INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

In Essay 8, I confront the most profound moral objection to act utilitarianism – the objection from justice. It may be useful here to present a particularly stark version of the objection. Suppose there are two sorts of people in the world, the Haves and the Have Nots. Suppose that the Haves have always enjoyed large amounts of pleasure; suppose that they never worked for the goods that provide the pleasure but simply stole them from the Have Nots; suppose, finally, that the Haves are nasty and cruel to the long-suffering Have Nots.

On the other hand, suppose that the Have Nots have struggled and suffered all their lives; they have not enjoyed any pleasures even though they are the rightful owners of the means to pleasure; suppose, finally, that the Have Nots are kind-hearted and decent – they treat each other and the nasty Haves with respect.

Suppose that it is now in your power to distribute some extra goods. You can give the new goods either to the Haves or to the Have Nots – but no other option is available. We stipulate that the amount of pleasure that will result will be exactly the same no matter which you do. The only difference is that if you give the goods to the Haves, they will experience the pleasure and the Have Nots will experience the disappointment of getting the short end of the stick again.