Book contents
- The Crisis behind the Eurocrisis
- The Crisis behind the Eurocrisis
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction The Elephant in the Room
- 1 There Is No (Legal) Alternative
- Part I The Crisis as a Crisis of the EU’s Identity
- 2 The Roots of the European Crisis
- 3 The End of Self-fulfilling Europe
- 4 The Authoritarian Neoliberalism of the EU
- Part II The Crisis as a Crisis of the EU’s Political and Democratic Legitimacy
- Part III The Crisis as a Crisis of the EU’s Economic Model
- Part IV The Crisis as a Crisis of the EU’s Social Character
- Part V Joining the Dots and the Way Forward
- Index
4 - The Authoritarian Neoliberalism of the EU
Legal Form and International Politico-Economic Sources
from Part I - The Crisis as a Crisis of the EU’s Identity
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 July 2019
- The Crisis behind the Eurocrisis
- The Crisis behind the Eurocrisis
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction The Elephant in the Room
- 1 There Is No (Legal) Alternative
- Part I The Crisis as a Crisis of the EU’s Identity
- 2 The Roots of the European Crisis
- 3 The End of Self-fulfilling Europe
- 4 The Authoritarian Neoliberalism of the EU
- Part II The Crisis as a Crisis of the EU’s Political and Democratic Legitimacy
- Part III The Crisis as a Crisis of the EU’s Economic Model
- Part IV The Crisis as a Crisis of the EU’s Social Character
- Part V Joining the Dots and the Way Forward
- Index
Summary
In its management of the eurozone crisis, the European Union (EU) reformed its economic policy regime and forged what has become known as the New Economic Governance (NEG). The NEG is constituted by an ensemble of directives, regulations and measures. It consists of the Six-Pack (five regulations and one directive), the Two-Pack (two regulations) and the European Fiscal Compact (or the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG)). Together, they tighten up surveillance and procedures pertaining to the 1996 Growth and Stability Pact. As such, they form a quid pro quo for measures in the field of monetary policy, which attenuated the prohibition against the European Central Bank (ECB) lending to EU institutions and Member States, but which nevertheless became necessary to save Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) against collapse: the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), as well as the Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) but above all the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) of the ECB.
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- Information
- The Crisis behind the EurocrisisThe Eurocrisis as a Multidimensional Systemic Crisis of the EU, pp. 89 - 98Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019
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