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8 - Physical-Layer Security with Delayed, Hybrid, and Alternating Channel State Knowledge

from Part II - Secure Communication

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 June 2017

P. Mukherjee
Affiliation:
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Maryland
R. Tandon
Affiliation:
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Arizona
S. Ulukus
Affiliation:
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Maryland
Rafael F. Schaefer
Affiliation:
Technische Universität Berlin
Holger Boche
Affiliation:
Technische Universität München
Ashish Khisti
Affiliation:
University of Toronto
H. Vincent Poor
Affiliation:
Princeton University, New Jersey
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Summary

In this chapter, we will discuss how the quality and availability of channel state information (CSI) affects secrecy in wireless networks. In particular, we study how the delay in the availability of CSI affects secrecy in the context of the two-user broadcast channel with confidential messages. We adopt a secure degrees of freedom perspective and investigate various CSI scenarios, including cases when the availability of CSI at the transmitter varies across users and with time. We discuss how to leverage such variabilities in CSI for secrecy and highlight the differences between the optimal degrees of freedom with or without secrecy constraints.

Introduction

The availability of channel state information at the transmitters (CSIT) plays a crucial role in securing wireless communication at the physical layer. Various well-known physical-layer security techniques such as coding for the fading wiretap channel [1–4], coding for the multiple-antenna wiretap channel [5–8], artificial noise injection [9], cooperative jamming [10, 11], cooperation for secrecy [12–18], secure signal alignment [19–22], and other related techniques rely upon the assumption of timely availability of precise CSIT; see also a recent review article in [23]. In most practical scenarios, the channel gains are measured by the receivers and then fed back to the transmitters. The measurement and feedback process necessarily introduces imprecision and delay into the CSI. Motivated by this fact, in this chapter we explore the fundamental limits of physical layer security when the CSIT is imperfect. For concreteness, we will focus on a particular wireless network model: the multiple-input single-output (MISO) broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCCM). This effectively models practical systems such as a cellular downlink network where each user wants not only reliability but also confidentiality of the information intended for it.

The focus of this chapter is on the secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) region of the fading two-user MISO BCCM, in which the transmitter with two antennas has two confidential messages, one for each of the single antenna users (see Fig. 8.1). The secrecy capacity region of the MISO broadcast channel (BC) for the case of perfect and instantaneous CSI at all terminals (transmitter and the receivers) has been characterized in [24, 25]. Using these results, it follows that for the two-user MISO BCCM, the sum s.d.o.f. is 2 with perfect and instantaneous CSIT.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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