Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Introduction
- 1 Why all the fuss? The many aspects of the Prisoner's Dilemma
- 2 How I learned to stop worrying and love the Prisoner's Dilemma
- 3 Taking the Prisoner's Dilemma seriously: what can we learn from a trivial game?
- 4 Prisoner's Dilemma doesn't explain much
- 5 The Prisoner's Dilemma and the coevolution of descriptive and predictive dispositions
- 6 I cannot cheat on you after we talk
- 7 Prisoner's Dilemma cannot be a Newcomb Problem
- 8 Counterfactuals and the Prisoner's Dilemma
- 9 The Tragedy of the Commons as a Voting Game
- 10 The role of numbers in Prisoner's Dilemmas and public good situations
- 11 The inner struggle: why you should cooperate with people you will never meet again
- 12 Prisoner's Dilemmas, intergenerational asymmetry, and climate change ethics
- 13 Prisoner's Dilemma experiments
- 14 The lesson of the Prisoner's Dilemma
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Bibliography
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 July 2015
Edited by
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of contributors
- Introduction
- 1 Why all the fuss? The many aspects of the Prisoner's Dilemma
- 2 How I learned to stop worrying and love the Prisoner's Dilemma
- 3 Taking the Prisoner's Dilemma seriously: what can we learn from a trivial game?
- 4 Prisoner's Dilemma doesn't explain much
- 5 The Prisoner's Dilemma and the coevolution of descriptive and predictive dispositions
- 6 I cannot cheat on you after we talk
- 7 Prisoner's Dilemma cannot be a Newcomb Problem
- 8 Counterfactuals and the Prisoner's Dilemma
- 9 The Tragedy of the Commons as a Voting Game
- 10 The role of numbers in Prisoner's Dilemmas and public good situations
- 11 The inner struggle: why you should cooperate with people you will never meet again
- 12 Prisoner's Dilemmas, intergenerational asymmetry, and climate change ethics
- 13 Prisoner's Dilemma experiments
- 14 The lesson of the Prisoner's Dilemma
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
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- The Prisoner's Dilemma , pp. 282 - 296Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015
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