Element contents
Series: Elements in Ethics
Feminist Ethics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 March 2024
Summary
Feminist Ethics provides an overview of feminist contributions to normative ethics, moral psychology, and metaethics. It argues that through their criticisms of traditional ethics and proposals for changes, feminists are advancing 'robust agency,' an account of ideal moral and rational agency that promises to give us better responses than those given in traditional ethics to problems in ethics, including how we know our duties, the kind of persons we should strive to become, and why we should act morally.
Keywords
- Type
- Element
- Information
- Series: Elements in EthicsOnline ISBN: 9781108587839Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 28 March 2024
References
Anderson, E. (2002). Should Feminists Reject Rational Choice Theory? In Antony, L. M. & Witt, C. E., eds., 2nd ed., A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 369–97.Google Scholar
Asefa, S. (1998). Female Genital Mutilation: Violence in the Name of Tradition, Religion, and Social Imperative. In French, S. G., Teays, W., & Purdy, L. M., eds., Violence Against Women: Philosophical Perspectives. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 92–104.Google Scholar
Baber, H. (2007). Adaptive Preference. Social Theory and Practice, 33(1), 105–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baier, A. (1987). The Need for More Than Justice. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 13(Supplement), 41–56.Google Scholar
Bailey, A. (1998). Privilege: Expanding on Marilyn Frye’s “Oppression.” Journal of Social Philosophy, 29(3), 104–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barnhill, A. (2012). Modesty as a Feminist Virtue. In Crasnow, S. L. & Superson, A. M., eds., Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 115–37.Google Scholar
Bartky, S. (1990a). Narcissism, Femininity, and Alienation. In Bartky, S. L., ed., Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression. New York: Routledge, pp. 33–44.Google Scholar
Bartky, S. (1999b). On Psychological Oppression. In Bartky, S. L., ed., Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression. New York: Routledge, pp. 22–32.Google Scholar
Beneke, T. (1997). Proving Manhood: Reflections on Men and Sexism, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Benson, P. (2000). Feeling Crazy: Self-Worth and the Social Character of Responsibility. In Mackenzie, C. & Stoljar, N., eds., Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 72–93.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bettcher, T. M. (2007). Evil Deceivers and Make-Believers: On Transphobic Violence and the Politics of Illusion. Hypatia, 22(3), 43–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blum, L. (1988). Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory. Ethics, 98(3), 472–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blum, L., Homiak, M., Housman, J., and Scheman, N. et. al. (1973–1974). Altruism and Women’s Oppression. The Philosophical Forum: Special Issue on Women & Philosophy, 5(1–2), 222–47.Google Scholar
Brink, D. (1986). Externalist Moral Realism. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 24 (Supplement), 23–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brison, S. (1993). Outliving Oneself: Trauma, Memory, and Personal Identity. In Meyers, D. T., ed., Feminists Rethink the Self. New York: Taylor & Francis, pp. 12–39.Google Scholar
Brison, S. J. (1998). Surviving Sexual Violence: A Philosophical Perspective. In French, S. G., Teays, W., & Purdy, L. M., eds., Violence against Women: Philosophical Perspectives. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 11–26.Google Scholar
Bruckner, D. W. (2007). In Defense of Adaptive Preferences. Philosophical Studies, 142, 307–24.Google Scholar
Caldwell, P. M. (1991). A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender. Duke Law Journal, 1(2), 365–96.Google Scholar
Calhoun, C. (1988). Justice, Care, and Gender Bias. The Journal of Philosophy, 85(9), 451–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Calhoun, C. (2004). Introduction. In Calhoun, C., ed., Setting the Moral Compass: Essays by Women Philosophers. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–19.Google Scholar
Card, C. (1993). Gender and Moral Luck. In Flanagan, O. J. & Oksenberg, A., eds., Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology. Bradford, MA: MIT University Press, pp. 199–218.Google Scholar
Cleckley, H. (1976). The Mask of Sanity: An Attempt to Clarify Some Issues about the So-Called Psychopathic Personality, 5th ed., St. Louis: Mosby.Google Scholar
Copp, D. (1982). Harman on Internalism, Relativism, and Logical Form. Ethics, 92(2), 227–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics. University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1, 139–67.Google Scholar
