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Chapter 11 - Reason to Feel Guilty

from Part III - Self-Blame and Moral Responsibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2022

Andreas Brekke Carlsson
Affiliation:
Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences
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Summary

Let F be a fact in virtue of which an agent, s, is blameworthy for performing an act of A-ing. We argue for the following three theses (with slight qualification of the first):

  • (Reason) F is (at some time) a reason for s to feel guilty (to some extent) for A-ing;

  • (Desert) s’s having this reason suffices for s’s deserving to feel guilty for A-ing; and

  • (Ground) what grounds s’s deserving to feel guilty for A-ing is simply what grounds that feeling’s being a fitting response by s to her A-ing.

In light of these theses, we address several claims that have been made regarding responsibility and desert. We take issue with the divorce of desert from responsibility. We find acceptable a claim regarding blameworthiness and reason to induce guilt, and we defend the idea that it is non-instrumentally good that one who is blameworthy be subject to a fitting feeling of guilt. Finally, we argue against a view on which desert of blame has a teleological dimension.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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