Skip to main content Accessibility help
Hostname: page-component-768dbb666b-prhj4 Total loading time: 1.096 Render date: 2023-02-02T18:21:53.840Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "useRatesEcommerce": false } hasContentIssue true

1 - How to Do Comparative Law: Some Lessons to Be Learned

from Part I - The Tradition of Comparative Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 December 2021

Helge Dedek
McGill University, Montréal


This Chapter appraises the range and depth of Patrick Glenn’s scholarly legacy by exploring some of the many lessons that can be drawn from his opus magnum Legal Traditions of the World. To this purpose, the chapter will focus on three key notions underlying Glenn’s chefs-d’œuvre: Law, Tradition, and Conciliation. The argument is that Glenn’s findings have in multiple ways enlightened the understanding of what the law is (outside and also inside the West), as well as the relentless dynamics within and between legal traditions. Through these findings, Glenn has also provided us – his friends, colleagues, readers – with a powerful intellectual tool to pursue his conciliatory dream towards a world of tolerance and diversity.

Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

I A Person as a Scholar

I have always thought that Patrick Glenn’s personal features – his modest and unassuming way of communicating and his persistent open-mindedness to new and others’ arguments – also lie at the core of his scholarly work. In the following pages, I will try to show this connection by putting in context and in perspective his legacy as a scholar.

Notwithstanding his impressive production, there is no doubt that Patrick Glenn will be long remembered for his opus magnum and for the debates it triggered. In my view, Legal Traditions of the WorldFootnote 1 is grounded upon three key notions: Law, Tradition, and Conciliation. I will address these notions critically and sequentially, as if they were strands of a thread through which Patrick Glenn’s personality and scholarship are woven.

II What Law?

Glenn does not introduce a ‘concept of law’ or explicitly criticize the concepts of others. Yet, he relies on the findings of a long line of legal anthropologists (and a shorter one of comparative law scholars) showing that, in non-Western traditions, there is no distinct line between legal and non-legal forms of normativity.Footnote 2 Glenn’s recognition of legal traditions that do not sharply divide legal from non-legal norms, or that do not gain legality from their relation to state authority, reminds all of us that there is no transcendent reason for which law has to be positive (ie, established by the state and its organs) or flow from the exercise of state coercion.Footnote 3 From this perspective, Glenn breaks away from the almost exclusive emphasis that mainstream scholarship puts on state law as the lodestar of any given legal system or effort to understand law.Footnote 4 This is an issue that deserves to be looked into at some length. I will do so now by recalling some data on others’ experiences, and then by focusing on the Western landscape.

Glenn is right in pointing out that positive law (as we mean it) is not necessarily the core of legal systems outside the West. Out there, positive law is constantly challenged by the relevance that each society assigns to other legal layers. These layers may come from what Glenn calls the chthonic legal tradition of the given society. But they may also be of religious origin (Christianity, Islam, etc.), or they may come from the European colonial or postcolonial legacy – both the latter sources may have been added alongside, or superimposed on, local traditional law. Some of the religious and colonial layers are still effective producers of legal order, and some are not. But the point is, traditional layers have never disappeared. On the contrary, they have always impinged upon and affected the enforcement of ‘transplanted’ legal rules.Footnote 5 From the Western positivistic viewpoint, these phenomena are not clearly visible because although history has bequeathed the Western part of the world a multifarious background,Footnote 6 mainstream legal discourse of the last two centuries has always seen law as the creation of the state. Consequently, the popular view – which has also shaped the way we look outside the Western koiné – is that rules cannot be law as we generally understand it when they come from sources other than the state. It should be further noted, according to Patrick Glenn,Footnote 7 that this view is nothing but the fruit of European ethnocentrism and that it is mainly due to the way European legal thought has systematized the reality with which it was faced. To the European rulers (and lawyers) of the past few centuries, it has been only too convenient to imagine that the law and the state coincide because both have long appeared to be their own.Footnote 8

Yet, even if different societies rely on different sources, or combine state and non-state law, all societies live by law and manage to make their rules effective. Actually, it is easy to acknowledge that whatever its source, the law of any society has basic functional and structural features in common with the state law that we know: it preserves a social order through obedience to rules. It is still law because it is society’s response to the need for social order.Footnote 9 This is why, for the study of any legal system to be accurate, it is necessary to distinguish and analyse the roles played by the official and the unofficial sources of law, the traditional layers and the layers of different origin, as well as the ways in which they interact and affect each other. This is a cognitive pathway that can be kept open only (it is worth emphasizing again) if one gets rid of the positivistic posture that does not allow one to consider a rule that does not stem from the state’s authority as properly ‘legal’.


To be sure, these caveats – thanks also to Patrick Glenn’s scholarship – are today well known and usually taken into consideration in the most advanced comparative law debates, as well as by legal historians, legal pluralists, legal anthropologists, and sociologists, when they deal with non-Western realities.Footnote 10 What still remains under-noticed or peripheral in comparative law debates, however, is that these caveats apply to Western settings as well. I will try to show why these caveats should be taken seriously by juxtaposing the positivist attitude of accepting as legal only that which comes from the state with two phenomena, which are of a different mould and origin but converge to shape a legal landscape that is very different from the one mainstream scholarship usually refers to. These are (1) the erosion of the West(phalian) state and (2) the thriving of unofficial sites of production of legal order in wide areas of Western social and economic relations.

Notwithstanding that the developmental paths of these two phenomena overlap in some areas, I will address them separately.

