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4 - Negotiating in the Early GATT

Norms, Rules and the US Tariff Schedule

from Part II - New Insight from the Early Times

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 May 2017

Manfred Elsig
Affiliation:
World Trade Institute, Universität Bern, Switzerland
Bernard Hoekman
Affiliation:
European University Institute, Florence
Joost Pauwelyn
Affiliation:
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
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Chapter
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Assessing the World Trade Organization
Fit for Purpose?
, pp. 75 - 96
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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