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  3. Persistence
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
August 2022
Print publication year:
2022
Online ISBN:
9781009057356
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009057356
Series:
Elements in Metaphysics
Subjects:
Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy: General Interest, Philosophy
Information

Book description

Persistence realism is the view that ordinary sentences that we think and utter about persisting objects are often true. Persistence realism involves both a semantic claim, about what it would take for those sentences to be true, and an ontological claim about the way things are. According to persistence realism, given what it would take for persistence sentences to be true, and given the ontology of our world, often such sentences are true. According to persistence error-theory, they are not. This Element considers several different views about the conditions under which those sentences are true. It argues for a view on which it is relatively easy to vindicate persistence realism, because all it takes is for the world to be the way it seems to us. Thereby it argues for the view that relations of numerical identity, or of being-part-of-the-same-object, are neither necessary nor sufficient for persistence realism.

References

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