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6 - Levi on Risk

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 March 2010

Erik J. Olsson
Affiliation:
Lunds Universitet, Sweden
Nils-Eric Sahlin
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Lund University
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Summary

In Plato's Apology, Socrates declares:

Probably neither of us knows anything really worth knowing: but whereas this man imagines he knows, without really knowing, I, knowing nothing, do not even suppose I know. On this one point, at any rate, I appear to be a little wiser than he, because I do not even think I know things about which I know nothing.

First-order knowledge is important, but second-order knowledge of what one does or does not know is even more important: That is, it is essential to have what we might call “epistemic self-knowledge.” Scientists are knowledge-driven. That is why inductive methods are so popular in science. Knowledge is a good thing, but there are situations in which we require more – in which we require wisdom and thus epistemic self-knowledge. For example, when our theories fail to deliver results, when we are forced to find new theories or create new hypotheses, it is vital to know what one does not know.

Indirectly, Socrates tells us something about rational decision making. When everything is propitious, when we can represent our knowledge and our values with unique probability distributions and precise utility functions, we can simply maximize expected utility. We can use one of the classical theories – for example, Ramsey's, or Savage's, or Jeffrey's theory. But when we are uncertain about the extent of our knowledge, when things are indeterminate, or when we are uncertain about our preferences, we know that the traditional theories will be of little or no use to us.

Type
Chapter
Information
Knowledge and Inquiry
Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi
, pp. 87 - 96
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

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References

Gärdenfors, P., and Sahlin, N.-E.. 1988. Decision, Probability, and Utility. Cambridge: Cambridge University PressCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kyburg, H. 1983. “Rational Belief.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6: 231–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Levi, I. 1980a. “A Brief Sermon on Assessing Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants.” In Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants: Appendix 1, Accident Definition and Use of Event Trees, and Appendix 2, Fault Trees. Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 1975. Republished in Levi 1980b, pp. 431–44Google Scholar
Levi, I. 1980b. The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT PressGoogle Scholar
Luce, R. D., and Raiffa, H.. 1957. Games and Decisions. New York: John Wiley & SonsGoogle Scholar
Sahlin, N.-E., and J. Persson. 1994. “Epistemic Risk – The Significance of Knowing What One Does Not Know.” In Brehmer, B. and Sahlin, N.-E. (eds.), Futures Risk and Risk Management, pp. 37–62. Dordrecht: Kluwer AcademicCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Seidenfeld, T. 1988. “Decision Theory without Independence or without Ordering, What Is the Difference?Economics and Philosophy 4: 267–315CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weinberg, A. M. 1972. “Science and Transscience.” Minerva 10, no. 2: 208–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar
“Wingspread Statement of the Precautionary Principle.” 1998. Http://www.safe2use.com/ca-ipm/01--03--30.htm

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  • Levi on Risk
  • Erik J. Olsson, Lunds Universitet, Sweden
  • Book: Knowledge and Inquiry
  • Online publication: 05 March 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511584312.008
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  • Levi on Risk
  • Erik J. Olsson, Lunds Universitet, Sweden
  • Book: Knowledge and Inquiry
  • Online publication: 05 March 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511584312.008
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Levi on Risk
  • Erik J. Olsson, Lunds Universitet, Sweden
  • Book: Knowledge and Inquiry
  • Online publication: 05 March 2010
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511584312.008
Available formats
×