Deontology is a promising family of views offering an alternative to consequentialist ethics. Against consequentialism, the deontologist holds that (1) we are bound by moral constraints, and so not always permitted to do what would bring about best consequences, and (2) we also enjoy options, and so are not always morally required to do what would bring about best consequences, even when doing so would violate no moral constraints. The deontological family is beset by squabbling, perhaps intractable squabbling. Larry Alexander has proposed an interesting, streamlined deontological doctrine. Its core is the means principle, which forbids using people in certain ways without their consent to advance one’s aims, even a good cause. Alexander holds that when the means principle does not apply, we are not bound by any moral constraint against harming others, provided that the harming would bring about best consequences. Alexander advances reasons to embrace the means principle as an absolute, exceptionless principle, to which we must comply whatever the consequences (though he does not fully commit to this absolutism). Alexander’s deontological doctrine is noteworthy for its affinity with right-wing “side constraint” libertarianism. This essay argues that Alexander’s version of deontology merits rejection.