Sympathy is a virtue marked by what we call “empathy-related responding”. Some philosophers (e.g. Blum 1980) and psychologists (e.g. Batson 1991; Hoffman 2000; Eisenberg et al. 2006) have argued that empathy-related responding is the basis of much virtuous behaviour, especially prosocial behaviour (voluntary behaviour intended to benefit another). In this chapter, we discuss definitions of empathy-related responding, its role in virtue, moral development and social competence, and the development and origins of empathy-related responding.

EMPATHY-RELATED RESPONDING: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Definitions of empathy and sympathy differ in the psychological sciences, as in philosophy. However, often both are assumed to have an emotional as well as cognitive component. For example, “empathic accuracy” refers to the ability to cognitively decipher another's emotional state and does involve emotion. Specifically, empathy is frequently defined as an affective response that stems from the apprehension or comprehension of another's emotional state or condition and is similar to what the other person is feeling or would be expected to feel in the given context (e.g. a person feels sad when viewing someone who is sad; Eisenberg et al. 2006). Empathy is usually assumed to involve at least some degree of self-other differentiation: the empathizer is aware at some level that the emotion or emotion-eliciting context is associated with the other person rather than the self. Empathy frequently occurs as a result of direct exposure to another's emotion.