W. D. Falk’s (1947–48) address to the Aristotelian Society – delivered April 19, 1948 – marks a turning point in twentieth-century metaethics. Whereas early twentieth-century metaethics was characterized by questions regarding the semantic and metaphysical commitments of moral terms, fin de siècle metaethics has been largely concerned with normativity more broadly construed. While this shift is generally traced to the 1970s or later, I argue that the beginnings of the metanormative turn can be found much earlier in the work of philosophers such as Falk and Frankena. In fact, there is a sense in which there never was any “turn” to the metanormative; rather, the metaethical and the metanormative have always been two independent yet intertwined branches within twentieth-century ethical theory. That said, the metanormative literature of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century has been characterized by a tendency to conceive of the normative fundamentally in terms of reasons for action, which in turn has shaped how metanormative questions regarding the authority of morality are framed. After documenting the turn to reasons, I end with a discussion of some recent alternatives to the “reasons-first” approach to these questions.