Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Dedication
- Introduction
- 1 The Forgotten Theatre: Britain, Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea
- 2 ‘To keep a fleet above a fortnight’: The Evolution of Naval Logistics during the Eighteenth Century
- 3 The Challenges of the Baltic Sea
- 4 The Administration of Power Projection
- 5 The First Year in the Baltic, 1808
- 6 The Escalation of Seapower, 1809
- 7 The Navy, Reform and the British State
- 8 Logistics and Seapower, 1810–1812
- Conclusion
- Appendices
- Bibliography
- Index
6 - The Escalation of Seapower, 1809
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 April 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Dedication
- Introduction
- 1 The Forgotten Theatre: Britain, Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea
- 2 ‘To keep a fleet above a fortnight’: The Evolution of Naval Logistics during the Eighteenth Century
- 3 The Challenges of the Baltic Sea
- 4 The Administration of Power Projection
- 5 The First Year in the Baltic, 1808
- 6 The Escalation of Seapower, 1809
- 7 The Navy, Reform and the British State
- 8 Logistics and Seapower, 1810–1812
- Conclusion
- Appendices
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
COMMAND OF THE SEA did not confer automatic dominance of the Baltic region. In early 1809, having re-entered the Baltic Sea as the ice melted, Saumarez spoke of his fears for the defence of Sweden. With a weaker army and navy than her neighbour, Sweden had ‘not the means to defray the expenses of the war’. Russia invaded Sweden by land through Finland, making significant advances through the winter of 1808–9. With the Baltic Sea frozen over, the Royal Navy could do little to assist its ally. Structural inefficiencies in the Swedish administration were exacerbated by an unstable domestic political situation. Sir John Moore, during his brief expedition to the Baltic, had described the parlous state Sweden was in. While the British fleet could defend Sweden during the summer months, he did not expect Sweden to last much longer:
The nobility are adverse to war and to all resistance, and will be glad to see the King reduced to compromise on any terms, or themselves to become subject to any other Power. The probability is that he is surrounded by persons in the interest and in correspondence with his enemies. In such a state of things we can do him no permanent good; he will not follow our counsels, and our force alone is not sufficient.
Isolation, an ineffective navy and internal subversion proved a heady mixture. The Swedish military officer corps was widely discontent with Gustav IV Adolf's war policy, which they believed had brought the country to the brink of the abyss.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Transformation of British Naval StrategySeapower and Supply in Northern Europe, 1808–1812, pp. 125 - 148Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2012