Int’l Aff. 55 (1995)Google Scholar.
110 For a critical review of this literature, see Susan Marks, The End of History? Reflecting on Some International Legal Theses, 8 Eur. J. Int’l L. 449 (1997).
111 Slaughter, supra note 10, at 504.
112 See Moravcsik, supra note 15.
113 In remarks in 1992, Kenneth Abbott introduced the concept of a “joint discipline,” which he defined as “the study of organized international cooperation.” Kenneth, W. Abbott, Elements of a Joint Discipline , 86 ASIL Proc. 167 (1992)Google Scholar (remarks at panel entitled “International Law and International Relations Theory: Building Bridges”). We borrow the term, but with a broader definition.
114 Kenneth, W. Abbott, Remarks on “Rationalistic Theory,” paper presented at conference on international law and international relations, Yale Law School, at 1 (Feb. 22–24, 1996)Google Scholar.
115 Id. at 4.
116 See Andrew, Moravcsik, From the Outside In: International Relations and the “Obsolescence” of Comparative Politics , APSA–CP (newsletter of the American Political Science Association section on comparative politics), Summer 1996, at 9 Google Scholar.
117 See Marks, supra note 110.
118 See Kingsbury, supra note 74.
119 Friedrich, Kratochwil, Constructivism as an Approach to International Law arid International Relations, paper presented at conference on international law and international relations theory, Yale Law School, at 2 (Oct. 1997)Google Scholar.
120 Id. at 4.
122 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 20.
123 As Keohane recently observed, “the most fundamental question scholars wish to answer concerns effectiveness: What structures, processes, and practices make international institutions more or less capable of affecting policies—and outcomes—in desired ways?” Robert, O. Keohane, International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work? Foreign Poly, Spring 1998, at 82, 89 Google Scholar.
124 Several international relations scholars have analogized the international system to a market. The most prominent of these market analogies treats states as oligopolistic firms, and posits several similarities between the two, including that both firms and states act strategically; both may be conceptualized as rational egoists; elimination is possible; and both may “exit” from cooperative ventures. See Keohane, supra note 3, at 89; Duncan, Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics , in Cooperation Under Anarchy 31 (Kenneth, A. Oyeed., 1986)Google Scholar.
125 See Susan, Strange, States, Firms, and Diplomacy , in International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power And Wealth 61 (Jeffry, A. Frieden & David, A. Lake eds., 3d ed. 1995)Google Scholar.
126 Ronald, J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing , 94 Yale L.J. 239 (1984)Google Scholar.
127 Charles Lipson points out that the analogy between states and firms is not perfect, since, unlike states, firms bargain in a milieu where legal promises can be enforced by a third party. See Lipson, supra note 20, at 503–04. The analogy may still be fruitful, however, because “deals” remain durable not only, and sometimes not even primarily, because the parties have made legally binding promises to one another, but because their agreements build in “incentive structures” that make compliance compatible with each side’s self-interest. See Robert H. Mnookin, Scott R. Peppet & Andrew S. Tulumello, the Lawyer as Negotiator (forthcoming).
128 See James, K. Sebenius, Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities , 46 Int’l Org. 323, 330 (1992)Google Scholar (discussing the limitations of standard two-by-two bargaining models that juxtapose cooperation and defection).
129 Sebenius has highlighted the importance of these questions. James, K. Sebenius, Designing Negotiations Toward a New Regime , 15 Int’l Security 110 (1991)Google Scholar; see also Stepan, Wood, Renegades and Vigilantes in Multilateral Environmental Regimes: Lessons of the Canadar-EU “Turbot War,” in Innovations in International Environmental Negotiation 184 (Lawrence, E. Susskind et al. eds., 1998)Google Scholar (examining negotiation processes within existing international environmental organizations).
130 For an overview of the interdisciplinary research on dispute resolution, see Barriers to Conflict Resolution (Kenneth, Arrow et al. eds., 1995)Google Scholar.
131 Several scholars have explored coalition dynamics in multiparty bargains characterized by incomplete or asymmetric information. See generally Howard, Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (1982)Google Scholar; David, Lax & James, K. Sebenius, Thinking Coalitionally: Party Arithmetic, Process Opportunism, and Strategic Sequencing in Negotiation Analysis 153 (Peyton, Young ed., 1991)Google Scholar; James, K. Sebenius, Sequencing to Build Coalitions: With Whom Should I Talk First? in Wise Choices: Decisions, Games, and Negotiations 324 (Richard, J. Zeckhauser et al. eds., 1996)Google Scholar.
