Paul Guyer considers the gulf between freedom and nature. In The Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), Kant claims that this third Critique is needed in order to bridge the “incalculable gulf fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible” (KU 5:176). Guyer argues that the third Critique does not mark a shift in Kant’s conception of the relationship between freedom and nature. Indeed, throughout the critical decade, Kant continues to argue for a bridge between freedom and nature. Guyer examines three of these bridges: First, Kant’s ethics demands actions of agents who are embodied and active in the natural world. Second, though the decision to make the moral law one’s fundamental maxim may seem to be a purely noumenal matter belonging to a free, autonomous will, it is both reflected in nature and affected by nature. Third, Guyer argues that Kant’s ultimate view of the highest good is that the “moral world” that represents the object of morality is something that can only be realized in nature.