In this essay, we describe the overlapping phenomena of new legal hubs (NLHs), international commercial courts, and arbitral courts. We survey their impact on the law and geopolitics of international commercial dispute resolution, identifying key issues these new dispute resolution institutions raise. While the rise of international commercial courts spans authoritarian and liberal states, Western and Asian states, common law and civil law traditions, it also highlights and builds upon regional differences. We question the assumption that the establishment of new courts is always consistent with an increase in the rule of law, particularly in non-democratic states. We close with thoughts about the potential influence and future role of these institutions. Some of the procedural innovations discussed here may lead to shifts in international commercial dispute resolution for years to come, but the question of whether there is sufficient demand for these new institutions lingers.

The past sixteen years have witnessed the proliferation of international commercial courts around the world. However, up until recently, this was largely an Asian and a Middle Eastern phenomenon. Only during the past decade have Continental European countries, notably Germany, France and the Netherlands, joined the bandwagon and started to create new judicial bodies for international commercial cases. Driven by the desire to attract high-volume commercial litigation, these bodies try to offer international businesses a better dispute settlement framework. But what are their chances of success? Will more international litigants decide to settle their disputes in these countries? In this essay, I argue that, despite its recently displayed activism, Continental Europe lags behind on international commercial courts. In fact, although the various European initiatives are laudable, most cannot compete with the traditional market leaders, especially the London Commercial Court, or with new rivals in Asia and the Middle East. If Continental Europe wants a role in the international litigation market, it must embrace more radical change. And this change will most likely have to happen on the European––not the national––level.

In the global development of new international commercial dispute resolution centers, the China International Commercial Court (CICC) represents a genuine innovation in China's legal history. The CICC aims to become a dispute resolution “one stop shop” (combining litigation, arbitration, and mediation) for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) related disputes. Despite its name and ambition, however, the CICC operates more like a domestic court. The CICC's stringent jurisdictional requirements and conservative institutional design show that the CICC cannot serve its stated objective of attracting new investment opportunities or foreign parties to the Chinese forum. These defects are not fatal but will have to be addressed for the CICC to reach its full potential of hybridization of litigation and arbitration both in and beyond China.

The Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation announced the establishment of the International Commercial Dispute Prevention and Settlement Organization (ICDPASO) in 2019. The ICDPASO was coordinated by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade and the China Chamber of International Commerce, together with industrial and commercial organizations and legal service agencies from over thirty countries and regions including the European Union, Italy, Singapore, Russia, Belgium, Mexico, Malaysia, Poland, Bulgaria, and Myanmar. It was launched on 15 October 2020. As its title indicates, ICDPASO's mandate to provide dispute resolution services is not confined to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) countries but includes resolving any disputes that the parties entrust to its jurisdiction. The ICDPASO aims to serve as a “legal hub” to resolve commercial and investment disputes effectively, efficiently, and practically. Unlike other multilateral dispute resolution forums, it is intended to provide an Asian-centric multilateral dispute resolution forum. This essay, the first on the subject of the ICDPASO, discusses how the ICDPASO can serve as a global laboratory for experimenting and innovating in dispute resolution with the potential to impact the landscape of international law, in particular its innovative use of mediation, good offices, and appeal processes to prevent and resolve disputes arising from the BRI. As BRI projects aim to establish infrastructure and digital connectivity within BRI countries and regions for trade and development, this essay argues that the dispute resolution process under the ICDPASO should take into account the overall development of a country or region. The essay concludes that the ICDPASO will be a game changer by introducing an Asian way of resolving disputes.

As worldwide interest in international commercial courts grows, questions arise as to whether individual nations can or should seek to compete in the “litigation market” by developing their own cross-border business courts. This essay compares the prospects of the United States and Australia in this regard, focusing on whether it is possible (Section II), probable (Section III), and preferable (Section IV) for one or both of these two federalized, common law nations to develop an international commercial court as part of their national judicial systems. The inquiry is particularly intriguing given that one country (the United States) has had a somewhat uneven relationship with international engagements while the other (Australia) is maintaining or increasing its connections to the rest of the world. Although this discrepancy could be used to explain the relative status of the debate about international commercial courts, which is much more advanced in Australia than in the United States, it is also possible that the distinctions between the United States and Australia are motivated by other factors. While neither country appears poised to create an international commercial court at the moment, the current analysis helps identify the types of factors that policy-makers can and should consider when contemplating reforms of this nature.