Cudd, A. E. (1988). Oppression by Choice. Journal of Social Philosophy, 25, 22–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cudd, A. E. (1990). Enforced Pregnancy, Rape, and the Image of Woman. Philosophical Studies, 60, 45–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cudd, A. E. (2002). Rational Choice Theory and the Lessons of Feminism. In Antony, L. M. & Witt, C. E., eds., A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 398–417.Google Scholar
Daly, M. (1978). Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism, Boston, MA: Beacon Press.Google Scholar
DesAutels, P. (2004). Moral Mindfulness. In Des Autels, P. & Walker, M. A., eds., Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 69–81.Google Scholar
Descartes, R. (1979). Meditations of First Philosophy, Cress, D. A., trans., Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar
Digby, T. (2011). Love and War: How Militarism Shapes Sexuality and Romance, New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Dillon, R. S. (2012). Critical Character Theory: Toward a Feminist Perspective on “Vice”(and “Virtue”). In Crasnow, S. L. & Superson, A. M., eds., Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 83–114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Driver, J. (2012). Constructivism and Feminism. In Crasnow, S. L. & Superson, A. M., eds., Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 175–94.Google Scholar
Duff, A. (1977). Psychopathy and Moral Understanding. American Philosophical Quarterly, 14(3), 189–200.Google Scholar
Estrich, S. (1993). Rape. In Smith, P., ed., Feminist Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 158–87.Google Scholar
Flanagan, O. & Jackson, K. (1987). Justice, Care, and Gender: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate Revisited. Ethics, 97(3), 622–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedman, M. A. (1985). Moral Integrity and the Deferential Wife. Philosophical Studies, 47(1), 141–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Friedman, M. (1993). Liberating Care. In Friedman, M. (ed.) What Are Friends For? Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 142-83.Google Scholar
Frye, M. (1983). Oppression. In Frye, M., ed., The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory. Trumansburg, NY: Crossing, pp. 1–16.Google Scholar
Frye, M. (1995). White Woman Feminist. In Koggel, C., ed., Moral Issues in Global Perspectives. Peterborough: Broadview Press, pp. 224–39.Google Scholar
Garry, A. (2012). Who Is Included? Intersectionality, Metaphors, and the Multiplicity of Gender. In Crasnow, S. L. & Superson, A. M., eds., Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 493–530.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Gilligan, C. (1987). Moral Orientation and Moral Development. In Kittay, E. & Meyers, D. T., eds., Women and Moral Theory. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, pp. 19–33.Google Scholar
Gilligan, J. (1997). Violence: Reflections on a National Epidemic, New York: Vintage Books.Google Scholar
Grasswick, H. E. (2012). Knowing Moral Agents: Epistemic Dependence and the Moral Realm. In Crasnow, S. L. & Superson, A. M., eds., Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 37–38.Google Scholar
Greeno, C. G. & Maccoby, E. E. (1993). How Different Is the “Different Voice?” In Larrabee, M. J., ed., An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. New York: Routledge, pp. 222–47.Google Scholar
Griffin, S. (1981). Rape: The All-American Crime. In M. Vetterling-Braggin, F. A. Elliston, & English, J., eds., Feminism and Philosophy. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, pp. 313–32.Google Scholar
Hampton, J. (1999). Defining Wrong and Defining Rape. In Burgess-Jackson, K., ed., A Most Detestable Crime. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 118–56.Google Scholar
Hampton, J. (2002). Feminist Contractarianism. In Antony, L. M. & Witt, C. E., eds., A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 337–68.Google Scholar
Harman, G. (1975). Moral Relativism Defended. Philosophical Review, 84(1), 3–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hay, C. (2005). Whether to Ignore Them and Spin: Moral Obligations to Resist Sexual Harassment. Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, 20(4), 94–108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Held, V. (1990). Feminist Transformations of Moral Theory. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1, 321–44.Google Scholar
Held, V. (2006). The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global, New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Herman, B. (1981). On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty. Philosophical Review, 90(3), 359–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hill, T. E. Jr. (1995). Servility and Self-Respect. In Dillon, R. S., ed., Dignity, Character, and Self-Respect. New York: Routledge, pp. 76–92.Google Scholar
Hoagland, S. L. (1991). Some Thoughts about “Caring.” In Card, C., ed., Feminist Ethics. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, pp. 246–63.Google Scholar
