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Crime, War, and Global Trafficking
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Globalization creates lucrative opportunities for traffickers of drugs, dirty money, blood diamonds, weapons, and other contraband. Effective countermeasures require international collaboration, but what if some countries suffer while others profit from illicit trade? Only international institutions with strong compliance mechanisms can ensure that profiteers will not dodge their law enforcement responsibilities. However, the effectiveness of these institutions may also depend on their ability to flexibly adjust to fast-changing environments. Combining international legal theory and transaction cost economics, this book develops a novel, comprehensive framework which reveals the factors that determine the optimal balance between institutional credibility and flexibility. The author tests this rational design paradigm on four recent anti-trafficking efforts: narcotics, money laundering, conflict diamonds, and small arms. She sheds light on the reasons why policymakers sometimes adopt suboptimal design solutions and unearths a nascent trend toward innovative forms of international cooperation which transcend the limitations of national sovereignty.


‘What constellations of interest, risk and uncertainty are conducive to the creation of more or less legalized international institutions? In an attempt to shed light on this question, Christine Jojarth conducts an exploratory probe of four international institutions established to respond to criminal and warlike activities. Her results are illuminating about the strengths and weaknesses of functional and structural theories of international institutions.’

Robert O. Keohane - Princeton University

‘Too many books on global crime are just a collection of anecdotes and ‘war stories’ that contribute little to our thinking on what to do about this growing threat. In these pages, Christine Jojarth provides sound analytical foundations on which to base what is an indispensable policy debate. This is one of the most rigorous books on this subject.’

Moisés Naím - author of Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy

‘In this compelling new book, Jojarth uses four case studies to examine the validity of the design of international institutions presented by functionalist theories. Using theoretical and empirical evidence in a stimulating and innovative way, Jojarth analyzes the relationship between legally binding treaties and compliance mechanisms in the development of international institutions. Jojarth's conceptual insights are relevant not only to war and crime, but shed light on the management of transnational problems that require countries to deal with messy challenges to traditional notions of sovereignty where cooperation across national jurisdictions is paramount. The book will inspire a wide-ranging debate about the design of new forms of international cooperation.’

Carlos Pascual - Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy, Brookings

‘Exactly the kind of analysis that is needed these days: refining our understanding of how institutions work and applying that insight to new international problems that desperately need solutions.’

Stephen John Stedman - Center for International Security and Cooperation and former Special Adviser to the Secretary General of the United Nations

‘This is an innovative study of the different strategies which public and private actors have adopted in countering illicit international activities. Case studies of narcotic drugs, money laundering, diamond smuggling and illegal weapons trading examine the alternative legal and institutional frameworks to which governments and companies have turned. No one institutional design can fit the particular challenges posed by different illicit trades, Dr Jojarth argues.’

Lord William Wallace of Saltaire - London School of Economics

'… it is well thought out, efficiently presented, nuanced, historically accurate and balanced, and most importantly and impressively, Christine Jojarth acknowledges readily the limitations of her model, which is almost unheard of in a world where models, alas, rarely if ever capture anything approximating the observed world.'

Source: International Affairs

'… sufficiently accessible to become a focal point around which many international institution scholars will coalesce in order to provide a greater degree of consistency to cross-issue studies.'

Source: Political Studies Review

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