In late September 1959, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of West Germany asked Ambassador David Bruce of the United States to pay him a “personal” visit. “He told me,” recalled Bruce, “[that] he wanted to talk to me as his friend Mr. Bruce and not as ambassador.” Bruce knew what such a request really meant: Adenauer needed to “express [certain] fears about U.S. government policy [or] some individuals connected with it.” At Adenauer's request, Bruce treated these conversations as private and thus used great discretion when reporting to his superiors. Particularly during the Adenauer governments, this ritual was crucial for healthy German-American relations; it allowed the chancellor to express his deepest concerns and, presumably, to have them swiftly conveyed to Washington. By 1968, however, this ritual had lost its substance.

Washington expected the American ambassador to keep his ear to the ground, maintain a loose leash on the chancellor, and faithfully report his observations on the latest developments. Each of the ambassadors to Germany between 1955 and 1968 attempted to go beyond these duties and make policy recommendations. Unless they already matched current thinking in the American administration, however, these efforts were ignored. The ambassadors' power, then, lay in their ability not to advise, but to listen and observe. This function depended on maintaining a close relationship with the chancellor; the ambassadors' effectiveness must, therefore, be measured by this standard. Four men served as ambassadors to the Federal Republic of Germany between 1955 and 1968. The first, James Conant, was the least successful.