Isaacs, T. (2011). Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jaggar, A. (1983). Feminist Politics and Human Nature. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld.Google Scholar
Jaggar, A. M. (2001). Feminist Ethics. In L. Becker, ed., Encyclopedia of Ethics. New York: Routledge, pp. 528–39.Google Scholar
Jaggar, A. M. (2006). Reasoning about Well-Being: Nussbaum’s Methods of Justifying. Journal of Political Philosophy, 14(3), 301–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kant, I. (1981). Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, J. W. Ellington, trans., Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar
Khader, S. J. (2011). Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Empowerment, New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kittay, E. F. (1999). Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency, New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Korsgaard, C. M. (1986). Skepticism about Practical Reason. The Journal of Philosophy, 83(1), 5–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Langton, R. (2009). Autonomy-Denial in Objectification. In Langton, R., ed., Sexual Solipsism: Philosophical Essays on Pornography and Objectification. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 223–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Little, M. O. (2007). Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology. In Shafer-Landau, R. & Cuneo, T., eds., Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology. Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 420–32.Google Scholar
Lloyd, G. (1984). The Man of Reason: “Male” and “Female” in Western Philosophy, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
Lugones, M. (1995). Playfulness, “World”-Traveling, and Loving Perception. In Mehuron, K. & Percesepe, G., eds., Free Spirits: Feminist Philosophers on Culture. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, pp. 121–28.Google Scholar
Luker, K. (1984). Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood, Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Luria, Z. (1993). A Methodological Critique. In Larrabee, M. J., ed., An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. New York: Routledge, pp. 199–203.Google Scholar
Mackenzie, C. (2001). On Bodily Autonomy. In Toombs, S. K., ed., Handbook of Phenomenology and Medicine. The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, pp. 417–39.Google Scholar
Mackenzie, C. & Stoljar, N. (2000). Introduction: Autonomy Refigured. In Mackenzie, C. & Stoljar, N., eds., Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 3–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
MacKinnon, C. (1987). Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination. In MacKinnon, C., ed., Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 32–45.Google Scholar
May, L. (1998). Socialization and Separatism. In May, L., ed., Masculinity and Morality. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 116–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
May, L. & Strikwerda, R. (1994). Men in Groups: Collective Responsibility for Rape. Hypatia, 9(2), 134–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McDowell, J. (1978). Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 52, 13–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McIntosh, P. (1993). White Privilege and Male Privilege. In Minas, A., ed., Gender Basics: Feminist Perspectives on Women and Men. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, pp. 30–38.Google Scholar
Menkiti, I. A. (1977–78). The Resentment of Injustice: Some Consequences of Institutional Racism. The Philosophical Forum, 9(2–3), 227–49.Google Scholar
Mill, J. S. & Mill, H. T. (1869)(Written 1861). The Subjection of Women, London: Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer.Google Scholar
Moody-Adams, M. (1994). Culture, Responsibility, and Affected Ignorance. Ethics, 104(2), 291–309.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Narayan, U. (2002). Minds of Their Own: Choices, Autonomy, Cultural Practices, and Other Women. In Antony, L. M. & Witt, C. E., eds., 2nd ed., A Mind of One’s Own: Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, pp. 418–32.Google Scholar
Nichols, S. (2002). How Psychopaths Threaten Moral Rationalism. The Monist, 85(2), 285–303.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Noddings, N. (1984). Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education, Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Nussbaum, M. C. (1999a). American Women. In Nussbaum, M. C., ed., Sex and Social Justice. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 130–53.Google Scholar
Nussbaum, M. C. (1999b). Judging Other Cultures: The Case of Genital Mutilation. In Nussbaum, M. C., ed., Sex and Social Justice. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 118–29.Google Scholar
Nussbaum, M. C. (2000). Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Okin, S. M. (2004). Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? In Baehr, A., ed., Varieties of Feminist Liberalism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 191–205.Google Scholar
