INTRODUCTION

The various modes of globalisation have made us conscious of the fact that the inequalities in life chances and increasing poverty are now the problems of a global society. The struggles against discrimination, exclusion and other forms of injustice can no longer solely be aligned within the respective state borders, but must, in order to be successful, (also) be conducted transnationally and globally. Social struggles emerge around concrete and local experiences of injustice. But then, the normative demands and justifications have to address the transnational roots of these injustices, and national actors tend to turn into international actors. Therewith, the framework of social struggles and of normative justification changes. The field ranges from voluntary, humanitarian aid to moral demands of global social justice and the enforcement of transnational social rights. Social rights, which traditionally protect and defend the life chances of citizens in a domestic frame, now need be conceived as transnational social rights and need transnational orientations and justifications. This chapter seeks to determine, from a philosophical point of view, which conceptual and argumentative problems can be found in these normative perspectives.

CONCEPTIONAL AND SYSTEMATIC CLARIFICATIONS

“TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL RIGHTS” AS HUMAN RIGHTS

I would like to understand “transnational social rights” as human rights. Frequently, human rights are seen – unfortunately, particularly by moral philosophers – as purely “moral rights” which merely correspond to “moral obligations” for all. This is, in many ways, not just one-sided, but will frequently lead to false and distorting considerations and conclusions. Human rights, properly understood, have three dimensions, which cannot be reduced to one another: a moral, a legal, and a political-historical dimension. They are motivated by historical processing of experiences of grave injustices and crimes against humanity; since the Second World War, international (political-given, legally-constituted and morally-justifiable) human rights, have been accredited in the same way to every human being in virtue of his or her human dignity. Thus, philosophical reflections on human rights should not only methodically emanate from the legal (national and international) human-rights documents, but must also track each other's separate considerations in political and moral terms.