1 The State as a Habit

As to the dynamics affecting the role of the state, the data to be considered is well known. Fields such as commerce, maritime and aerial navigation, fishing, agriculture, food, telecommunications, intellectual property, the value of currencies and mortgages, the environment, the exploitation of sea resources, and the use of space and energy resources, on top of, obviously, finance, have long been the objects of a discipline that is largely denationalized – that is, they are not determined or exclusively dependent on the state but on centres of rule production that are based in regional and global arenas. The so-called global orders have been and are ever more shaping (especially as far as the economic turf is concerned) the choices of state actors and disaggregating the latter’s traditional functions on a spectrum of different agendas and interestsFootnote 11 – sometimes deeply puzzling local grassroots and ruling classes unable to make sense out of these developments.Footnote 12

To be sure, the weakening of an autonomous capacity of economic government is not bound to make the state disappear in the short term.Footnote 13 Rather, that process assigns to the state a new role: that of an agency, public and local, to transcend the legal, economic (and financial) order. Thanks to its domestic monopoly of the normative sanctioning power, the state is called on to monitor the implementation of values and principles coming from regional, international, global, and public and private centres of production of a legal order. It is a model of organization that reminds us of the indirect rule through which the British Empire administered its colonies, relying on indigenous governors or intermediaries. But the point remains that the internal dynamics of the state government are destined to increasingly suffer the stiletto of legal, economic, and financial globalizations, to wear less the clothes of the rule-maker and ever more those of the rule-taker.Footnote 14

The specific modalities of development (and the geographical distribution) of this phenomenon obviously deserve extensive discussion.Footnote 15 For the limited purposes of this chapter, however, let me only note how the aforementioned phenomenon makes clear that studying legal systems cannot be any longer (if it could ever be) an exegetic exercise of worship of state law. The tradition of positivism has, among many other things, relied on and forged the classical distinctions between comparative law, foreign law, and international law. These are distinctions that nowadays account for only a piece of the legal reality – their relevance is particularly emphasized in those debates where domestic and international law specialists aim to construct a disciplinary wall to protect self-determined interests. From a comparative law point of view, the remaining (large) part of legal reality should instead push scholars to compare an array of law-producing entities – either among themselves or with the structures of domestic state law. These entities often defy being squeezed, or cannot be squeezed at all, into the mainstream positivistic account of the sources of law (national and international), both because they are supra- and transnational in nature, and because they produce thriving legality at levels different from those controlled by the state and international law instruments.Footnote 16

Yet, establishing distance from the most transient elements and/or from the elements that can change with just the stroke of a legislator’s pen does not always prove to be an easy task. It did to Patrick Glenn but not to just anyone. The cultural sway of mainstream legal positivism may often drive the comparative law scholar off track, in search of what is most glimmering, most practically useful, or more understandable to the audience that she targets as her own.Footnote 17 In the latter perspective, the core study of comparing legal data introducing change, or expressing permanence or resistance, unavoidably ends up being conducted as if these were phenomena stemming only from national authoritative sources. What underpins this working method is the idea that all legal actors operate via a one-to-one correspondence with the values and legal culture of the whole, or the vast majority, of the members of the societies concerned. Consequently, the arrangement of similarities and differences across legal systems, and even the classification of these systems, may be safely shaped according to what is said and done by the ‘official’ legal actors. Needless to say, the aforementioned method and its results may be seen as useful to spread and enhance comparative legal knowledge in many Western scholarly and public debates. But these debates are not the only ones, not even in the West, and they do not cover the whole spectrum of legal reality that comparative law is called upon to understand.

2 A Challenge from Within

The failure of legal positivism can also be appreciated from a different and, as I said, interconnected perspective – which, once again, goes under-debated in mainstream discourses. The presence of a stratified multilevel legal system is discernible, not only outside the West but also within our own societies. I refer to the survival (or sometimes the rebirth) of different legal ‘layers’ in which rules flourish indifferent to, or even in contrast with, the official law of the state, and disputes are settled outside the official circuits of adjudication.Footnote 18

Even though incidentally, I have to stress that in speaking of these layers, I am not taking into account the pan-Western debate (and its positivistic inspiration) that concerns the role performed by so-called social norms as something different from what is strictly understood to be law. At the basis of the current analysis there is, as previously stated, the assumption that the law is the whole of the rules that a given community (regardless of its size and social or economic sophistication) adopts to govern itself. Once this definition of the legal phenomenon is taken, any distinction between legal and social rules disappears as long as the rules at issue correspond to the above-mentioned requisites.Footnote 19

For the purposes of this chapter, the existing legal stratification in the West can be roughly introduced by taking into consideration four layers of rules. One, and only one, of our legal horizons is contained in what can be named as the ‘ordinary official layer’, to which Western legal discourse and legal education usually refer. It is the stratum where we encounter positive, or would-be positive (as is the case for most soft law initiatives) legal rules – that is, the rules enacted, or intended to be acknowledged, by an officially recognized authority and usually carved into national and local regulations, treaties, or other international law instruments, and worked out in judicial decisions derived from the same texts. It is only here that behaviours, entitlements, and disputes are controlled by official law and official circuits of adjudication. The other levels of legal experience are grounded in different rules. Under the legal skies where the lodestar is not state law, a layer that regulates common situations is the one relying on rules and tools of dispute settlement that have a customary origin and that are inspired by the principle of ‘personal authority’. This is the layer to which most Western family and kinship relationships belong.Footnote 20 Another layer is also given order by the ‘unofficial’ rules and ‘unofficial’ adjudication devices, but these rules and devices have, at least in part, a different nature and origin. They are rooted in communitarian customs and their enforcement is guaranteed by extra-kinship factors.Footnote 21 This is something that in the West can be observed largely in the exercise of property rights (especially outside urban contexts),Footnote 22 in the settlement of small disputes arising in everyday life,Footnote 23 and in the management of small businessesFootnote 24 – even though the ‘small value’ cap seems irrelevant to many.Footnote 25 The last layer that deserves mention here is the one occupied by transnational business and financial law fields – where the rules applied are mostly provided by private or semi-private international bodies, or are the result of customs developed over time by commercial and financial practices. This is a layer where business actors may not only operate by their own rules but also adopt ‘home-made’ regimes for settling disputes, establishing their own courts and nominating their own judges.Footnote 26