Pineau, L. (1989). Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis. Law and Philosophy, 8, 217–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Railton, P. (1984). Alienation, Consequentialism, and Morality. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 13(2), 134–71.Google Scholar
Ruddick, S. (1980). Maternal Thinking. In Persall, M., ed., Women and Values: Readings in Recent Feminist Philosophy. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, pp. 340–51.Google Scholar
Sayre-McCord, G. (2015). Moral Realism. In Zalta, E., ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring ed. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/moral-realism/.Google Scholar
Stark, C. A. (1997). The Rationality of Valuing Oneself: A Critique of Kant on Self-Respect. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 35(1), 65–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stocker, M. (1976). The Schizophrenia of Modern Moral Theories. The Journal of Philosophy, 73(14), 453–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stoljar, N. (2000). Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition. In Mackenzie, C. & Stoljar, N., eds., Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 94–123.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Superson, A. M. (1993a). Right-Wing Women Causes, Choices, and Blaming the Victim. Journal of Social Philosophy, 73(14), 453–66.Google Scholar
Superson, A. M. (1993b). A Feminist Definition of Sexual Harassment. Journal of Social Philosophy, 24(1), 46–64.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Superson, A. M. (2004). Privilege, Immorality, and Responsibility for Attending to the Facts about Humanity. Journal of Social Philosophy, 35(1), 34–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Superson, A. M. (2010). The Deferential Wife Revisited: Agency, Responsibility, and Self-Respect. Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, 25(2), 253–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Superson, A. M. (2012). Standards of Rationality and the Challenge of the Moral Skeptic. In Crasnow, S. L. & Superson, A. M., eds., Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 139–73.Google Scholar
Superson, A. M. (2014). The Right to Bodily Autonomy and the Abortion Controversy. In Veltman, A. & Piper, M., eds., Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 301–25.Google Scholar
Teays, W. (1998). Standards of Perfection and Battered Women’s Self-defense. In French, S. G., Teays, W., & Purdy, L. M., eds., Violence against Women: Philosophical Perspectives. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 57–76.Google Scholar
Tessman, L. (2001). Critical Virtue Ethics: Understanding Oppression as Morally Damaging. In DesAutels, P. & Waugh, J., eds., Feminists Doing Ethics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 79–99.Google Scholar
Tessman, L. (2005). Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles, New York: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tessman, L. (2011). Book Review of The Moral Skeptic, by Anita Superson. Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, 26(4), 883–87.Google Scholar
Thomas, L. (1999). Moral Deference. In Koggel, C., ed., Moral Issues in Global Perspectives. Peterborough: Broadview Press, pp. 180–91.Google Scholar
Thomson, J. J. (1971). A Defense of Abortion. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1(1), 47–66.Google Scholar
Tronto, J. (1993). Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care. In Larrabee, M. J., ed., An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. New York: Routledge, pp. 240–57.Google Scholar
Varden, H. (2012). A Feminist, Kantian Conception of the Right to Bodily Integrity: The Cases of Abortion and Homosexuality. In Crasnow, S. L. & Superson, A. M., eds., Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 33–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Waits, K. (1993). The Criminal Justice System’s Response to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions. In Smith, P., ed., Feminist Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 188–209.Google Scholar
Walker, L. J. (1993). Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning: A Critical Review. In Larrabee, M. J., ed., An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives. New York: Routledge, pp. 157–76.Google Scholar
Westlund, A. C. (2003). Selflessness and Responsibility for Self: Is Deference Compatible with Autonomy? The Philosophical Review, 112(4), 483–523.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, C. (2004). The Preferences of Women. In Desautels, P. & Walker, M. U., eds., Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 99–117.Google Scholar
Wolf, N. (1992). The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty Are Used against Women, New York: Anchor Books.Google Scholar
Wolf, S. (1986). Asymmetrical Freedom. In Fischer, J. M., ed., Moral Responsibility. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 225–40.Google Scholar