Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7c8c6479df-24hb2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-03-29T11:04:43.592Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

23 - How (and why) do climate policy costs differ among countries?

from Part III - Mitigation of greenhouse gases

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 December 2010

Sergey Paltsev
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA, USA
John M. Reilly
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA, USA
Henry D. Jacoby
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology CT, USA
Kok Hou Tay
Affiliation:
Yale FES Cambridge, MA, USA
Michael E. Schlesinger
Affiliation:
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Haroon S. Kheshgi
Affiliation:
ExxonMobil Research and Engineering
Joel Smith
Affiliation:
Stratus Consulting Ltd, Boulder
Francisco C. de la Chesnaye
Affiliation:
US Environmental Protection Agency
John M. Reilly
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Tom Wilson
Affiliation:
Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto
Charles Kolstad
Affiliation:
University of California, Santa Barbara
Get access

Summary

Introduction

There have been many studies of the cost to Annex B countries of meeting Kyoto Protocol commitments. Unfortunately for these analyses, the Protocol has proved to be a moving target in terms of its interpretation and likely implementation. In addition, the economic performance and future expectations for some parties also are changing, and with these changes come revisions in reference emissions, which have a strong influence on the projected cost of meeting Protocol requirements. Looking back across these studies, the progression of work can be divided into three broad phases. The first studies were conducted soon after the Protocol was signed in 1997, and they focused on carbon emissions from fossil fuels. Often they assumed an idealized system of harmonized carbon taxes, or cap-and-trade among all the Annex B parties, contrasting such systems with implementation without international permit trade but with an idealized trading system operating within each country (see, for example, Weyant and Hill [1999]). These studies showed a high cost of the Protocol with autarkic compliance, but huge benefits of international trading because it made Russian “hot air” (potentially tradable emission quotas in excess of their anticipated emissions) accessible to other Annex B parties.

A second phase of studies followed the final negotiations in Marrakech in 2001 (Manne and Richels, 2001; Babiker et al., 2002; Bohringer, 2002). By that time, the United States had withdrawn from the Protocol, and the potential contribution of Article 3.4 carbon sinks had been defined for each party.

