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7 - Geography and Gridlock in the United States

from Reforming the Electoral System

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2015

Jonathan Rodden
Affiliation:
Stanford University
Nathaniel Persily
Affiliation:
Stanford Law School
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Summary

Political polarization in the United States causes inefficiency and policy uncertainty. This occurs not because of unusually high levels of ideological polarization among voters or legislators that generate large policy swings. Rather, it is a problem of extreme gridlock under a unique form of two-party presidential democracy in which changes from the status quo frequently require defections from opposition legislators.

This chapter explores the argument that these defections are increasingly difficult to achieve because of a profound transformation of American political geography associated with deindustrialization and suburbanization. Our understanding of this transformation is still limited, as should be the hubris with which we dispense reform advice. This chapter advocates a cautious and experimental approach to reform at the state level, focusing on the potential advantages of some form of compulsory voting.

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?

The United States has a unique constitution. It is one of the only countries in the world that combines a strict two-party system with a presidential form of government. Its only peers are Venezuela, Ghana, and Sierra Leone. As demonstrated in Figure 7.1, all other former British colonies with singlemember districts and strict two-party systems have a parliamentary form of government. These countries have no need for bipartisanship. Members of the government party almost always vote for the legislative proposals of the executive, and members of the opposition vote against. A bimodal distribution of roll-call voting scores without centrists is neither remarkable nor troubling in a parliamentary system.

The problem in the United States is that for two-thirds of the years since 1950, the president has not presided over a partisan legislative majority. To achieve any change from the status quo, the president must assemble the votes not only of co-partisans but also of some members of the opposition party. In most other presidential systems, the chief executive is able to assemble multiparty coalitions rather than relying on defections from a single opposition party that controls the legislative agenda.

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Chapter
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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

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References

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