Third-party funding, also known as “dispute finance,” is a controversial, dynamic, and evolving arrangement whereby an outside entity (“the funder”) finances the legal representation of a party involved in litigation or arbitration, whether domestically or internationally, on a non-recourse basis, meaning that the funder is not entitled to receive any money from the funded party if the case is unsuccessful. It has been documented in more than sixty countries on six continents worldwide—including in many of the jurisdictions highlighted in this symposium that are experimenting with other aspects of international commercial dispute resolution. Indeed, funding greases the wheels of this experimentation. The true prevalence of third-party funding is likely far greater than we know since disclosure is not presently mandated everywhere. This essay argues that the three biggest global regulatory issues with respect to dispute finance are disclosure, definition, and delegation of oversight and that the global laboratories of dispute finance remain firmly within the control of the private sector with the public regulators continuously struggling to understand and address new developments in the industry. An apt analogy would be that the dispute financiers are driving cars and building spaceships with respect to their innovative financing arrangements, while many of the regulators are aiming their sights at the classic “horse-and-buggy” third-party funding arrangements that are rapidly falling out of use.

President Biden faces many hurdles to constructing an effective international legal order on migration, not least of which is the absence of any such structure even prior to the dual challenges of the nationalist fallout of the Trump administration's rhetoric and policies and the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet the excesses of cruelty under Trump and the social instability resulting from the pandemic may have created political space for the Biden administration to lay the groundwork for a more comprehensive international structure that governs migration of all kinds. To that end, President Biden should cultivate normative authority in the migration arena by shifting the national discourse, shoring up international agreements and institutions, and building regional cooperation.

Trade policy decisions have direct, and almost immediate, effects on American jobs and wages. As result, historically, commercial policy has been highly partisan and closely associated with constituent demands. From this perspective, the post-World War II years were anomalous: trade policy was bipartisan and de-politicized. Due to rapid growth in the U.S. economy, those hurt by imports were easily re-employed, dampening the growth of a pro-protection coalition in either party. This facilitated a U.S.-led expansion of trade under the umbrella of commonly accepted international rules. In the last decades of the twentieth century, however, this pro-trade consensus began to unravel. While U.S. exports continued to thrive, the growth of regional and global value chains and the emergence of East Asian manufacturing giants caused job dislocation and a bifurcation of the U.S. economy around a skill premium. The Trump administration's response was to externalize these problems onto U.S. trading partners. The Biden administration needs a different strategy. Even though the Democratic party has been critical of aspects of the multilateral regime, Biden must re-connect with the international community. The United States should strive to be a better partner in the World Trade Organization (WTO), resist the capricious use of trade law, and rebuild a competitive domestic economy.

The Biden administration has much to do to restore the United States’ credibility as a human rights leader and to strengthen the human rights system in an era of rising right-wing nationalism, authoritarianism, and competition for global power. In doing so, it needs to lead by example by putting its own house in order, and act with both courage and humility in the face of deep global skepticism and distrust. Specifically, the administration should pursue five stages of engagement on human rights: reverse and revoke measures taken by the Trump administration, reaffirm the United States’ traditional commitments to human rights at home and abroad, rebuild the State Department and diplomatic corps, reengage with international and regional mechanisms through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, and reconceptualize the United States’ twenty-first century relationship to human rights. All of the other topics addressed in this symposium—climate, health, elections, migration, structural racism, and trade—implicate human rights. None can be adequately addressed without a robust U.S. human rights agenda.

On November 7, 2020, President Joe Biden proclaimed that his administration would “restore the soul of America.” He declared that U.S. voters had given him a mandate “to achieve racial justice and root out systemic racism in this country,” and that he plans to use the nation's restored moral leadership to create international consensus around U.S. values and urge foreign nations and intergovernmental institutions to adopt anti-racist agendas. To be sure, Biden's commitment to ending systemic racism is rooted in troubling notions of U.S. exceptionalism and invokes an unfounded anti-racist nostalgia. We should never “restore” America's racial past. Nevertheless, Biden's commitment is, in many ways, refreshing and raises a crucial and productive question: how might the United States recalibrate the international legal order and address systemic racism within Biden's framework? One straightforward and pragmatic answer emerges: the Biden administration should live up to the standards of those who inspired his campaign's mission. In other words, truly improving the racial order at home might be a viable way to advance anti-racism abroad, including through existing international institutions.

If we have learned anything since the 2016 election, it is that foreign election interference is not just a strategic tool used by Russia. Many countries are now using social media disinformation as statecraft to attack democracies. With a relatively small investment of personnel and financial resources, a foreign power can use social media and other online tools to heighten divisions in the electorate, spread disinformation and conspiracy theories, and undermine confidence in the electoral system specifically and democratic institutions generally. The Biden administration should use the moral, political, and legal authorities of the Executive Branch to protect the United States from foreign election interference. In parallel, it should work cooperatively with allies to combat election interference using multilateral initiatives.