Type
Chapter
Information
Human-Induced Climate Change
An Interdisciplinary Assessment
, pp. 282 - 293
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Babiker, M. H., Reilly, J. M., and Jacoby, H. D. (2000a). The Kyoto Protocol and developing countries. Energy Policy 28, 525–536.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Babiker, M. H., Bautista, M., Jacoby, H. D. and Reilly, J. M. (2000b). Effects of Differentiating Climate Policy by Sector: A United States Example. Cambridge MA: MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report 61.Google Scholar
Babiker, M. H., Reilly, J. M. and Ellerman, A. D. (2000c). Japanese nuclear power and the Kyoto agreement. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 14, 169–188.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Babiker, M. H., Reilly, J. M., Mayer, M.et al. (2001). The MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) Model: Revisions, Sensitivities, and Comparisons of Results. Cambridge MA: MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report 71.Google Scholar
Babiker, M. H., Jacoby, H. D., Reilly, J. M. and Reiner, D. M. (2002). The evolution of a climate regime: Kyoto to Marrakech. Environmental Science and Policy 5(3), 195–206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Babiker, M. H., Criqui, P., Ellerman, A. D., Reilly, J. M. and Viguier, L. L. (2003a). Assessing the impact of carbon tax differentiation in the European Union. Environmental Modeling and Assessment 8(3), 187–197.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Babiker, M. H., Metcalf, G. E. and Reilly, J. M. (2003b). Tax distortions and global climate policy. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 46, 269–287.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Babiker, M. H., Reilly, J. M. and Viguier, L. (2004). Is international emissions trading always beneficial?The Energy Journal 25(2), 33–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bernard, A., Paltsev, S., Reilly, J. M., Vielle, M. and Viguier, L. (2003). Russia's Role in the Kyoto Protocol. Cambridge MA: MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report 98.Google Scholar
Bohringer, C. (2002). Climate politics from Kyoto to Bonn: from little to nothing? The Energy Journal 23(2), 51–71.CrossRef
Dimaranan, B. and McDougall, R. (2002). Global Trade, Assistance, and Production: The GTAP 5 Data Base. West Lafayette, IN: Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University.Google Scholar
Ellerman, A. D. and Decaux, A. (1998). Analysis of Post-Kyoto CO2 Emissions Trading Using Marginal Abatement Curves. Cambridge MA: MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report 40.Google Scholar
Ellerman, A. D. and Sue Wing, I. (2000). Supplementarity: an invitation to monopsony?The Energy Journal 21(4), 29–59.Google Scholar
Fullerton, D. and Metcalf, G. E. (2001). Environmental controls, scarcity rents, and pre-existing distortions. Journal of Public Economics 80, 249–267.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goulder, L. H. (1995). Environmental taxation and the “Double Dividend:” a reader's guide. International Tax and Public Finance 2/2, 157–183.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hertel, T. (1997). Global Trade Analysis: Modeling and Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Jacoby, H. D., Eckhaus, R. S., Ellerman, A. D.et al. (1997). CO2 emissions limits: economic adjustments and the distribution of burdens. The Energy Journal 18(3), 31–58.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jacoby, H. D. and Sue Wing, I. (1999). Adjustment time, capital malleability, and policy cost. The Energy Journal Special Issue: The Costs of the Kyoto Protocol: A Multi-Model Evaluation, 73–92.
Jacoby, H. J. and Ellerman, A. D. (2004). The safety valve and climate policy. Energy Policy 32(4), 481–491.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Manne A. and Richels, R. (2001). US Rejection of the Kyoto Protocol: The Impact on Compliance Cost and CO2Emissions. AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 01–12.
Mayer, M., Hyman, R., Harnisch J. and Reilly, J. M. (2000). Emissions Inventories and Time Trends for Greenhouse Gases and Other Pollutants. Cambridge, MA: MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Technical Note 1.
OECD/IEA (2004). Energy Prices and Taxes, Quarterly Statistics, 2nd Quarter. Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/International Energy Agency.
Paltsev, S., Reilly, J. M., Jacoby, H. D., Ellerman, A. D. and Tay, K. H. (2003). Emissions Trading to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the United States: The McCain-Lieberman Proposal. Cambridge MA: MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report 97.Google Scholar
Paltsev, S., Viguier, L., Reilly, J. M., Tay, K. H. and Babiker, M. H. (2004a). Disaggregating Household Transport in the MIT-EPPA Model. Cambridge MA: MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Technical Note 5.Google Scholar
Paltsev, S., Reilly, J. M., Jacoby, H. D. and Tay, K. H. (2004b). The Cost of Kyoto Protocol Targets: The Case of Japan. Cambridge MA: MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change, Report 112.Google Scholar
Paltsev, S., Reilly, J., Jacoby, H.et al. (2005). The MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) Model: Version 4. Cambridge MA: MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Changes, Report 125.Google Scholar
Reilly, J. M., Prinn, R. G., Harnisch, J.et al. (1999). Multi-gas assessment of the Kyoto Protocol. Nature 401, 549–555.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shackleton, R. M., Shelby, M., Cristofaro, A.et al. (1993). The Efficiency Value of Carbon Tax Revenues, Stanford CA: Energy Modeling Forum EMF Working Paper 12.8.Google Scholar
Weyant, J. P. and Hill, J. N. (1999). The Costs of the Kyoto Protocol: A Multi-Model Evaluation. The Energy Journal Special Issue: Introduction and overview, vii–xliv.
White House (2002). Global Climate Change Policy Book. Washington DC: White House, February.
Yang, T., Reilly, J. M. and Paltsev, S. (2005). Air pollution health effects: toward an integrated assessment. In The Coupling of Climate and Economic Dynamics. ed. Haurie, A. and Viguier, L.. Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×