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18 - The role of expectations in modeling costs of climate change policies

from Part III - Mitigation of greenhouse gases

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 December 2010

Paul M. Bernstein
Affiliation:
5265 Lawelawe Pl. Honolulu, HI 96821 USA
Robert L. Earle
Affiliation:
2125 E. Orange Grove Blvd. Pasadena, CA 91104 USA
W. David Montgomery
Affiliation:
1201 F St. NW Ste. 700 Washington, DC 20004 USA
Michael E. Schlesinger
Affiliation:
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Haroon S. Kheshgi
Affiliation:
ExxonMobil Research and Engineering
Joel Smith
Affiliation:
Stratus Consulting Ltd, Boulder
Francisco C. de la Chesnaye
Affiliation:
US Environmental Protection Agency
John M. Reilly
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tom Wilson
Affiliation:
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto
Charles Kolstad
Affiliation:
University of California, Santa Barbara
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Summary

Introduction

Policies to address climate change in the European Union and the United States, as well as international negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, have come to share a surprising feature. All define carbon limits over only a very short time-frame compared with either the timescales characteristic of climate processes or the time horizon over which investments in mitigation measures must be evaluated. The Kyoto Protocol set national greenhouse gas emission targets only through 2012, and did not allow negotiations on targets for the Second Commitment period from 2013 to 2017 to begin until the protocol enters into force. In the European Union, a pilot emission trading system has been set up for the years 2005–2007, but targets and allocations for the First Commitment period limits were not specified. In the United States, proposed legislation to limit US greenhouse gas emissions has been specific about limits to 2020 but purposely ambiguous about limits further in the future.

The short time horizons arise at least in part from the fundamental impossibility of binding future governments (through legislation or treaty) to policies that must be implemented and enforced over the indefinite future. Short policy horizons pose very difficult problems for assessing costs because silence on long-term limits leaves considerable ambiguity over long-term expectations about policies not yet enacted.

Type
Chapter
Information
Human-Induced Climate Change
An Interdisciplinary Assessment
, pp. 216 - 226
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

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References

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