While this is not the place to discuss either the internal fabric of all these layersFootnote 27 or the (variable) degree of consistency between unofficial rules and state law, one has to note that unofficial legal layers have always existed in the West.Footnote 28 It is only the long-standing positivistic attitude of legal education and scholarship that has largely obscured the phenomenon in its treatises and books, as well as in its teaching methods and programmes, and consequently, in judicial culture and decisions.Footnote 29 These layers exist and persist for many reasons. The most popular of these reasons centres on the notions of functionalism and rationalism, although there is no real contrast between the two. The former is grounded in the idea that people respect unofficial rules because of reciprocity and the expectation of social gain.Footnote 30 The latter is embraced by those who wish to highlight how compliance with unofficial rules is in direct relation to their utility, rationality, and efficiency.Footnote 31

IV An Unassuming Lesson

What is certain is that taking into account the stratification of the law proves to be extremely fruitful for acquiring the necessary awareness about the legal relationships to be understood and dealt with, whatever the perspective – domestic, international, or comparative. Thus, from the specific comparative law viewpoint, the final question becomes the following: Given that a legal system is not a monolithic institution but a dynamic entity, and that each of its layers stands in a different relation to the pressure (due to prestige or other driving factors) coming from the other layers – domestic, foreign, or internationalFootnote 32 – what cognitive dimension is left if we overlook the relevant phenomena, which, in addition to ‘official’ law, deeply affect the living law of different societies? The answer lies in the need for a multilayered, pluralistic, and comparative perspective.Footnote 33 Such a perspective would help call into question traditional understandings of the legal dimension(s), connect mainstream visions with the broader social contexts producing them, and unveil the cultural assumptions that underlie and support the operations of law mechanisms. To delve beyond conventional wisdom into the cultural and operational frameworks in which all law operates and is embedded would be both promising and challenging for this perspective. But carrying on this perspective requires legal scholars to be equipped with far-sighted views, cultural tolerance, and a modest sense of self-worth, precisely the qualities for which Glenn’s personality and scholarship are remarkable.

V Legal Tradition: A Lesson of Open-Mindedness

Potentially less controversial, but definitely crucial in Patrick Glenn’s Weltanschauung, is the notion of tradition. He sees it as a ‘bran-tub’ of information,Footnote 34 available to individuals, communities, and societies as they make choices for themselves. In Glenn’s view, historically the legal traditions have always exchanged information, to the point that sometimes it can be difficult to identify a given piece of information with just one tradition,Footnote 35 even though it is easy for a person who identifies with any given tradition to retrieve and use information from another traditionFootnote 36 – and scholarly findings show how often people live astride traditions and identities, and retrieve, enjoy, and exploit information coming from their multifarious backgrounds.Footnote 37

If one takes seriously the idea of tradition as a relentless flow of information, and that the way this flow arranges itself in a given society forges the latter through the dynamics of individuals’ mindsets and preferences, then three important consequences follow.

First, in any society, the strength of identitarian forces of all groupings, such as those based on language, religion, and family ties, should be seen as contingent and dependent upon the kind of information available in the given tradition and to the different groupings. Second, one should acknowledge that every time the flow of a tradition comes into contact with another, they both exchange information and grow to challenge and/or incorporate one another. Glenn goes as far as to underline that ‘[t]he conclusion that tradition is the controlling element in determining social identity means that there are no fundamentally different, totally irreconcilable social identities in the world.’Footnote 38 This is an issue which I will come back to later, but a broad notion of tradition is crucial to Glenn’s way of understanding law, because it captures elements that tend to be missed by legal theorists who analyse law in abstract terms (such as command, norms, rules, and principles). What they particularly miss, in Glenn’s view,Footnote 39 is the sway of the past and its relentless dynamics.Footnote 40 The third consequence is that isolation of a legal tradition is wholly exceptional. Most diffusion has been informal rather than formal; most influence involves exchange or reciprocity rather than movement in one direction only; the main agents of change are not always governments but can equally well be individuals and groups such as merchants, jurists, and emigrants (including colonizers). From this perspective – it should go without saying, mais cela va peut-être mieux en le disant – one can smoothly appreciate how common law and civil law traditions are only one part of the story in the context of world history, but also acknowledge that these are traditions that have been as much importers as exporters of each otherFootnote 41 and of other traditions.Footnote 42

Further, Glenn points out that no tradition can exercise full control over what information is preserved and captured in the future, therefore implicitly but straightforwardly rejecting the post-Enlightenment tendency to treat tradition and change as antinomies.Footnote 43 This is a valuable lesson in assessing the mainstream representation of legal globalization phenomena, that is, the view according to which legal globalization[s] should be seen as a progressive march towards the uniformity of legal institutions and rules, thereby discarding history and geography, because the past is given and the future is (common, and) given too.Footnote 44 Patrick Glenn’s open-mindedness, the capacity of including and composing apparent antinomies in a breathing vision of the reality to come, is a(nother) fundamental lesson to be learned by everyone.

VI Legal Conciliation

As I have mentioned, according to Glenn, there are ‘no fundamentally different, totally irreconcilable social identities in the world’.Footnote 45 At the same time, he is well aware that the imposition of rules and institutions from above or outside the given legal system often reveals itself to be a lose–lose game.Footnote 46 This is why he prefers discussing the problem from the perspective of a possible reconciliation of laws, a process Glenn sees as grounded in ‘accepting (not tolerating) the major, complex legal traditions of the world (all of them)’, and in ‘seeing all traditions as one’s own, in some measure, since each is dependent on the others’.Footnote 47 As to this sort of cultural (messianic?) revolution, I am both more sceptical and pessimistic than Patrick Glenn. Beyond being unavoidably selective and asymmetrical (we cannot pretend these ‘reconciling’ attitudes could develop with the same modalities, at the same time, across all ‘major’ legal traditions), I think legal reconciliation’s value and desirability depend, among many other things, on the way it is carried out and on the potential scores (and qualities) of the winners and losers.

