Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
  • Print publication year: 2009
  • Online publication date: August 2010

30 - Steps toward the Europeanization of US securities regulation, with thoughts on the evolution and design of a multinational securities regulator

from PART 2 - Perspectives in financial regulation, SECTION 2: Transatlantic perspectives

Summary

Introduction

The United States currently faces a set of regulatory issues that are profoundly important to the future of its form of securities regulation and hence its place in the global capital marketplace. Calls for extensive reform have come from a well-publicized set of studies that question the ability of the US to be competitive worldwide because of excessive regulation and an overdeveloped litigation culture.

One of the principal moves being considered takes the form of mutual recognition. The likely first stage of this would be the invitation to foreign stock exchanges and securities firms to have a presence in the US without registration with the SEC as a domestic exchange or broker-dealer firm, upon the determination that adequate home country regulation exists and can be relied upon as a substitute for direct SEC oversight. As part of this, however, would be some attention to a bigger project: the potential for mutual recognition of issuer disclosure and governance rules. Foreign trading screens and foreign broker-dealer presence in the US is meaningful largely as a means of making foreign securities more readily available to US investors, and the potential for increased competition and lower costs will hardly follow if making such securities available means intense US regulation of the issuers of those securities. Some mutual recognition of issuer disclosure standards is thus inevitable if the project is to succeed, and the SEC has already taken steps in this direction with the recent determination that foreign issuers do not have to reconcile their financial reporting to US generally accepted accounting principles.

Related content

Powered by UNSILO
Pan, E., ‘The New Internationalization of US Securities Regulation: Improving the Prospects for an Trans-Atlantic Marketplace’, European Company Law, 5 (2008), 1
Tafara, E. and Peterson, R., ‘A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to US Investors: A New International Framework’, Harvard International Law Journal, 48 (2007), 31–68.
Ferran, E., Building an EU Securities Market (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
Moloney, N., ‘Building a Retail Investment Culture Through Law: The 2004 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive’, European Business Organization Law Review, 6 (2005), 341–421.
Langevoort, D., ‘The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley’, Michigan Law Review, 105 (2007), 1817–55.
Choi, S. and Guzman, A., ‘Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation’, Southern California Law Review, 71 (1998), 903–52.
Moloney, N., ‘Innovation and Risk in EC Financial Market Regulation: New Instruments of Financial Market Intervention and the Committee of European Securities Regulators’, European Law Review, 32 (2007), 627–63.
Langevoort, D., ‘Structuring Securities Regulation in the European Union: Lessons from the US Experience’, in Ferrarini, and Wymeersch, (eds.), Investor Protection in Europe: Corporate Law Making, the MiFID and Beyond (Oxford University Press, 2006), 485–506.
Brummer, C., ‘Stock Exchanges and the New Market for Securities Law’, University of Chicago Law Review 75 (2008), 1435.
Langevoort, D., ‘The Social Construction of Sarbanes–Oxley’, Michigan Law Review, 105 (2007), 1828–9.
Coffee, J., ‘Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and its Implementation’, Columbia Law Review, 106 (2006), 1534.
Baker, T. and Griffith, S., ‘The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Director and Officer's Liability Insurer’, Georgetown Law Journal, 95 (2007), 795–845.
Langevoort, D., ‘On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate Over Entity Versus Individual Liability’, Wake Forest Law Review, 42 (2007), 627–61.