133 If one can specify the conditions in which intersubjective understandings of interstate relations are positively transformed, it may be possible to structure the process by which states (or their agents) negotiate in a manner likely to produce those conditions. The first step in such research would be to analyze empirically validated moments of “transformation” in specific international negotiations to generate a set of hypotheses about why transformation takes place. For a claim that the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union changed during the Cuban missile crisis as a result of the specific bargaining process undertaken by Kennedy and Khrushchev, see Richard, N. Lebow, Beyond Parsimony: Rethinking Theories of Coercive Bargaining , 4 Eur. J. Int’l Rel. 31 (1998)Google Scholar.
134 See supra notes 40–42 and corresponding text, and notes 96–97 and corresponding text.
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136 Kratochwil, supra note 119, at 30.
137 See, e.g., Ruggie, supra note 40, at 19; Kratochwil, supra note 119, at 9, 11; Wendt, supra note 40, at 411.
138 Koskenniemi, Place of Law, supra note 99, at 477.
139 Ruggie, supra note 40, at 42 (posing the question whether and how linguistic structures are implicated in power relations). The issue can be and has been approached from many theoretical and methodological perspectives. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 27 (norms and legitimacy as influences on state behavior); Rodney, Bruce Hall, Moral Authority as a Power Resource , 51 Int’l Org. 591 (1997)Google Scholar (moral authority as a source of political power in feudal Europe); Scott, supra note 102 (dominant ideology of international law as a form of power); Chris, Tennant, Indigenous Peoples, International Institutions, and the International Legal Literature from 1945–1993 , 16 Hum. Rts. Q. 1 (1994)Google Scholar (international legal discourse as a determinant of and constraint on possibilities for identity and action).
140 See, e.g., Keohane, supra note 8, at 488.
141 See, e.g., Kratochwil, supra note 119, at 30.
142 Cf. Wendt, supra note 40.
143 See id. at 413 (“The sovereign state is an ongoing accomplishment of practice, not a once-and-for-all creation of norms that somehow exist apart from practice.”).
144 In IL, see, e.g., Antony, Anghie, Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law , 5 Soc. & Legai. Stud. 321 (1996)Google Scholar; Nathaniel, Berman, “But the Alternative Is Despair”: European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law , 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1792 (1993)Google Scholar.
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148 See Kratochwil, supra note 119, at 12.
150 See, e.g., David, Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion , 65 Nordic J. Int’l L. 385 (1996)Google Scholar; and Waever, supra note 34, at 9–10.
151 Examples include the Basel Committee of central bankers, the International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, and the Organization of the Supreme Courts of the Americas. See David, T. Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations , 33 Tex. Int’l L.J. 281 (1998)Google Scholar.
152 Examples in this category include informal contacts among government departments charged with the oversight of competition policy, environmental policy, criminal law enforcement, labor policy, etc. Informal contacts among judges from other countries would also qualify. See Slaughter, supra note 73.
153 On the Basel Committee and IOSCO, see supra note 151.
154 Cf. John Ruggie’s theory of “embedded liberalism,” supra note 98, an account of the construction of the postwar international trade regime that emphasizes domestic constraints on the formation and implementation of international rules.
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157 International Law Decisions in National Courts (Thomas, M. Franck & Gregory, H. Fox eds., 1996)Google Scholar; Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 21, at 370–73, 308–12. See also sources cited on the European Court of Justice and national courts, supra note 155.
158 See Koh, Transnational Process, supra note 11.
159 Howe v. Goldcorp Investments, Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 950 (1st Cir. 1991). The quoted language is from Judge Breyer, who thus justified the court’s decision to dismiss, on forum non conveniens grounds, a case brought by a U.S. plaintiff against a Canadian defendant in U.S. court. The court decided that the case would be better heard by a Canadian court, notwithstanding the contrary expressed view of the Securities and Exchange Commission, writing as an amicus.
160 See, e.g., Roby v. Corporation of Lloyds, 996 F.2d 1353, 1363–65 (2d. Cir. 1993) (choosing to let a case proceed in England rather than the United States, notwithstanding significant differences in the mode and content of securities regulation under English law, on the premise that “the available [English] remedies are adequate” and “sufficient” to deter “British issuers from defrauding American investors”).
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