Three remarks are in order here. First, anthropologists teach us that the majority of societies develop their own expansive ethnocentrism, to be understood as the tendency to consider one’s form of civilization better than others, and therefore to try to spread it as much as possible and expand and strengthen one’s own interests.Footnote 48 The West was, is, and will be no exception. Second, lessons from the past and the present show us how often initiatives targeting from outside the transformation of others’ laws lack the support of adequate comparative law means, required to meet the basic needs of contextualization for the solutions to be applied in the new, or newly shaped settings. Third, in assessing these endeavours, one should differentiate the various possible levels of analysis. The evaluation of the cultural aspects is one thing, the evaluation of the applicative aspects is, or may be, another.

On a cultural level, those who, like Glenn,Footnote 49 pay due attention to the teachings of history know how colonization, one of the most evident phenomena of the compression of legal diversity, first determined a process of propagation of the European model within the colonies, albeit with limited effectiveness and ultimately a critical reaction to that forced diffusion (although not necessarily to the whole of its contents). Moreover, in the language of the students of traditional models, the superimposition of foreign models – irrespective of the wishes of the local elites, who often have been and still are educated in the West – is mostly seen as a tool of de-culturalization, of trampling on the weaker identity, and of destruction of possible meanings.Footnote 50

On the operative level, other evaluations are needed. Here, it is critical to recognize – in the wake of Glenn and many othersFootnote 51 – that not all differences from the Western paradigms are to be celebrated, (1) because many of them could be the result of customary rules that a large part of the involved society would well do without (one can think of the developments taking place in relation to female genital mutilation or polygamy in (some of) the concerned societiesFootnote 52); and/or (2) because keeping in place those differences can be very costly in terms of Western-style economic development (assuming the latter is the model to be pursued): It suffices to think of patterns of distributing land and other entitlements according to religious, clannish, gendered, or political criteria.Footnote 53 Further, one has to acknowledge that legal uniformity processes can be carried out through the spontaneous acceptance of the same body of rules by different groups of law users, producing effective and widespread transnational compliance without imposition from above or outsideFootnote 54 – the ‘lex mercatoria’,Footnote 55 the rules regulating international diamond traffic,Footnote 56 or the international water policy agreements,Footnote 57 are good examples in this respect.

VII The Lesson of Optimism

What the foregoing observations allow one to better understand is the reason for which the circulation of Western legal models has so often been ineffective and inefficient outside the Western world. On the one hand, one should be aware that the needs to be met and the tools to be used when transplanting or ‘importing’ any rule are factors that vary considerably, depending on the area of the law in question, and on the area of the world one targets – finance is not welfare, healthcare is not commerce, and what is necessary to make any reform in the matter of procedural law effective is quite different if one considers the case of, for example, France as compared to Burundi.Footnote 58 On the other hand, the lack of a common cultural background shared by law-makers and law-takers,Footnote 59 and the neglect of the essential involvement of the local law-users – what Patrick Glenn would call the lack of a critical mass of information exchange – may make any transplantation process an exercise in mere wishful thinking, or may have its implementation on the ground costing (economically, politically, and socially) an excessive price in terms of time, money, and energy.Footnote 60

Patrick Glenn would subscribe to the abovementioned remarks, perhaps. Yet, his attitude is more ‘optimistic’. He is not overly concerned with expansive ethnocentrism;Footnote 61 in his view, conflictual, oppressive, and violent encounters between legal traditions appear to be nothing but an unavoidable moment of legal traditions’ everlasting cohabitation and interchange. Seen this way, dominance efforts are a perennial ‘form of corruption’ affecting all major legal traditions in their relentless survival dynamics – dynamics in which the winner of today might well be the loser of tomorrow. This is why Glenn invites the readers to see ‘the major, complex legal traditions of the world . . . as mutually interdependent, such that the loss of any of them would be a loss to all the others, which would then lose a major source of support, or at least of self-interrogation’.Footnote 62 This would be the first step for ‘acting positively to sustain diversity in law’:Footnote 63 a process that could ‘improve communication between lawyers of the world . . . enhance the prospect for peaceful settlement of disputes’ but also ‘enhance the legal mission.’Footnote 64

It may be that Glenn’s optimism stems once more from his ‘human-friendly’ and bright personality, or from growing up within a culture (the Canadian one) that has maintained over time the values of diversity and coherence, holding together diverse viewpoints while striving for a common identity. It may also be that this kind of culture – what Glenn would right away call ‘tradition’Footnote 65 – have something to teach everyone about how to cope with the legal challenges of an increasingly transnational world. Certainly, Patrick Glenn taught us a lot about how to try to understand all of this. Merci, Patrick!


1 H Patrick Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law (5th edn, OUP 2014) (hereafter Glenn, LTW).

2 Footnote Ibid, 60–94, 98–129, 180–215, 287–315, 319–56. See also, among many others, Masaji Chiba, ‘Legal Pluralism in Mind: A Non-Western View’ in Hanne Petersen and Henrik Zahle (eds), Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of Pluralism in Law (Dartmouth 1995) 7183; Masaji Chiba, ‘Three Dichotomies of Law: An Analytical Scheme of Legal Culture’ (1987) 1 Tokai L Rev 279; Michel Alliot, ‘Les transferts du droit ou la double illusion’ in Michel Alliot (ed), Le droit et le service public au miroir de l’anthropologie (Karthala 2003); Franz von Benda-Beckmann, ‘Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?’ (2002) 47 J Leg Plur 37, 4852; Jorge L Esquirol, ‘The Failed Law of Latin America’ (2008) 56 Am J Comp L 75. See also Michele Graziadei, Chapter 5 in this volume; Ahmed Fekry Ibrahim, Chapter 9 in this volume.

3 The latter assumption is still widespread outside comparative law circles. An excellent example of this assumption is Frederick Schauer, The Force of Law (CUP 2015). On this point, see also Martin Krygier, Chapter 6 in this volume.

4 On the connected views that overlap the notion of state with that of nation state, it may be worth recalling that

contemporary legal and political theory largely assumes the existence of ‘nation-states’ which would represent the confluence of a nation (a people homogeneous in religion, language and ethnicity) with the legal and political structures of a state. In reality there never has been, and there never will be, a nation-state. Even the smallest state in the world today, Tuvalu, has a diverse population.

