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Series:   Elements in Philosophy of Law

Sociological Approaches to Theories of Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 May 2022

Brian Z. Tamanaha
Brian Z. Tamanaha
Affiliation:
Washington University School of Law

Summary

Sociological Approaches to Theories of Law applies empirical insights to examine theories of law proffered by analytical jurisprudents. The topics covered include artifact legal theory, law as a social construction, idealized accounts of the function of law, the dis-embeddeness of legal systems, the purported guidance function of law, the false social efficacy thesis, missteps in the quest to answer 'What is law?', and the relationship between empiricism and analytical jurisprudence. The analysis shows that on a number of central issues analytical jurisprudents assert positions inconsistent with the social reality of law. Woven throughout the text, the author presents a theoretically and empirically informed account of law as a social institution. The overarching theme is that philosophical claims about the nature of law can be tested and improved through greater empirical input.
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Keywords

analytical jurisprudenceartifact legal theorylaw as a social constructionwhat is lawfunctions of law
Type
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Series: Elements in Philosophy of Law
Online ISBN: 9781009128193
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 23 June 2022

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