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The Design Argument
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 December 2018
Summary
This Element analyzes the various forms that design arguments for the existence of God can take, but the main focus is on two such arguments. The first concerns the complex adaptive features that organisms have. Creationists who advance this argument contend that evolution by natural selection cannot be the right explanation. The second design argument - the argument from fine-tuning - begins with the fact that life could not exist in our universe if the constants found in the laws of physics had values that differed more than a little from their actual values. Since probability is the main analytical tool used, the Element provides a primer on probability theory.
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- Online ISBN: 9781108558068Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 29 November 2018
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