H Patrick Glenn, ‘International and Foreign Factors in Legal Reform: Risk and Opportunities’ in Mauro Bussani and Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler (eds), Comparisons in Legal Development: The Impact of Foreign and International Law on National Legal Systems (Schulthess 2016) 224. See also H Patrick Glenn, The Cosmopolitan State (OUP 2013) 8692, 98101.

5 Cf Michel Doucet and Jacques Vanderlinden (eds), La réception des systèmes juridiques: Implantation et destin (Bruylant 1994); William Graham Sumner, Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals (Ginn 1906); Lon L Fuller, ‘Human Interaction and the Law’ in Robert Paul Wolff (ed), The Rule of Law (Simon & Schuster 1971); Masaji Chiba, ‘Introduction’ in Masaji Chiba (ed), Asian Indigenous Law in Interaction with Received Law (KPI 1986); Masaji Chiba, ‘Conclusion’ in Chiba, Asian Indigenous Law; von Benda-Beckmann, ‘Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?’ (Footnote n 2) 48–52; Werner Menski, ‘The Uniform Civil Code Debate in Indian Law: New Developments and Changing Agenda’ (2008) 9 Germ LJ 211, 216–44; Rodolfo Sacco, ‘The Sub-Saharan Legal Tradition’ in Mauro Bussani and Ugo Mattei (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Comparative Law (CUP 2012) 314–21. Cf Eugen Ehrlich, Grundlegung der Soziologie des Rechts (reprinted from 1st edn 1913, Duncker & Humblot 1929) 4954, 315–19; Santi Romano, The Legal Order (Mariano Croce tr, Routledge 2017), translated from Santi Romano, L’ordinamento giuridico (E. Spoerri 1918).

6 For an analysis revealing how some of the intimate and long-standing features of the Western legal tradition may work as the most reliable criteria to understand what is, and what is not, the ‘West’, see Mauro Bussani, El derecho de Occidente: Geopolítica de las reglas globales (rev edn, Marcial Pons 2018) chs 10–13, translated from Mauro Bussani, Il diritto dell’Occidente: Geopolitica delle regole globali (Maria Elena Sánchez Jordán tr, Einaudi 2010) 60, 6972; Mauro Bussani, ‘Deglobalizing Rule of Law and Democracy: Hunting Down Rhetoric Through Comparative Law’ (2019) 67 Am J Comp L 701, 704–739.

7 Glenn, LTW (Footnote n 1) 142–47, 159–61, 272–79.

8 See also Wolfgang J Mommsen and Jaap A de Moor (eds), European Expansion and Law: The Encounter of European and Indigenous Law in 19th- and 20th-Century Africa and Asia (Berg 1992); Chiba, Asian Indigenous Law (Footnote n 5); Tom W Bennett, ‘Comparative Law and African Customary Law’ in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (2nd edn, OUP 2019).

9 On the role that non-official rules play in achieving social order, see the authors cited in note 5.

10 Eg, Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Mute Law’ (1995) 43 Am J Comp L 455; Doucet and Vanderlinden (Footnote n 5); Norbert Rouland, Anthropologie juridique (Presses Universitaires de France 1988); Oscar G Chase, Law, Culture and Ritual: Disputing Systems in Cross-Cultural Context (NYU Press 2005) 3046, 94124; Richard L Abel (ed), The Politics of Informal Justice (Academic Press 1982); Werner Menski, Comparative Law in the Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa (2nd edn, CUP 2006) 3; Chiba, ‘Introduction’ (Footnote n 5); Chiba, ‘Conclusion’ (Footnote n 5); von Benda-Beckmann, ‘Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?’ (Footnote n 2); Roger Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory (Ashgate 2006) 112–16, 155–59.

11 For example, among many others, Sabino Cassese, ‘Introduction’ in Sabino Cassesse (ed), Research Handbook on Global Administrative Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 411; Jan H Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational and Comparative Commercial, Financial and Trade Law (3rd edn, Hart 2007) ix; José E Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (OUP 2005) 217–68, 608–20; Benedict W Kingsbury, ‘The International Legal Order’ (2005) NYU Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers 14 <>; Francis G Snyder, ‘Governing Globalization’ in Michael B Likosky (ed), Transnational Legal Processes: Globalization and Power Disparities (Butterworths 2002) 7197; John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (CUP 2000) 488; Gunther Teubner, ‘“Global Bukowina”: Legal Pluralism in the World Society’ in Gunther Teubner (ed), Global Law without a State (Dartmouth 1997).

12 See also Neil Walker, Chapter 15 in this volume.

13 ‘The state, as frozen accident, is beginning to melt, though the process may be a very long one’: Glenn, LTW (Footnote n 1) 53.

14 All in all, the state risks revealing itself as a valuable structure, but only if understood in terms of path dependency. On the one hand, the state works as an entity that is useful for the implementation and the protection of global orders; on the other hand, it appears to be a structure that is far less costly to keep as is (if necessary, eroding its borders from the outside) rather than substituting it in the short term.

15 See, eg, Sabino Cassese, The Global Polity: Global Dimensions of Democracy and the Rule of Law (Global Law Press 2012) 1522; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press 2004) 1215, 266–69; Donald B King, ‘The Unknown World Government: Some Very Recent Commercial Law Developments and Gaps’ (2005) 23 Pa St Int’l L Rev 535; Achim Hurrelmann and others, ‘Is There a Legitimation Crisis of the Nation-State?’ in Stephan Leibfried and Michael Zürn (eds), Transformations of the State? (CUP 2005); Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (CUP 1999) 336415; Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990–1992 (Blackwell 1990). See also Stanley Aronowitz and Peter Bratsis (eds), Paradigm Lost: State Theory Reconsidered (University of Minnesota Press 2002); Susan Marks, ‘Empire’s Law’ (2003) 10 Ind J Glob Leg Stud 449; Antonio Negri, ‘Postmodern Global Governance and the Critical Legal Project’ (2005) 16 Law & Crit 27, 3032.

