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  • Cited by 7
  • Print publication year: 2011
  • Online publication date: June 2012

3 - Kripke on Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility


This chapter argues that there are, in fact, two Kripkean routes to the necessary a posteriori - one correct and philosophically far-reaching, the other incorrect and philosophically misleading. The two routes to the necessary a posteriori differs in certain ways. The first route applies to a proper subset of cases to which the second is meant to apply; only the first route leads to the recognition of epistemically possible world-states over and above those that are metaphysically possible. The problem with Saul Kripke's second route to the necessary a posteriori is that the principle, strong disquotation and justification (SDJ), on which it depends, requires an unrealistic degree of transparency in the relationship between sentences and the propositions they express. The strong descriptive origin and justification (SDOJ) can be used in Kripke's second route to the necessary a posteriori in essentially the same way that SDJ was.

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