This is not an optimistic book. Throughout the preceding chapters, we have emphasized the enormous challenges associated with building the rule of law after military interventions. The very concept of the “rule of law” is elusive to begin with, and striving for the rule of law requires a constant juggling act on the part of interveners. It is little wonder that so many past efforts in this area have been so disappointing.

But this book is not entirely pessimistic, either. Although the challenges are daunting, we are convinced that modest successes are possible. If the international community has delivered less than was promised in Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Afghanistan, people in these societies are nonetheless probably better off than if there had been no outside interventions and no subsequent rule of law programs. In each case, serious problems remain: security is tenuous, economic development has been slow, serious rights abuses continue, political and legal institutions have struggled to achieve credibility and effectiveness, and many abuses have gone unpunished and uncompensated. Nonetheless, in each case, things could be far worse.

The moral, we think, is that it is possible for outside interventions to help foster the rule of law, but only if interveners fully understand the nature and magnitude of the task – and only if interveners understand that the role outsiders can play is crucial but limited.