16 On the different ‘levels of law’ – global, international, regional, transnational, inter-communal, territorial state, sub-state, and non-state – see the classification offered in William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Butterworths 2000) 139.

17 Jürgen Basedow, ‘Comparative Law and Its Clients’ (2014) 62 Am J Comp L 821, 835–36.

18 A thorough analysis of the issues dealt with in this section can be found in Mauro Bussani, ‘Strangers in the Law: Lawyers’ Law and the Other Legal Dimensions’ (2019) 40 Cardozo L Rev 3125. For the purposes of this chapter, one can see, on the presence, in the West, of multiple normative orders that push litigation to the periphery of dispute processing, eg, Stewart Macaulay, ‘Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures and the Complexities of Contract’ (1977) 11 L & Soc’y Rev 507; Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working Class Americans (University of Chicago Press 1990) 3763, 88109; Norbert Rouland, Aux confins du droit (Odile Jacob 1991); Herbert Jacob, ‘The Elusive Shadow of the Law’ (1992) 26 L & Soc’y Rev 565. Cf W Michael Reisman, Law in Brief Encounters (Yale University Press 1999); Daniel Jutras, ‘The Legal Dimensions of Everyday Life’ (2001) 16 Can JL & Soc’y 45.

19 Compare the distinction between ‘law’ and ‘legislation’ made in Friedrich A Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Vol 1: Rules and Order (University of Chicago Press 1973) 3551, 7274, 124–26. According to Hayek, ‘law’ belongs to the category of endogenous orders growing or originating from within a given society – ie, growing spontaneously through rules which people live in accordance with – because of mutual expectations, whereas ‘legislation’ belongs to the category of exogenous orders imposed from the outside or from above, with a view of influencing the endogenous rules when they evolve in a direction which is regarded to be wrong or one-sided by a democratically elected legislature.

20 Eg, Robert C Ellickson, The Household: Informal Order around the Hearth (Princeton University Press 2008); Lawrence M Friedman and Grant M Hayden, American Law: An Introduction (3rd edn, OUP 2017) 20; Elizabeth S Scott, ‘Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage’ (2000) 86 Va L Rev 1901, 1903; Eric A Posner, Law and Social Norms (Harvard University Press 2000) 7276. See also Eric A Feldman, The Ritual of Rights in Japan (CUP 2000) 357; Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation (2nd edn, CUP 2002) 426–34; Jutras (Footnote n 18) 45–51.

21 In both this and the aforementioned ‘kinship’ layer, one can easily observe that rewards usually amount to goods, services, or obligations to which a person would assign a positive (economic or non-economic) value. Likewise, punishments actualize in goods, services, and obligations to which a person would assign a negative (economic or non-economic) value. See Gillian K Hadfield and Barry R Weingast, ‘Law without the State: Legal Attributes and the Coordination of Decentralized Collective Punishment’ (2013) 1 JL & Courts 35; Barak D Richman, ‘Norms and Law: Putting the Horse before the Cart’ (2012) 62 Duke LJ 739, 747; Lisa Bernstein, ‘Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions’ (2001) 99 Mich L Rev 1724, 1776.

22 Robert C Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard University Press 1991); Antonio Gambaro, ‘Perspectives on the Codification of the Law of Property: An Overview’ (1997) 5 ERPL 497. See also Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (Basic Books 2000).

23 Ellickson, Order without Law (Footnote n 22) 50, 87, 185, 209. See also Mauro Bussani and Marta Infantino, ‘Tort Law and Legal Cultures’ (2015) 63 Am J Comp L 77, 8390.

24 Stewart Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’ (1963) 28 Am Soc Rev 55. See also Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, Making the Law Work for Everyone: Working Group Reports, vol 2 (Toppan Printing 2008) 196267; Janet Tai Landa, Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity: Beyond the New Institutional Economics of Ethnic Trading Networks, Contract Law, and Gift-Exchange (University of Michigan Press 1994).

25 In many fields, the ‘small value’ cap is actually irrelevant. A good example is the huge amount of money involved in daily transactions that are fully controlled by the unofficial rules worked out by the cotton and diamond industries in the United States and elsewhere. See Barak D Richman, Stateless Commerce: The Diamond Network and the Persistence of Relational Exchange (Harvard University Press 2017); Lisa Bernstein, ‘Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry’ (1992) 21 JLS 115; Bernstein, ‘Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry’ (Footnote n 21) 1724. ‘[E]mpirical studies have called attention to the relative insignificance of formal contracts and enforcement mechanisms in the interaction of business partners’: Jutras (Footnote n 18) 55. It is worth recalling that the same kind of allegiance to extra-kinship, customary, and unofficial rules may be found in the ‘global law’ arenas and in the body of the state itself – in the latter case they may be termed praxis or constitutional conventions. See the references in Bussani, El derecho de Occidente (Footnote n 6) 93–109, 123–40. See also David J Bederman, Custom as a Source of Law (CUP 2010) 90ff (on the survival and flourishing of customary unofficial practices in US separation-of-powers constitutional law); Robert M Cover, ‘Nomos and Narrative’ (1983) 97 Harv L Rev 4, 31 (discussing communities committed to different ‘constitutional visions’); Peter M Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy: Study of Interpersonal Relations in Two Government Agencies (2nd edn, University of Chicago Press 1963) 183206 (for a field study of bureaucratic institutions, and their formal and informal mechanisms of control, adaptation, and change).

26 Jan H Dalhuisen, ‘Legal Orders and Their Manifestation: The Operation of the International Commercial and Financial Legal Order and Its Lex Mercatoria’ (2006) 24 Berk J Int’l L 129; Chris Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule-Making in the 21st Century (2nd edn, CUP 2015); Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks’ in Michael Byers (ed), The Role of Law in International Politics, Essays in International Law (OUP 2000) 202. For a historical overview (from the mid-thirteenth to the mid-twentieth century), see Mary Elizabeth Basile and others (eds), Lex Mercatoria and Legal Pluralism: A Late Thirteen Century Treatise and Its Afterlife (Ames Foundation 1998).

