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9 - The political economy of the Exchange Rate Mechanism

from II - Exchange rate policy and redistribution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2013

Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger
Affiliation:
Katholieke Universiteit Brabant, The Netherlands
Harry P. Huizinga
Affiliation:
Katholieke Universiteit Brabant, The Netherlands
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Summary

An open economy model

The model, set out in table 9.1, is a distillation of the dependent economy model of Swan (1963); its derivation is based on Minford (1992) and is explained fully in the appendix. The time horizon is the “intermediate run,” where capital is, at least to some degree, fixed.

(1)is the supply curve of traded goods; (2) is the demand curve for traded goods; (3) and (4) equate the implied demand for non-traded goods with the output of these, by market-clearing through PNT; (5) is the overall output identity; (6) is the national budget constraint in the absence of long-term loans – it forces the current account of the balance of payments into balance. For convenience, it ignores the payment of net interest to foreign residents that would result from the integral of past current account deficits (this would in fact lower domestic demand pro tanto), but our focus here is on the effects of the ERM and this element depends on demand policies pursued by the government – a separate issue, so we omit it (or equivalently, treat it as exogenous); (7) is the open economy supply curve. Its derivation assumes that non-traded goods are more labor intensive than traded goods and have a higher elasticity of labor demand to the product real wage.

To pay for the cost of the subsidy, we assume the government raises either a tax on non-traded goods or a general consumption (or income) tax, following the normal assumption that it is impossible for the government to levy non-distorting taxes.

Type
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Positive Political Economy
Theory and Evidence
, pp. 253 - 264
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1998

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