Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- Part I Communication architectures and models for smart grid
- Part II Physical data communications, access, detection, and estimation techniques for smart grid
- Part III Smart grid and wide-area networks
- Part IV Sensor and actuator networks for smart grid
- Part V Security in smart grid communications and networking
- 15 Cyber-attack impact analysis of smart grid
- 16 Jamming for manipulating the power market in smart grid
- 17 Power-system state-estimation security: attacks and protection schemes
- 18 A hierarchical security architecture for smart grid
- 19 Application-driven design for a secured smart grid
- Part VI Field trials and deployments
- Index
17 - Power-system state-estimation security: attacks and protection schemes
from Part V - Security in smart grid communications and networking
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 January 2013
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Preface
- Part I Communication architectures and models for smart grid
- Part II Physical data communications, access, detection, and estimation techniques for smart grid
- Part III Smart grid and wide-area networks
- Part IV Sensor and actuator networks for smart grid
- Part V Security in smart grid communications and networking
- 15 Cyber-attack impact analysis of smart grid
- 16 Jamming for manipulating the power market in smart grid
- 17 Power-system state-estimation security: attacks and protection schemes
- 18 A hierarchical security architecture for smart grid
- 19 Application-driven design for a secured smart grid
- Part VI Field trials and deployments
- Index
Summary
Introduction
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are widely used to monitor and control large-scale transmission power grids. Monitoring traditionally involves the measurement of voltage magnitudes and power flows; these data are collected by meters located in substations. In order to deliver the measured data from the substations to the control centre, the measurement data measured by meters in the same substation are multiplexed by a remote terminal unit (RTU) [1, 2]. Because electric power transmission systems extend over large geographical areas, typically entire countries, wide-area networks (WANs) are used to deliver the multiplexed measurement data from the substations to the control centre.
For large-scale transmission grids it is often not feasible to measure all power flows and voltages of interest. Furthermore, the measurements are often noisy. Therefore the measurement data are usually fed into a model-based state estimator (SE) at the control centre, which is used to estimate the complete physical state (complex bus voltages) of the power grid. The SE is used to identify faulty equipment and corrupted measurement data through the so-called bad-data detection (BDD) system. Apart from BDD, the state estimate is used by the human operators and by the energy-management systems (EMS) found in modern SCADA systems, such as optimal power flow analysis, and contingency analysis (CA), see for example [1]. Future power grids will be even more dependent on accurate state estimators to fulfil their task of optimally and dynamically routing power flows, because clean renewable power generation tends to be less predictable than nonrenewable power generation.
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- Information
- Smart Grid Communications and Networking , pp. 388 - 412Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012