Andras Gyorgy Kovács researched the effectiveness of competition sanctions from the perspective of an administrative judge. Undertakings in breach of competition law rules are most likely expected to be fined. His hypothesis, ,to be examined through the courts’ case law, is that the level of competition fines is significantly higher than that of criminal penalties. Nevertheless, it is not unusual for the very same undertaking to be reinvestigated by the competition authority for a second or even third time. It seems that the expected legal policy aim of fines in competition matters, i.e. the individual and general prevention of anticompetitive practices, cannot be achieved in all cases. His chapter aims at identifying the reasons thereof and presenting a number of conclusions, to be drawn from the Hungarian administrative courts’ jurisprudence, in respect of the effectiveness of the imposition of fines. He argues that judicial case law can resolve some of the efficiency problems, while others require modification of the legislation. As regards repeated infringements, evaluating this as an aggravating factor may be used in an effective and reassuring way when imposing a fine. He argues for laws which stipulate the imposition of fines proportionate to the infringing undertakings’ income and assets.