To be reckless, one must take an unjustifiable risk. In determining justifiability, must one take into account the downstream wrongdoing of others? This chapter argues that, with a few exceptions, one must take into account the potential downstream culpable and nonculpable wrongdoing of others, but reaffirms our view that one need not take into account one’s own future wrongdoing. We elucidate that the exceptions to this rule derive from our autonomy interests and our rights not to be required to self-sacrifice, and we address how these questions apply to both moral blackmail and merchants selling lawful goods. We then turn to the intersection between the actor’s breaking of a justified rule and the potential misinterpretation or camouflaging of wrongdoing that may take place by causally downstream actors. Finally, we address cases in which the risk of harm of the primary actor’s act is, in his estimation, either nonexistent because overdetermined by others’ anticipated acts, or too small by itself to be culpable though when joined with others’ acts is capable of producing a formidable risk of harm.