Joseph R. Biden was elected President of the United States during a period of compound crises for global health and security: the worst pandemic in a century, as well as steep reverses in progress toward reducing poverty, hunger, and disease. The United States has been in full retreat from global health leadership, fraying relationships with allies, weakening global institutions, and engaging in nationalist populism that threatens global cooperation to address worldwide challenges. Yet these tragic circumstances are also fertile soil for deep structural reforms. President Biden can both bolster the immediate responses to COVID-19 and its vast ramifications, and spearhead lasting changes to create a healthier and safer world, from which the United States would richly benefit. His immediate task will be to bring U.S. economic and scientific strength to the COVID-19 response in partnership with the World Health Organization (WHO). The Biden administration should also assume financial and strategic leadership in bolstering world efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including its singular pledge to leave no one behind. Finally, President Biden should empower the WHO and lead on reforms to the global health architecture to advance the right to health.

After four years of not simply inaction but significant retrogression in U.S. climate change policy, the Biden administration has its work cut out. As a start, it needs to undo what Trump did. The Biden administration took a step in that direction on Day 1 by rejoining the Paris Agreement. But simply restoring the pre-Trump status quo ante is not enough. The United States also needs to push for more ambitious global action. In part, this will require strengthening parties’ nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement; but it will also require actions by what Sue Biniaz, the former State Department climate change lawyer, likes to call the Greater Metropolitan Paris Agreement—that is, the array of other international actors that help advance the Paris Agreement's goals, including global institutions such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the Montreal Protocol, and the World Bank, as well as regional organizations and non-state actors. Although the Biden administration can pursue some of these international initiatives directly through executive action, new regulatory initiatives will face an uncertain fate in the Supreme Court. So how much the Biden Administration is able to achieve will likely depend significantly on how much a nearly evenly-divided Congress is willing to support.

Effective arms control between rival states requires reconciling three autonomous elements simultaneously: a) politics—the substantive agreement about what military items and activities will be restricted or prohibited; b) technology—the means and methods to monitor compliance with those negotiated limitations; and c) law—the rights and obligations that enable effective international use of the designated verification capabilities. Each of these three variables changes over time; the history of arms control reveals the difficulty of keeping them in sync as international conditions evolve. Today, we are in a period of remarkably rapid revolution regarding all three factors—particularly evident in the air and space domains—which will generate exciting new opportunities and require negotiators to be extraordinarily deft and responsive. This essay reviews some illustrative prior state practice in arms control in harmonizing the three variables and speculates about future adaptations.

Weapons inspections in Iraq and Syria have drawn considerable attention from the international community in recent decades. This essay summarizes the key events associated with those inspections and draws upon my personal experience as a UN weapons inspector in both countries to identify lessons learned and future challenges. Those challenges include distrust among non-Western states, the difficulty of detecting much of the illicit activity, disinformation, and deficiencies in inspector training.

Over the past four decades, the most prolific time in recent memory for the negotiation and implementation of arms control treaties, a cadre of expertise was developed that enabled weapons inspections. Yet the pipeline for educating and developing rising generations to perform such inspections is now running dry, particularly outside of the United States and Europe. In this essay, I argue that we must invigorate efforts to develop and maintain that pipeline. I identify historical sources of expertise in the field of arms control and describe the obstacles that we face in maintaining them. I conclude by offering potential solutions to this problem, arguing that it is time to revitalize platforms for supporting cross-domain, cross-regional, and multi-generational nonproliferation experience and learning opportunities.

The intentional spread of disinformation is not a new challenge for the scientific world. We have seen it perpetuate the idea of a flat earth, convince communities that vaccines are more dangerous than helpful, and even suggest a connection between the “5G” communication infrastructure and COVID-19. Nor is disinformation a new phenomenon in the weapons inspection arena. Weapons inspectors themselves are often forced to sift through alternative narratives of events and inconsistent reporting, and they regularly see their credibility and conclusions questioned in the face of government politics or public biases. But certain recent disinformation campaigns have become so overwhelmingly comprehensive and effective that they constitute a new kind of threat. By preventing accountability for clear violations of international law, these campaigns have created a challenge to the survival of arms control treaties themselves. If weapons inspectors cannot regain the trust of the international community in the face of this challenge, it will be increasingly difficult to ensure compliance with arms control and disarmament treaties going forward. In this essay, I will briefly discuss one of the most comprehensive disinformation efforts of the past decade: the disinformation campaign used to prevent accountability for Syria's repeated use of chemical weapons. After this discussion, I will propose one possible approach to help protect the credibility of disarmament experts and weapons inspectors in the face of pervasive disinformation. This approach will require a concerted effort to connect and support compliance experts and to understand and explain their expertise across cultural, political, national, economic, and religious divides.