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194 - Rules (two concepts of)

from R

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2015

Jon Mandle
Affiliation:
State University of New York, Albany
David A. Reidy
Affiliation:
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
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Summary

John Rawls is usually thought of as a stalwart critic of utilitarianism in all of its forms. It might therefore come as a surprise that Rawls devoted an entire early essay to providing utilitarianism with philosophical ammunition with which to deflect one of the most common objections to that theory, which is that, given certain empirical sets of circumstances, it can require morally quite counterintuitive behavior. As a theory which views the good-making properties of actions as residing solely in their consequences, and which views consequences in a purely aggregative way, utilitarianism can yield prescriptions that are startling in their distributive implications.

Utilitarianisms since John Stuart Mill have responded to this concern by claiming that the theory is best thought of as applying not to individual actions, but rather to rules. “Rule-utilitarianism” would have us focus not on the consequences of each particular instance of a kind of behavior X, but rather on a general practice of X-ing. Many counterintuitive consequences are thought to dissolve if the focus of the theory is changed in this manner. What may be justified in the individual case (lying, deceit, torture, etc.) ceases to be so justified when a general rule recommending this kind of behavior is envisaged.

Rule-utilitarianism has been viewed as inadequate by orthodox utilitarian such as J. J. C. Smart. They have accused rule-utilitarians of being “rule-fetishists,” that is, of cleaving to rules even in individual cases in which the agent can plainly see that breaking the rule would best conduce to general utility.

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014

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