Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-42gr6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-25T05:44:53.068Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Richard Nixon, Congress, and the War in Vietnam, 1969–1974

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 November 2009

Robert D. Schulzinger
Affiliation:
University of Colorado
Randall B. Woods
Affiliation:
University of Arkansas
Get access

Summary

Domestic divisions over the war in Vietnam helped Richard M. Nixon win the presidency in 1968. Paradoxically, continuing discord over the course of American policy in Vietnam contributed to Nixon's disgrace and downfall in 1974. During the five and a half years of his presidency, Nixon ignored, abused, and fought with members of the Democratic-controlled Congress on a variety of domestic and international issues. The competition was especially intense on the subject of Vietnam, and it deepened as time went on. Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his national security adviser (and, from September 1973, his Secretary of State) enjoyed wide congressional support for their policy of détente with the Soviet Union and opening relations with the People's Republic of China.

But Congressional endorsement of Nixon's conduct of U.S. foreign relations did not extend to the war in Vietnam. Nixon's policy toward the world other than Vietnam seemed fresh and forward looking in 1969. His efforts in Vietnam, however, appeared to many in the general public and in Congress a continuation of the past. In 1969, most Americans were eager for the war to end. Nixon enjoyed a year-long “honeymoon” on Vietnam, but the U.S. expansion of the war in Cambodia in April, 1970, ignited some of the loudest protests of the war. After Cambodia, more and more members of both houses came to distrust Nixon deeply. They made their displeasure known by introducing and sometimes passing a variety of resolutions and laws limiting the president's authority to carry on the war.

Type
Chapter
Information
Vietnam and the American Political Tradition
The Politics of Dissent
, pp. 282 - 300
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2003

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×