27 See the works cited in Footnote notes 20Footnote 26.

28 Eg, Esin Örücü, ‘What Is a Mixed Legal System: Exclusion or Expansion?’ in Esin Örücü (ed), Mixed Legal Systems at New Frontiers (Wildy, Simmonds & Hill 2010); Roderick A Macdonald, ‘Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal Pluralism’ (1998) 15 Ariz J Int’l & Comp L 69; Avner Greif, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade (CUP 2006).

29 See also Helge Dedek, ‘Stating Boundaries: The Law, Disciplined’ in Helge Dedek and Shauna Van Praagh (eds), Stateless Law: Evolving Boundaries of a Discipline (Ashgate 2015) 9, 21; Gillian K Hadfield and Barry R Weingast, ‘Microfoundations of the Rule of Law’ (2014) 17 Ann Rev Pol Sci 21.

30 Eg, Marc Galanter, ‘Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society’ (1983) 31 UCLA L Rev 4; Posner (n 20) 171–77; Bronislaw Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (first published 1926, Routledge 1982) 4649; see also Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries (JH Burns and HLA Hart eds, University of London Press 1977) 231–34, as well as the end of note 31.

31 Ellickson, Order without Law (Footnote n 22) 283; John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff, ‘Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam’ (1999) 15 JL Econ & Org 637; Lewis A Kornhauser, ‘Are There Cracks in the Foundation of Spontaneous Order?’ (1992) 67 NYU L Rev 647; Anthony T Kronman, ‘Contract Law and the State of Nature’ (1985) 1 JL Econ & Org 5; Avinash K Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance (Princeton University Press 2004) 1011; Oliver E Williamson, ‘Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization’ (1993) 36 JL & Econ 453, 471–72. See also Cass R Sunstein, ‘Social Norms and Social Roles’ (1996) 96 Colum L Rev 903, 930.

On the top of different utilitarian reasons, general notions of reciprocal fairness and cooperation, mutual trust, common values, expectations, and beliefs may and actually do motivate participants in these groups. The legal upshot is the compliance with sets of rules that are grounded on the credibility of each one’s commitments to her self-interest and/or self-perceived identity as a member of a personal, business, professional community, or of a defined socio-demographic group with which one shares what matters in the given life setting. Abiding by their own law allows people to be loyal to their notions of honour and to their views of what they are and are doing, and assures them that they will preserve the opportunity to engage in future transactions, maintain a trustworthy reputation, and remain in good community standing with no, or very limited, need to resort to official law devices. See, eg, Barak D Richman, ‘How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchant in New York’ (2006) 31 L & Soc Inq 383, 393–94, 409; Bederman (Footnote n 25) passim, 179ff; Barbara Yngvesson, ‘Re-Examining Continuing Relations and the Law’ 1985 (1985) Wis L Rev 623; Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolutions of Institutions for Collective Action (CUP 1990) 184; Tom R Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton University Press 1990; republished 2006) 173. See also Bernstein, ‘Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry’ (Footnote n 21) 1745.

32 De Sousa Santos (Footnote n 20). See also Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, ‘Why Bother About Legal Pluralism? Analytical and Policy Questions: An Introductory Address’ in Keebet von Benda-Beckmann and Harald W Finkler (eds), Folk Law and Legal Pluralism: Societies in Transformation: Papers of the XIth International Congress (Department of Circumpolar Affairs 1999). See also the works cited in notes 25–26.

33 See also Jutras (Footnote n 18) 60–63.

34 Glenn, LTW (Footnote n 1) 13. See also Martin Krygier, Chapter 6 in this volume.

35 Glenn, LTW (Footnote n 1) 34–41.

36 Footnote Ibid, 13–16.

37 Eg, Thomas W Pogge, ‘Group Rights and Ethnicity’ in Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka (eds), Ethnicity and Group Rights (NYU Press 1997); Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Clarendon 1989) 186; Seyla Benhabib, Ian Shapiro, and Danilo Petranoviç, ‘Editor’s Introduction’ in Seyla Benhabib, Ian Shapiro, and Danilo Petranovic (eds), Identities, Affiliations, and Allegiances (CUP 2007); David Nelken, ‘Eugen Ehrlich, Living Law, and Plural Legalities’ (2008) 9(2) Theo Inq L 443. See also Seth Godin, Tribes: We Need You to Lead Us (Penguin 2008). Indeed, in the majority of known societies, Western and otherwise, individual identities are spread over different layers of affiliation dictated, for example, by religion, family, the local-national-transnational idiom, professional and economic choices (abstract and ideal or concrete and investment oriented), food choices, political options, and belonging to an ethnic or territorial community (the latter being obviously less common for those states whose borders were hetero-established, and thus are ethnically ‘imaginative’). These ‘affiliations’, though with varying intensity and range of action, express needs, orient the choices of individuals and groups, demand or postulate representativeness, require rules respectful of their identities, and circulate information about those needs and choices and about expected representation and rules. See Philip Selznick (with the collaboration of Philippe Nonet and Howard M Vollmer), Law, Society, and Industrial Justice (Russell Sage Foundation 1969) 271–73; Bernard Gert, ‘Loyalty and Morality’ in Sanford V Levinson, Joel Parker, and Paul Woodruff (eds), Nomos LIV. Loyalty (NYU Press 2013) 3, 6ff; Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Clarendon 1984) 199ff; Bussani, ‘Strangers in the Law’ (Footnote n 18). More generally, see Amartya Sen, Identity and Value: The Illusion of Destiny (Norton 2006); Martha C Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (CUP 2001).

38 Glenn, LTW (Footnote n 1) 39.

39 But see also John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western Europe and Latin America (2nd edn, Stanford University Press 1995) 2.

