Introduction

The trial of Sir Thomas More is a touchstone for examining our sense of injustice, whether understood in terms of legalistic notions of due process or in the most fundamental sense of human rights. Until very recently, however, such examinations were conducted without a sound historical basis either as to the legal background of the time or the events of the trial itself. That has changed, thanks to the pioneering work of twentieth-century scholars such as J. H. Baker, John G. Bellamy, and J. Duncan M. Derrett. Further implications of the law of sixteenth-century England for the trial are developed by H. A. Kelly and R. H. Helmholz in chapters 1 and 2 of this volume.

In this chapter, we seek to provide an account of More's trial from the modern lawyer's perspective in such a way as to minimize the distorting effects of hindsight and partisan prejudices. Any such account, however, will necessarily remain incomplete because there remain as yet unbridged gaps in our historical knowledge, due mainly to the lack of a contemporaneous record of the trial proceedings. Authorized court reporters and trial transcripts are a thing of our, not More's, time.

Important questions remain unresolved as to major aspects of the proceedings themselves. For instance, did More successfully move to dismiss a large portion of the indictment? A recent consensus, deriving from Professor Derrett, is “yes.” If so, we may look to More's trial as evidencing an early example of judicial courage and independence.