40 Glenn, LTW (Footnote n 1) 23–27.

41 Nicholas Kasirer, ‘Legal Education as Métissage’ (2003) 78 Tul L Rev 500.

42 Glenn, LTW (Footnote n 1) 134–36, 165–70, 175–76, 236–41.

43 In these terms, see William Twining, ‘Glenn on Tradition: An Overview’ (2006) 1 J Comp L 107, 111, in the wake of Martin Krygier, ‘Law as Tradition’ (1986) 5 Law & Phil 237, 239. See also Chapter 8 in this volume.

44 See the criticism of this view in Glenn, LTW (Footnote n 1) 272–79, 372–76.

46 Footnote Ibid, 275–83.

47 Footnote Ibid, 378.

48 See, eg, Serena Nanda and Richard L Warms, Cultural Anthropology (10th edn, Cengage Learning 2011) 10ff; Michael Herzfeld, Anthropology Through the Looking-Glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe (CUP 1989) 78, 97; Christoffel AO van Nieuwenhuijze, Culture and Development: The Prospects of an Afterthought (Institute of Social Studies 1983) passim and esp 3, 21, 24ff, 48; Edmund R Leach, ‘Etnocentrismi’ in Ruggiero Romano and others (eds), Enciclopedia Einaudi, vol 5 (Einaudi 1978); Edmund R Leach, ‘The Nature of War’ in Stephen Hugh-Jones and James Laidlaw (eds), The Essential Edmund Leach: Anthropology and Society (Yale University Press 1965) 354–56; Claude Lévi-Strauss, Race et histoire (Pouillon 1952); Tzvetan Todorov, Nous et les autres: La réflexion française sur la diversité humaine (Seuil 1989); Ernesto De Martino, La fine del mondo: Contributo all’analisi delle apocalissi culturali (Einaudi 2002) 394–98; Sumner (Footnote n 5) – Sumner is credited with coining the term ‘ethnocentrism’.

49 Glenn, LTW (Footnote n 1) 376–79.

50 See Rodolfo Sacco, ‘Diversity and Uniformity in the Law’ (2001) 49 Am J Comp L 171, 17879; Étienne Le Roy, ‘Quels projets de société pour les africains du XXIe siècle?’ in Camille Kuyu (ed), À la recherche du droit africain du XXIe siècle (Connaissances et Savoirs 2005); Steven Wilf, ‘The Invention of Legal Primitivism’ (2008) 10(2) Theo Inq L 485, 491. ‘It may be recalled that since the 16th century the development of capitalism has called for the destruction of differences in laws, standards, currencies, weights and measures, taxes, customs duties at the level of nation state’: Bhupinder S Chimni, ‘International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making’ (2004) 15 EJIL 1, 7. See also Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (CUP 2004) 5.

51 Glenn, LTW (Footnote n 1) 28–30.

52 Eg, Bussani, El derecho de Occidente (Footnote n 6) 55–56, 197–201; Radhika Coomaraswamy, ‘The Contemporary Challenges to International Human Rights’ in Scott Sheeran and Sir Nigel Rodley (eds), Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights Law (Routledge 2014) 132–33.

53 See the references to the vivid debate in Bussani, El derecho de Occidente (Footnote n 6) 104–09, 250–56.

54 Eg, David A Westbrook, ‘Theorizing the Diffusion of Law: Conceptual Difficulties, Unstable Imaginations, and the Effort to Think Gracefully Nonetheless’ (2006) 47 Harv Int’l LJ 489.

55 Karl Kroeschell, ‘Universales und partikulares Recht in der europäischen Rechtsgeschichte’ in Karl Kroeschell and Albrecht Cordes (eds), Vom nationalen zum transnationalen Recht (CF Müller 1995) 273; Helmut Coing, Europäisches Privatrecht, I: Älteres Gemeines Recht 1500 bis 1800 (CH Beck 1985) 519–23. See also Basile and others (Footnote n 26).

57 Eg, Philippe Cullet, ‘International Water Norms and Principles – Impacts on Law and Policy Development in India’ in Bussani and Heckendorn Urscheler (Footnote n 4).

58 Rather, what is evident is a paradox. Trade – which is based on exchanges and interests that may be closely entwined with local culture, rules, and needs – is largely controlled by a uniform official law adjudicated by a global official institution (the WTO) in the shadow of which a few powerful actors (the United States, the EU, China, the WB, the IMF, and the biggest multinationals) maintain an unofficial but extensive ability to manoeuvre. Finance, which thrives on exchanges, interests, and technical matrices broadly common to all the operators on the planet, has been governed to date by an unofficial law made and shared by the global financial actors, and by official laws largely depending on the local (national/regional) regulations – whose possible ‘capture’ by big business actors is a phenomenon that deserves extensive discussion. Eg, Marver J Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (Princeton University Press 1955); Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, ‘The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture’ (1991) 106 QJ Econ 1089; Chris Brummer, ‘Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance – And Not Trade’ (2010) 13 J Int’l Econ L 623.

59 As now realized even by the World Bank in its programs for legal and judicial reforms: see Hassane Cissé, ‘Justice Reform: The Experience of the World Bank’ in Bussani and Heckendorn Urscheler (Footnote n 4) 24–26.

60 Eg, Stephen Golub, ‘The Legal Empowerment Alternative’ in Thomas Carothers (ed), Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: In Search of Knowledge (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2006); Mary McClymont and Stephen Golub (eds), Many Roads to Justice: The Law Related Work of the Ford Foundation Grantees Around the World (Ford Foundation 2000); Michael R Anderson, ‘Access to Justice and Legal Process: Making Legal Institutions Responsive to Poor People in LDCs’ (2003) IDS Working Paper 178 <>; Julia Eckert and others (eds), Law against the State: Ethnographic Forays into Law’s Transformations (CUP 2012).

61 See Footnote note 50 and corresponding text.

62 Glenn, LTW (Footnote n 1) 378.

65 Footnote Ibid, 73, 163. See also Esin Örücü, Chapter 4 in this volume.

You have Access

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the or variations. ‘’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats